Types of infringement of a right to trade marks with reputation in Polish and EU jurisprudence

In EU copyright and trademark law, the protection of the right to intellectual property is the rule, and breathing space for competing fundamental rights, such as freedom of expression and the right to a healthy environment, is the exception. While formally recognizing the need to balance protection interests against other fundamental rights and values, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) fails to use competing fundamental rights productively. Instead, the Court has developed a meaningless fundamental rights rhetoric that produces the false impression that there is sufficient room for all competing rights and interests within the existing copyright and trademark systems. However, the current configuration of EU copyright and trademark law fails to offer users the chance of meeting right holders as equals, even if their fundamental rights are of equal ranking in the Charter. By adding fundamental rights cosmetics to imbalanced protection systems, the CJEU only cements and further stabilizes the existing rule/exception edifice that is strongly in favour of right holders. Introducing the mantra of internal balancing – requiring the reconciliation of competing rights and interests within the confines of secondary copyright and trademark legislation – the Court has even created a considerable risk of sacrificing competing fundamental rights on the altar of the EU harmonization agenda. By letting the harmonization objective reign supreme, the CJEU has also given the three-step test in copyright law and the honest practices proviso in trademark law a quasi-constitutional status. As a result, these open-ended provisions undermine limitations of exclusive rights that could support competing fundamental rights. To remove the imbalances in current EU copyright and trademark law, it would be necessary to introduce upfront gatekeeper requirements that prevent illegitimate infringement claims from the outset when competing fundamental rights are at stake.

This article reviews the extent to which European trade mark law permits a proprietor to enforce its trade mark against uses of signs or marks by third parties which do not cause consumer confusion, with a particular focus on the recent decisions of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in Intel v CPM and L'Oréal v Bellure. Following L'Oréal, it is now clear that action can be taken under Article 5(1)(a) of the Trade Marks Directive (and equivalent national law) notwithstanding that a trade mark's essential function as a badge of origin is unimpaired. So long as some other function is affected, it does not matter if consumers are not confused by the third party use in question. Under Article 5(2), the prohibition against dilution is harder to rely upon after Intel, requiring evidence of a change in consumer behaviour. However, it is now easier to show that unfair advantage has been taken of a mark with a reputation, following L'Oréal. Article 5(1)(a) now offers wider protection than ever before for trade mark owners, and it may follow that certain uses of trade marks previously thought lawful are not now so. Article 5(2)—the unfair advantage limb at least—is now a significant weapon for trade marks with a reputation, and proprietors will be seeking to argue that they have such a reputation in order to benefit from it.

Purpose: The main goal of the paper is to analyse the possibilities and rules of management of the protection of a famous person’s surname based on the provisions of the Regulation 2017/1001 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2017 on the European Union trade mark (EUTMR). Moreover, the author aims at exploring whether the general principles of European Union trade marks protection are modified in view of the relation between a trade mark and a famous person in the case of the conflict between a trade mark containing a famous person’s surname and a similar trade mark of another person. Design/Methodology/Approach: The author analyses and interprets legal provisions of EUTMR and a variety cases concerning the problem of a famous person’s surname protection based on the EUTMR provisions. Findings: A specific theory of a trade mark neutralization is applied in the case of a conflict between a trade mark containing a famous person’s surname and a similar trade mark of another person. Furthermore, in such a conflict the general rule formulated by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the SABEL case (“the more distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion”) tends to be modified by CJEU. Practical Implications: The paper is addressed to both lawyers dealing with the protection of intangible assets (particularly personal names and trade marks) and managers of famous persons. Originality/Value: The article contains a comprehensive analysis of the subject matter. The possibilities and principles of protection of a famous person’s surname on the ground of the EUTMR are discussed in the context of specific cases, including the latest ones, to enable the author to detect the specific approach to the matter that tends to be applied by the courts.

