U.S. Nuclear Policy in Comparative Perspective

The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) has been an important document detailing the US administration's policy preferences since its first issuance in 1994. Biden administration released its NPR in October 2022, which identifies nuclear rivals and focus areas examining the role of nuclear weapons in overall US strategy. Using the historical research method and open-source information, the paper provides an overview of the US strategic calculus on nuclear weapons since 1945, focusing on post-Cold War developments and how its nuclear policy and strategy evolved. The paper argues that despite advocating for nuclear disarmament, US presidents stayed within lip service and kept enhancing the US nuclear stockpile. It also highlights that President Trump’s decisions adversely affected US nuclear weapons policy and global security and that President Biden’s NPR would follow the route rather than fulfil his campaign promises. The paper has three parts: the first deals with US nuclear policy during the Cold War; the second looks at the policy during the post-Cold War era from President Bush Senior to President Biden. The third and final part critically analyses the overall nuclear policy challenges faced by the Biden Administration and how it might address them. Bibliography Entry Zeb, Rizwan. 2023. "Biden Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review and American Nuclear Policy: A Critical Overview" Margalla Papers 27 (1): 53-66.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) by the Biden Administration was published in October 2022. What is its focus and how should we evaluate it? How is it different from previous administrations? Does the NPR reflect Biden’s proactive statements before its publication? This article introduces and examines pressing issues of the international security environment and threat perceptions, nuclear deterrence, declaratory policy, arms control, and nuclear capability as reflected in the NPR. Analysis is presented from two aspects, military and diplomacy, as the NPR emphasizes to “put diplomacy first”. The military aspects of the NPR, to strengthen and modernize nuclear deterrence as the main role of nuclear weapons, is strongly emphasized. On the other hand, diplomatic aspects of the NPR are narrowly and superficially treated, and it does not include proactive proposals. Future NPRs should include military and diplomatic positions more equally.

Since 1994 when first Nuclear Posture review (NPR) was issued, it has emerged as a key document that detailed policy options and preferences of each administration. The generally held view is that former American President Trump has made several changes in the long held positions on nuclear weapons and related issues is prepared by every American administration. Biden administration is currently finalizing its NPR. It was announced that in this review, the main object would be to “examine how the United States can take steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its national security strategy.” This paper overviews the role of nuclear weapons in American strategic calculus since 1945. The paper also focuses on post-cold war developments and how American nuclear policy and strategy evolved and how the war against terror added to this. The paper argues that despite advocating for nuclear disarmament, American presidents never moved beyond lip service on the issue and in fact kept enhancing American nuclear stockpile. The paper also argues that Trump made quite a hullaballoo and took several decisions that would have adverse effects for not only for American nuclear weapons policy but also for global security. Using the historical research method, the paper overviews American nuclear policy since 1945 using published and open source information. The paper has three parts: first, deals with American nuclear policy during the cold war while second looks at the policy during the post-cold war era from Presidents Bush senior to Trump. The third part critically analyzes the overall nuclear policy challenges faced by the Biden administration and how it might address these challenges.

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Members of the Japanese government and the Japanese security elite welcomed the 2010 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, praising its emphasis on the twin goals of pursuing disarmament and protecting international peace and stability. Unlike many non-nuclear weapon states, Japan does not condition its support for nonproliferation upon nuclear weapon states’ progress on denuclearization. Despite general enthusiasm for the review in Japan, concerns remain. The NPR emphasizes the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the hands of non-state actors; from Japan's vantage point, state actors—North Korea, China, and Russia—are just as worrisome. While disarmament advocates in Japan had hoped the NPR would endorse a no-first-use doctrine or “sole purpose” declaration, defense officials and strategists were relieved it did not go that far, fearing that to do so would undermine US extended deterrence and leave Japan vulnerable to attack by North Korean biological or chemical weapons. US policy toward China shadows many Japanese concerns about security policy in general and nuclear policy in particular. In the absence of more clarity on the Sino-US relationship, Japanese concerns can be expected to increase. Nonetheless, the Japanese government has responded positively to the release of the NPR, in large part due to unprecedented levels of coordination and consultation between Tokyo and Washington during the drafting process. Tokyo now seeks continued close consultation on nuclear strategy and policy to develop a better understanding of the concept of extended deterrence and what Tokyo can do to support this shared goal.

