Abstract
Using the accountability framework developed by Romzek, Dubnick, and colleagues, this article considers the creation and operation of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA’s short duration and the difficult circumstances of Iraq combined to pose fundamental challenges to the normal expectations for accountable behavior of a federal agency. With minimal plans in place for governing Post-invasion Iraq, the CPA had little structure and few institutional expectations to influence its behavior. This lack of guidance, combined with the CPA’s de facto reporting relationships and noncareer staff, led to the maximization of political accountability, whereas professional accountability was secondary.
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