At the most general level, trademark law is classically motivated by the goal of protecting understandings that consumers have developed regarding the source or quality of goods or services. This is a rather simple, if conventional, account of trademark law. In fact, contemporary uses of trademarks implicate a far more complex set of social concerns than the protection of consumer understanding. But even this simple statement of the purpose and remit of trademark law begs many questions. These questions fall into two basic groups. First, because trademark law does not seek to prevent all forms of confusion, the consumer protection rationale presents a series of essentially prescriptive questions regarding the nature and level of confusion that should be actionable, along with the forms of consumer understanding that are properly protected against such confusion. And, once those prescriptive choices are made, trademark law confronts a second set of questions that on their face are more positivistic dilemmas: how to determine consumer reaction to a symbol used purportedly to mark goods (the question of protectability, or distinctiveness) and the effect of unauthorized third party use of that symbol (the question of infringement, classically involving assessment of the likelihood of confusion). These inquiries have the appearance of purely empirical assessments, and indeed doctrine regarding distinctiveness and likelihood of confusion is heavily driven by the factual context of particular disputes that have reached the courts. Courts in trademark cases devote substantial time developing doctrinal rules designed to facilitate this second set of empirical inquiries, but rarely discuss the prescriptive questions upon which the empirical inquiries are based. Courts typically treat consumer understanding as a largely pre-determined, relatively fixed, fact to which the template of trademark law can be applied and from which, therefore, the answers to the relevant legal questions of association and confusion easily provided. This Article challenges this dominant analytical approach to trademark lawmaking as descriptively false and prescriptively harmful. It masks important prescriptive choices that courts are making about trademark law without any explicit discussion of those choices. Thus, the prevalent form of trademark decisionmaking prevents proper development of a normative debate about the nature and scope of trademark law. To highlight the nature of the descriptive flaws and prescriptive perils of this approach, I explore the insight that scholars and courts are insufficiently attentive to whether trademark law should simply react to consumer behavior or whether instead the law should proactively seek to influence and construct consumer (and producer) behavior. Stated differently, what is the relationship between trademark law and the social norms by which trademark law purports to be guided?

A dispute resolution panel of the World Trade Organization in June 2000 held the United States in contravention of its obligation under art. 13 of the TRIPs accord to confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder. In the dispute resolution proceeding, initiated by the European Union at the behest of the Irish performing rights organization, the contested exception, enacted in the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act, exempted a broad range of retail and restaurant establishments from liability for the public performance of musical works by means of communication of radio and television transmissions. The WTO panel decision marks the first time an international adjudicative body has interpreted either art. 13 of TRIPs, or art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention, the text TRIPs incorporates, and generalizes from the Berne Convention reproduction right to all TRIPs and Berne rights under copyright. Berne art. 9.2/TRIPs art. 13 impose the to evaluate the legitimacy of exceptions and limitations on copyright; the panel's decision extensively analyzes each of the steps. As other multilateral instruments, such as the 1996 WIPO Copyright Treaty (art. 10) and WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty (art. 16.2), as well as the pending European Union Information Society Directive (art. 5.4), increasingly adopt the test, the WTO Panel decision may significantly advance the development of a truly supra national law of copyright. This article will analyze the Panel's interpretation of the test's three steps, and their application to the U.S.-law exemption. The article will also compare the Panel's treatment of the three-step test with the prior analyses proposed by several Berne Convention commentators, in order to reflect on what the Panel's analysis might mean for copyright exceptions more broadly. It is important to recognize, however, that the decision's actual impact on international copyright law will also depend on other considerations that will not be addressed here, including: Member State compliance with Panel decisions; the precedential effect of one Panel decision on later dispute resolution panels; and the willingness of national courts to look to WTO Panel decisions for guidance in evaluating local exceptions.