Since the inception of the open-door policy in 1978, China has progressively become more integrated into the global economy through trade, foreign direct investment, and, more recently, outward direct investment. This economic integration has gained momentum with initiatives like the ‘Go Global’ strategy, China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001, and the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013. China’s economic ascent, coupled with its increasing political influence and military power, prompted the United States (US) to initiate a strategy of rebalancing in the Asia Pacific region, starting with the Bush administration and continuing through the Obama, Trump, and Biden administrations. During the Trump administration, this rebalancing strategy was supported by decoupling strategy, ultimately leading to a trade war with China. Despite its intention to avoid the initiation of a new Cold War and to adopt a more moderate stance towards China, the US-China trade war has evolved further into a tech war under the Biden administration. Given this context, this article aims to outline the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China during the Biden administration, comparing it to the Trump administration and assessing its impact on both nations. The central argument of this article is that the primary characteristics of the US economic policy towards China under Biden administration are rebalancing and decoupling, carried over from the policies of the preceding Trump administration, and there are clear signs that these characteristics are deepening. Furthermore, the article demonstrates that the extensive decoupling measures enacted by the US have proven effective in diminishing China’s role in global industrial and supply chains, particularly in industries related to semiconductors and chipmaking equipment.

In this chapter, we consider the Donald J. Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as part of the larger issue of presidential responsibility and prerogative on nuclear issues. The Nuclear Posture Review outlines Trump administration priorities with respect to nuclear force structure, modernization, policy planning and other issues. Compared to the Barack Obama administration, Trump calls for a wider range of limited nuclear options for deterrence across the spectrum of possible conflicts, prompted by alleged Russian interest in a theory of victory supported by nuclear first use as a means of de-escalation. However, Russia is also modernizing its conventional forces, including those for long-range, precision strike, in order to implement a more credible pre-nuclear deterrence. The Trump administration NPR anticipates commitments to nuclear modernization beyond the ambitious program already approved during the Obama administration. Along with this, Trump also expects to augment US defense capabilities in space and cyberspace: the President has called for the creation of a space force that is organized as a separate arm of service, but initially it will be a subordinate command within the US Air Force.

America Is Back?Opportunities and Obstacles to Restoring U.S. Credibility in Southeast Asia Ann Marie Murphy (bio) U.S. president Joe Biden has announced that "America is back," and in contrast to his predecessor's unilateral and transactional "America first" policy, he has sought to assure world leaders of the U.S. commitment to multilateralism and renewed engagement with allies and partners. The Biden administration, however, has taken office at a time when Southeast Asian perceptions of U.S. power have declined dramatically. According to the ISEAS–Yusof Ishak Institute's "State of Southeast Asia: 2021 Survey Report," 49% of Southeast Asian elites view China as the region's most influential political and strategic power compared to only 30% for the United States, a marked shift from a decade ago.1 Rising Southeast Asian concerns about China's growing economic and strategic influence, combined with a desire for assistance in overcoming the Covid-19 health and economic crises, create opportunities for the Biden administration to enhance ties in the region. At the same time, long-standing concerns about U.S. commitment to the region and a fear that the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry will pressure Southeast Asian states to choose sides are key obstacles to strengthening ties. China is the largest trading partner of most Southeast Asian states and a leading source of investment across the region. Leaders seeking to maintain their strategic autonomy in an increasingly complex external environment may welcome the Biden administration's pledge of renewed attention and support for allies and partners, but no state wants to be forced into a binary choice between Washington and Beijing. This essay analyzes the opportunities and obstacles facing the Biden administration as it seeks to strengthen ties with Southeast Asian states as part of its broader Indo-Pacific strategy. The essay begins by briefly outlining the trajectory of U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia over the past decade, tracing the shift from the Obama administration's "rebalance" [End Page 66] policy to the Trump administration's "free and open Indo-Pacific" strategy to illustrate which aspects of each policy were welcome in Southeast Asia and why. It then outlines the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific policy, Southeast Asia's place within it, and U.S. diplomatic efforts toward the region to date. The Biden administration got off to a slow start engaging Southeast Asia, and there is a distinct perception that the Quad rather than the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is the preferred vehicle for engagement. At a time when promoting health security and economic recovery are Southeast Asia's key interests, vaccine diplomacy provides an opportunity for the United States, while the lack of a trade strategy is an obstacle. Southeast Asian countries are mostly keen to enhance ties with the United States but also do not wish to be seen as joining a U.S.-sponsored anti-China containment policy. U.S. Policy Shifts Generate Southeast Asian Concerns about U.S. Commitment Southeast Asian states have long perceived their relationship with the United States as one of ambivalent engagement because U.S. policy toward the region has undergone dramatic shifts over time, raising concerns regarding Washington's commitment. The Obama administration's rebalance policy was designed to address these fears by refocusing foreign policy away from the Middle East and toward Asia. The rebalance policy was multifaceted: it had a security component that called for increasing the U.S. naval presence in the region; an economic component, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); and a multilateral component that embraced regional ASEAN-led architecture. Southeast Asian countries largely welcomed the rebalance because it appeared to illustrate Washington's commitment to play its traditional offshore balancing role, increase economic cooperation, and enhance ASEAN centrality, all of which help maintain an overall power balance in Asia and give smaller states more economic and strategic options. In the end, many contend that the rebalance failed to deliver because of the Obama administration's reluctance to respond to China's assertive actions, such as its 2012 seizure of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines and construction and militarization of artificial islands in the South China Sea. The Trump administration's...

