Ukraine and an Integrated Deterrence Strategy

Journal of Policy Analysis and ManagementVolume 3, Issue 2 p. 314-315 Book Note Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s, report of the European security study. New York: St. Martin's, 1983, 260 pp. Price: $9.95 paper First published: Winter 1984 https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.4050030237AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditWechat No abstract is available for this article. Volume3, Issue2Winter 1984Pages 314-315 RelatedInformation

This chapter examines the possibilities of moving towards conventional deterrence in Europe. It examines two contingent factors: firstly, what should be the goals in transforming North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) strategy and, secondly, the military balance of conventional forces in Europe. After 1950s NATO’s basic strategy for responding to an invasion by the Warsaw Pact has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. This strategy of flexible response envisaged that the West would respond with nuclear weapons if a Soviet conventional attack succeeded in breaking through NATO’s defences. Cordesman’s analysis starts from his belief that NATO itself has a tendency to underestimate its own strengths and abilities: NATO is unique in its tendency to underestimate its strengths. Whilst Armoured Division Equivalents provides an indication of qualitative differences in ground combat forces, there are also significant qualitative factors in the balance of air power. There are some 1,750 NATO combat aircraft presently based in the United States and Canada.

The growing and diversifying threats of Russian unconventional warfare are directed at states outside of Ukraine. These activities contribute to the wider use of information operations and active measures to destabilize and undermine opposing states. Russia's approach has been remarkably consistent for decades. The overall approach is to use information operations and active measures to polarize the target population, mobilize factions to support allied elites, and paralyze support for opposing elements of the country's leadership. Human intelligence operations /HUMINT/ are used to try to capture the elite by offering help to politicians who support Russian interests. Finally, violence can be used to escalate political tensions to the point of crisis or in other contexts to isolate a captive elite. This paper emphasizes: First, although Russia's capacity for covert violence in Europe has been disrupted by the exposure of its personnel and the dismantling of elements of its support apparatus, the Russian state is actively working to rebuild that capacity. Second, the intention to achieve this reflects a broader vision to widen the opening of geostrategic competition with the West, which could be manifested in Europe but is already being carried out to a large extent in Africa. Third, the kaleidoscopic and chaotic lines of effort (example of Kadyrov) carried out by the Russian special services - if left unchecked - will become increasingly mutually supportive and harder to disrupt. Russian approaches are often crude with a series of failures. Institutional and operational security are often weak, although the current process of restructuring and reform may strengthen the ability to keep operations undetected. In the Russian special services, there is a systemic problem with the lack of independent analysis. Those charged with carrying out the operation are primarily responsible for assessing its possible success and therefore tend to overestimate their capabilities. Nevertheless, the Russians are persistent and, if not stopped, failures such as those experienced in Mozambique turn into successes as seen in Mali. Europe is facing a series of elections this year, and the initial chaotic implementation of active measures is gradually becoming more coherent under the close attention of the Russian presidential administration. Faced with this threat, Western nations must realize that undermining the human intelligence activity/HUMINT/ that supports unconventional warfare methods is critical to degrading Russia's ability to use the techniques described in this paper. In this context, countering disinformation - although important - results in less success than cutting off Russian access to and influence over elites. This can be achieved by exposing its activities and arresting its agents and intelligence officers. Strengthening counterintelligence activities in this sense is an important priority. The risk is that the effort to contain Russia becomes McCarthyist paranoia. As many of Russia's unconventional operations are self-defeating, countering Russian unconventional warfare must be based on careful, selective, intelligence based targeting. This is why it is essential to have a broad understanding of Russian forms and methods; protects the state from jumping into the shadows. Ultimately, Russia's progress in Africa is the formation of the "Roskolonia Entente". On the one hand, it is as Russian officials admit internally a colonial project to gain control over African governments and exploit the continent's natural resources. On the other hand, the Entente or informal and friendly alliance between factions - reflects the fact that Russia has been called upon to take that role, and juntas that invite Russians often have significant popular support, at least among the majority ethnic groups in their countries. Russia's mandate is a consequence of the West's strategic neglect and its failure to address the problems facing its partners. Russia may also fail to do so, but for now frustration with the West in both Africa and the Middle East is high. The point is that as Western states focus on rebuilding their conventional deterrence in Europe, strategic documents emphasizing the nature of global competition are justified. However, Western countries fail to compete. This has to change. Russia uses unconventional warfare to advance its vision of a multipolar world order. This poses a threat far beyond Ukraine. It is of crucial importance that the Western countries face this challenge.

It is not yet clear that NATO has either a serious strategy for responding to the Russian threat or the capabilities to back up such a strategy.

Journal Article Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: proposals for the 1980s. Report of the European Security Study (ESECS) Get access Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: proposals for the 1980s. Report of the European Security Study (ESECS). London: Macmillan. 1983. 260 pp. Index. £17.50. Pb.: £5.95. Martin Edmonds Martin Edmonds 1University of Lancaster Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International Affairs, Volume 59, Issue 4, September 1983, Page 726, https://doi.org/10.2307/2619486 Published: 01 October 1983

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s. Report of the European Security Study

The European Security Study (ESECS) published its Report on "Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe" in May 1983. The Study was prompted by concern about the relation of NATO dependence on the early use of nuclear weapons to its primary purpose of maintaining secure peace with freedom in the NATO region.

Book Review: Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe (ECECS II)

With political, military, and technical barriers restraining any plan to improve NATO's conventional strategy, nuclear deterrence may play an even more important role in European defense in the coming years.

The Compromise That Never Was: George Kennan, Paul Nitze, and the Issue of Conventional Deterrence in Europe, 1949?1952

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe: Proposals for the 1980s

Strengthening Conventional Deterrence in Europe

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This chapter examines the theoretical principles that underpin conventional deterrence and its evolution in practice over the past century. It disaggregates conventional deterrence approaches into four strategic categories based on their geographic scope and the nature of the threats they employ, and focuses in particular on strategies of punishment through resistance to an invader on the battlefield. It concludes with an assessment of the strengths and limitations of conventional and nuclear deterrence, and a set of summary principles for conventional deterrence strategy makers.

: A central tenet of the U.S. Navy's new Maritime Strategy is that preventing wars is as important as winning wars. This emphasis on war prevention has generated new research on maritime contributions to deterrence. OPNAV N51 (Director, Strategy and Policy Division) asked CNA to identify and analyze how maritime capabilities, assets, and operations contribute to conventional deterrence in the current and emerging international security environment. Deterrence has always been one of the central strategic principles of war prevention. But now, with the end of the Cold War and the rise of a new generation of security challenges, deterrence strategies need to be updated. This study examines one aspect of deterrence that has traditionally been overlooked - conventional deterrence. Our objective is to analyze how U.S. non-nuclear capabilities can be used to deter conventional aggression, and to examine the role of maritime power in preventing conventional conflicts.