This chapter discusses the evolution of two distinct indications of origin: Made in Britain as a trade description, and 'Made in Britain' as a registered trade mark. In broad terms, domestic manufacturers were at liberty to apply this trade description to their products; it is not the exclusive property of any individual. However, the owners of 'Made in Britain' are required to establish the criteria which determine who may use this trade mark. The earliest campaigns to register 'Made in Britain' occurred in the late nineteenth century and continued until the 1920s. These early initiatives were unsuccessful, primarily because they encountered considerable opposition from manufacturers owning famous trade marks. Much of the debate on Made in Britain as a trade description, and as a trade mark, invoked consumer protection. This, in turn, prompted a broader enquiry into consumer behaviour: did consumers wish to buy domestic products simply because they were British? Or were they prevented from exercising this preference because imports were 'passed-off' as British? More importantly, perhaps, what constituted a British product? In 2014, 'Made in Britain' was registered by the association Made in Britain (hereafter, MiB). The rules governing membership of this body assure British provenance of the products to which the trade mark is applied. MiB is not responsible for policing misleading use of trade descriptions, but it does ensure that its trade mark is only used for bona fide purposes.

The extended protection of trade marks with a reputation is losing its “exceptional” character, making way for an almost categorical bar to the registration of any competing sign; indeed, the “unfair advantage” requirement appears to have been confounded with that of similarity. Certainly, trade marks are recognized as a legitimate restriction of the freedom of commerce and, arguably, in principle, competitors can and should invest their own efforts into conceiving and promoting an original sign under which they can market their goods and services. Nevertheless, trade mark law, insofar as it protects the investment function of a reputed mark, does not for as much shield the proprietor from all competition, even if this means that he must work harder in order to preserve this reputation. Indeed, the use of a similar sign is sometimes deemed to be ineluctable, where the applicant demonstrates that he cannot reasonably be required to abstain from using such a sign as, for example, it would be made necessary for the marketing of his products. This is especially true where the sign makes use of descriptive terms or elements in order to indicate the type of goods or services offered by the applicant under the mark applied for. This paper aims to critically discuss the most recent EU and UK jurisprudence on “unfair advantage” in the context of trade mark registration and infringement, focussing primarily on the components of this EU creation and how they are interpreted by courts on both a national and EU level.