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The new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), published in January 2018, stipulates a “tailored” strategy towards each country which Washington sees as presenting a nuclear challenge to the United States. Yet each “tailored” strategy is based on the same reiterated assumption that the U.S. measures and programs are developed in response to external hostile actions. The NPR cites other countries’ aggressive behavior and military buildup as the reason to reinstitute the role of nuclear weapons as the key component of the U.S. deterrent, modernize the U.S. strategic triad and dual-capable aircraft, develop new small-yield warheads, create sealaunched cruise missiles, and reinforce the C3 systems to support them. These initiatives go along with the new expanded understanding of “extreme circumstances” which allow for a U.S. nuclear response to a non-nuclear attack, as well as with other new features of the U.S. nuclear doctrine: the creation of “more usable” types of nuclear weapons, the integration of nuclear and conventional elements of planning and operations, the enhanced focus on cyber threats, and the prioritization of “flexibility,” “uncertainty,” and “hedging” – which all increase the danger of an actual use of nuclear weapons. The NPR presents Russia as a higher threat compared to China, while China – as a major challenge to the United States in the Asian region. Yet the NPR does not call these two states “adversaries” and stresses the need to avoid confrontation and an arms race. Besides Russia’s “aggressive policies,” military programs and bellicose declarations, the NPR focuses on its alleged adherence to the concept of “escalation for de-escalation” – early first use of nuclear weapons to end a conventional conflict on favorable terms – a notion that the NPR sets to counteract. The requirements formulated by the NPR towards Iran and North Korea include ensuring their non-nuclear status, countering their growing influence in the respective Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions, preventing the transfer of nuclear and missile technologies and sensitive materials to third parties and states, and convincingly demonstrating that their aggression, including a conventional one, would be met with resolute action by the United States and its allies. Yet, in a shuffle of a kind, opposite to how the Obama Administration renounced military solution to the Iran problem and chose negotiations with this country with no preliminary condition, – and at the same time preferred the tactics of isolating North Korea and disregarding its claims, – now it is with Seoul that Washington may engage with, while simultaneously demonstrating a tough line towards Teheran. Yet the shifts towards a settlement on the Korean Peninsula, along with certain signs of restraint in the NPR, offer some grounds to hope that – given political will and active international efforts – the worst-case scenarios and further deterioration of international situation may successfully be avoided.

On 6 April 2010 the long-awaited nuclear posture review report was released, fulfilling a promise from as the White House blog proclaimed.1 A year earlier, in Prague, President Barack Obama had pledged that the United States would take concrete steps towards a world without nuclear weapons. On the 40th anniversary of the entry into force of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty in March 2010, Obama pledged that the forthcoming review would move beyond outdated Cold War thinking and reduce the number and role of nuclear weapons in US strategy.2 The administration clearly saw the review as a key element of the positive narrative regarding US nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policy that it wanted to convey prior to the Washington nuclear security summit in April and the nonproliferation treaty review conference in New York in May. Now that these major multilateral events have successfully been held and the anniversary of the review's release has passed, it is worth considering its real impact on the international strategic environment. Did the review represent a genuine reform of US nuclear policy or was it more of a public relations exercise designed to position the US favourably in the context of a major meeting of the nonproliferation treaty parties? This article will consider the review from an international perspective, and in particular how its content responds to the obligations of states party to the treaty and the decisions of its quinquennial review conferences. The review, as an authoritative policy statement of the world's leading nuclear power, was addressed to a foreign as much as a domestic audience. The nature and timing of the review was intended to influence states active in international nuclear affairs in a manner coincident with US policy objectives. Issued a month before the opening of the May 2010 review conference of the nonproliferation treaty, and after a decade of difficulties for this core international security treaty, the nuclear posture review was undoubtedly going to have an impact on the perceptions of participating states as well as on the atmosphere of the conference itself.Despite the timing of its release and its deployment as a public diplomacy vehicle in the lead-up to the US -hosted nuclear security summit and treaty review conference, the nuclear review was nevertheless very much a home-grown product. It had domestic roots as a congressionally mandated review of all aspects of US nuclear weapons policy and posture, as well as the related infrastructure of the nuclear weapons complex. An early decision was taken to issue the review solely in an unclassified form, thus ensuring full transparency of the results to the public, both domestic and foreign. The Obama administration was not going to repeat the mistake of the previous administration, which conducted a classified nuclear posture review in 2001 and saw excerpts of it leaked, including controversial text on nuclear deterrence and preemption that provoked international consternation. The 2010 review was designed to be viewed as a progressive statement on US nuclear weapons policy that would complement the administration's foreign policy aims of strengthening the treaty and enlisting international support in shoring up the global nonproliferation regime. At the same time, it was also meant to send a reassuring message to US allies and partners who rely on extended deterrence that American commitments are as solid as ever. Finally, it was intended to placate various domestic constituencies with vested interests in the continuation of nuclear forces and the associated nuclear weapons complex. Given the inherent tensions, if not downright incompatibility, among these various aims, it is not surprising that in the end the review delivered a rather mixed message to the international audience.The salient issues of the review from an international perspective were the definition of the role for nuclear weapons in US strategy; the nature of the security assurances the US was prepared to give to non-nuclear weapons states; what action the US would take on outstanding nuclear disarmament commitments; what would be done to strengthen nonproliferation and nuclear security; and how the US would approach relations with other nuclear weapons-possessing states. …

Except for the Eisenhower administration’s threat of nuclear retaliation to even local non-nuclear and limited aggression, the Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is the most open description of US capabilities and strategies for employing nuclear weapons in a wide range of contingencies. Blurring the distinction between non-nuclear and nuclear war, the 2018 NPR reverses the commitment in the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US grand strategy. It champions this wider role as warranted by three developments: the deterioration of the Post-Cold War relationships with Russia and China; new technologies which allow for precisely tailored nuclear attacks well short of mutual assured destruction (MAD) levels, and evidence that Moscow and Beijing are adopting such limited nuclear war capabilities and strategies; and the evident desire of other states and non-state actors hostile to the United States to acquire their own weapons of mass destruction and/or intimidation. But the 2018 NPR fails to show why modernized nuclear capabilities are better able to deter and defend against potential enemy aggression than technologicallyadvanced nonnuclear capabilities. Its presumption of controllable nuclear exchanges will reduce the calculations of risk and increase the likelihood of conflicts escalating to nuclear war.

In the years ahead, historians and political scientists will dissect the Trump presidency and offer their academic assessments. The January 6, 2021, attack on the US Capitol by President Trump's supporters cast a large shadow over his controversial presidency. The long-term legacy of President Trump has yet to be written.This book by Frank Thompson, Kenneth Wong, and Barry Rabe neither lauds nor condemns the Trump presidency. These three eminent political scientists assess the first three years from the perspective of the administrative presidency, and they compare the Trump administration's actions with those of his immediate predecessor in three domestic policy arenas: health care, climate change, and education. The authors have extensively studied their respective policy venues for years, and they bring insight and perspective to their case studies.Frank Thompson's work on Medicaid and federalism will be familiar to readers of this journal. No less distinguished is Kenneth Wong's scholarship in education policy and Barry Rabe's study of environmental policy. They defend the decision to evaluate Trump's first three years rather than his whole term in order to bring the book to press before the 2020 election. The authors argue in the preface that despite the COVID pandemic in the final year of the Trump administration, that year was not substantially different from the first three in the employment of the administrative presidency.The core of the book is a three-chapter section in which each author develops a case study in their respective policy arenas. The cases examine the strategies and tactics used by the Trump administration in its attempts to repeal or change Obama administration actions in various policy domains. For readers interested in health policy and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), this case study is an excellent summary history of the Trump administration's efforts to repeal and sabotage the most significant policy accomplishment of the Obama administration. The chapters on education and climate change also enable the readers to quickly grasp the major issues and controversies in those spheres.In the preface and introduction, the authors place this study within disciplinary conceptual ideas on executive branch action and federalism, which are the twin frameworks for organizing the book. This is followed by a chapter on the legacy of the Obama administration, which catalogues the extensive employment of the president's administrative powers to achieve policy goals in the three areas. Only in health care was an Obama-era legislative accomplishment the catapult for administrative actions. As the cases show, the Trump administration only sought legislative action in health care, but it employed presidential powers in all three spheres to overturn policies inherited from the Obama administration.The intensity of the Trump administration's efforts is illustrated in the chapter titles. There was a “war” on the ACA, an effort to “search and destroy” climate change policies, and the “reversal” of education initiatives. The cases catalogue for the reader the myriad of tools employed to modify, repeal, and change Obama administration policies. These include executive orders, rulemaking, waivers, directives, and support for legal challenges.The integration of the case-study lessons comes in the final chapter, which begins by characterizing the Trump administration approach as a “hostile takeover.” The authors utilize a set of basic conceptual categories to draw generalizations from the three distinct cases. They conclude that there was not a systematic and consistent Trump administration approach in each area.In the summary analysis, the authors examine the Trump administration's objectives in the three areas and compare them in terms of magnitude, extent of empowerment of state/local governments, and constraints sought to limit authority of local governments. They found that the objectives were far more sweeping for health and climate than for education. “Opportunistic federalism” was the label they applied to whether the action sought to empower or constrain states. They did not find a consistent philosophy of federalism but rather a variety of strategies. In the climate case the Trump administration sought to limit California's freedom to establish emission standards, but the administration gave states greater discretion in regulating power plants. Through ACA sabotage the administration reduced states' ability to do outreach, but they also sought to give greater discretion to states with Medicaid waivers.In the integrative final chapter, the authors return to recent history by tracing similar instances of presidents using executive powers to advance policy objectives as far back as the Carter administration. Then President Reagan sought to unravel actions taken by President Carter; President Clinton used executive powers to undo some of the policies of the previous Republican administrations; and the pattern repeated with President George W. Bush and President Obama.The authors also highlight the emerging role of the state attorneys general, who in recent years have been more aggressive in bringing lawsuits in attempts to overturn presidential administrative endeavors. This has been true for both Republican and Democratic attorneys general. They demonstrate with examples from the cases how this is a new twist in the long history of cooperation and competition in American federalism.This legal strategy has been strengthened by the greater politization of the federal courts through a more strongly partisan approach to judicial appointments, especially in the Republican Party. The authors demonstrate the likely prospect that administrative federalism battles may be waged in the courts with greater frequency in the future.The book begins and ends with brief discussions of the dangers and prospects of the administrative presidency for American democracy. A full discussion of this important consideration of the expanding administrative presidency is left to another book. They do point out that federalism is both a constraint on a president's abuse of power through use of executive authority, and a limit on the scope of executive powers to achieve national objectives. The emerging greater role of state attorneys general in challenging presidential actions is highlighted in the conclusion and offers vivid examples of a perhaps underappreciated trend.One reads a book review to help answer the question, “Should I buy this book?” Yes, you should buy this book. It features three excellent case studies of the administrative presidency in the Trump years. Even if none of the three studies are of special academic interest, the reader will quickly grasp the critical issues from 2017 thru 2019 surrounding ACA, climate change, and education. If your interest is the presidency, this book offers significant insights into the Trump administration's use of executive powers to advance a conservative domestic agenda. The review of the Trump administration is offered not in isolation but in the context of the use of presidential powers since President Reagan.In the aftermath of the November 2020 election, Ronald Brownstein (2020) offered a sober assessment for Democrats based on the fact that they had won the presidency but lost ground in the House of Representatives, which has few precedents. If the 2020 election is a preview of the coming decade, we might expect Democratic party success at winning the White House but with a Republican-dominated Congress.The authors vividly demonstrate how divided government has contributed to expansion of the administrative presidency for both Democrats and Republicans. In our constitutional system, federalism and the courts restrain executive powers; but given the increasing polarization of the electorate and the parties, we might anticipate greater use of the administrative presidency to achieve domestic policy goals in the absence of unified government. This book illustrates the strategies and tools for an expanded administrative presidency. The Trump successes were limited, and most seem susceptible to reversal if the Biden Administration uses many of the same tools employed by the Trump administration. The strategies of the Trump administrative presidency may become the norm in the decade ahead.

The Iran policy is an important part of the US Middle East policy, and the key to the US handling of its relations with Iran. After the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, the US and Iran continued to dispute over the Iranian nuclear issue. In the last 20 years of the twentieth century, the US invested a lot in the Middle East in response to possible security threats from the Iranian nuclear issue. Since the unfolding of the twenty-first century, with the intensified changes in the power balance among the major powers, the Obama administration has proposed to ‘pivot to Asia-Pacific’ by adopting a series of policies to ease and engage with Iran, and finally promoted the conclusion of the Iranian nuclear agreement. However, the subsequent restoration of Iran’s regional influence and the dissatisfaction of Saudi Arabia and other allies have also brought into questions to the Obama administration’s Iranian nuclear policy. In order to contain Iran’s expanding regional power and reshape the image of the US leadership among its allies, the Trump administration had adopted a compulsory policy towards Iran that focuses on economic sanctions and military threats. However, the Trump administration continued the Obama administration’s strategy of contraction in the Middle East, the US investment in the Middle East was relatively reduced, and its Iranian nuclear policy had limited results. Anyway, under the premise of ‘pivot to Asia-Pacific region and contraction in the Middle East’, the previous two US governments’ either ‘soft’ or ‘hard’ Iranian nuclear policies have their limitations. After the Biden administration came to power, it still values the importance of US-Iranian relations and the Iranian nuclear issue in US policy in the Middle East. At the same time, it faces a regional situation different from the previous two administrations. The Biden administration hopes to maintain the relative balance of powers in the Middle East through the Iranian nuclear policy of both soft and hard, while relying on Saudi Arabia, Israel and other allies to contain Iran. Avoid or reduce the possibility of US direct military confrontation with Iran, thus creating possible conditions for it to fully implement Asia-Pacific deployment and contain the rise of emerging Asian powers.

US power and prestige may have diminished in recent years, but the United States still plays a pivotal role in international institutions, alliances, and media, so who becomes president and which party controls Congress matter for the global nuclear order. Nuclear weapons are often considered the esoteric domain of experts. Yet three recent developments – the ban on above-ground nuclear tests, INF Treaty, and collapse of the Berlin Wall – would not have happened without mass protests. Popular preoccupation with COVID-19, economic distress, racial animus, and climate change makes mobilization of a mass anti-nuclear movement unlikely. The international milieu is thus critical for the nuclear future. President Trump’s reelection is likely to have a pernicious effect on that milieu, hindering international cooperation to limit nuclear weapons and accelerating a destabilizing qualitative arms race. Yet an intense crisis risking nuclear war is unlikely because he wants to avoid involvement in any wars, not start new ones. He will also try to sustain nuclear diplomacy with North Korea, though whether he would satisfy Pyongyang’s stiffer demands remains in doubt. His opponent, Joseph Biden, will face those same demands. Personnel is policy, and the Biden administration will likely be staffed with officials who served under President Obama. That means a return to shoring up alliances, international cooperation, and continuity with Obama’s nuclear policies. Whether or not he will curtail nuclear modernization, but he will try to restore the JCPOA, save New START, preserve the Open Skies accord, and seek technical talks with China.