About the Authors

Monographs on key aspects of trade mark law are a rare breed. The arrival of Ilanah Fhima and Dev Gangjee's full-length study of the confusion test in European trade mark law is therefore a moment of joy for all trade mark experts, promising detailed, penetrating analysis by recognised experts in the field. Moreover, the confusion test presents one of the thorniest and most complex issues in European trade mark law. Having started with such high expectations, does the book actually deliver? There are eight chapters in total, starting with an introduction titled ‘The Likelihood of Confusion’. It is wise not to launch into a detailed analysis of the components of the confusion test without spending some time and effort analysing the central concept. Clarity is essential, since ‘confusion’ arises in two slightly different contexts. For most of us, ‘confusion’ – as legal test or concept – is immediately and inextricably linked to trade mark infringement, but in a second sense it also pertains to the relative grounds for refusing to register a trade mark. These two distinct causes of action imply nuanced applications of the concept of confusion. This introductory chapter appropriately distinguishes between them, framing the analysis within the broader context of general rationales for trade mark protection and some consideration of what the future may bring for the concept of confusion. Having properly calibrated the conceptual microscope, analysis turns to the individual components of the confusion test in European trade mark law. The first component is that of similarity. The confusion test is engaged when either the sign that is applied for or that is allegedly infringing is similar to the registered trade mark or when the goods or services are similar. Chapter 2 logically turns to the similarity of marks. The first task is to distinguish between aural, visual and conceptual similarity and to consider which dimension is most important. Visual similarity between the sign and the mark, aural or phonetic similarity and, finally, conceptual similarity are addressed in turn, exemplifying one of the book's major strengths. All too often scholarly articles and (text-)books limit themselves to syntheses illustrated with just one or two examples. By contrast, these authors have undertaken exhaustive analysis of the seemingly endless EU Court of Justice and the General Court jurisprudence, augmented where needed by relevant UK cases. Rather than highlighting a couple of examples, their analysis works its way through dozens of interesting illustrations of the various points and concepts that the courts have relied on to decide whether there is visual, aural or conceptual similarity between the sign and the mark. As Ilanah Fhima intimates in her acknowledgments, the publisher must have been concerned by the sheer volume of material. But there is tangible value for the reader in being taken through a succession of real examples in a structured way in coming to understand and appreciate the approaches developed by the courts. The minefield of confusing similarity between the sign and the mark is defused and the overall jurisprudential picture becomes a lot clearer. To give just a couple of indications, in relation to aural and phonetic similarity the journey through the examples clarifies the strength of emphasis on common beginnings, how that is balanced or influenced by the presence of other factors pointing towards similarity or dissimilarity, and the impact of device marks or descriptive elements. In relation to conceptual similarity the journey through the examples clarifies the impact and the value of, for example, foreign and obscure terms and graphical elements, and what is the appropriate level of abstraction in this respect. Such clarifications are already more than enough benefit to encourage specialist readers; albeit they should anticipate a fairly slow read, as the pages are packed with detailed recapitulations of the conceptual nuances and marginally different approaches which characterise this topic. Chapter 3 introduces further complications by examining composite marks, and exploring whether they should be assessed holistically, in terms of their dominant element, or by reference to a distinctive element? Once more, multiple examples are put to best use to guide the reader through these additional layers of complexity. With that, the book leaves behind the complexity of the similarity between signs and marks and moves on to goods and services, opening up a new debate. A first thorny issue tackled in Chapter 4 is the distinction between identical and similar goods and services. Once that distinction has been clarified, critical analysis is trained on what has become known as the Canon test, as developed by the CJEU, for this purpose. The authors rely once more on an abundance of caselaw examples to clarify the fine distinctions that may arise in trade mark disputes. Chapter 5 follows up by analysing the salience of the distinctiveness of the marks. The starting point is the rather controversial way in which the CJEU dealt with the role of distinctiveness in assessing likelihood of confusion. Is there an empirical basis for the assumption that a higher level of distinctiveness leads to an enhanced likelihood of confusion, or is it rather the case that very distinctive marks are better remembered by end users and thus present a reduced likelihood of confusion? Once that discussion is broached one needs to distinguish between distinctiveness for infringement and distinctiveness for registrability purposes. With these conceptual issues neutralised, the book reverts to its primary strength of distinguishing in detail between a range of practical scenarios. Inherently distinctive marks, descriptive marks, weak and allusive marks, and marks with acquired distinctiveness are systematically considered, with multiple illustrations on the established pattern. Chapters 6 and 7 turn to the more practical components of the test for confusion. Chapter 6 deals with assessing the likelihood of confusion. The key concept here is ‘the average consumer’, but the chapter also discusses the normative standard involved in this global assessment and practical issues of proof. Chapter 7 adds in the element of timing. The two burning issues of temporal sequencing are the potential place for, and role of, initial interest confusion and post-sale confusion, respectively. All seven chapters are highly informative and a treasure trove of caselaw illustrations for any reader interested in European trade mark law. Whilst we may try to keep up with the burgeoning caselaw, placing new CJEU decisions in the overall structural framework is not always easy and some judgments seemingly lack clarity and coherence. Be that as it may, by systematically organising all these cases into a rational framework and by taking the reader step by step through each stage of the analysis this book makes a major contribution to critical understanding of the Court's jurisprudence. With the benefit of multiple examples to support the analysis, the reader discerns a backbone structure and the sometimes small or marginal differences in judicial approaches become more visibly distinct. Much as I admire this treatment, it comes with limitations. Chapters 2 to 4 of this monograph have a tendency to fall into the trap of becoming overly descriptive. There is a lot of very valuable material on offer, but the reader gets the impression that more could have been done with it, in terms of fuller contextualisation and critical analysis. Chapters 5 to 7 are superior in this regard, but still pass up the opportunity for further elucidation. More extensive treatment might have extended the length of the book by another 100 pages or more (possibly not to the publisher's delight) but would have added significant value. As it is, a bright picture is drawn, but the potential for more light and shade through in-depth analysis has not been fully realized. The chapters contain frequent references to US trade mark law, but these are mere stubs. Full-scale comparative analysis is eschewed. Differences between European and US trade mark law are not elucidated in a way that would enable readers to derive maximum benefit from comparative analysis and perspectives. Compounded by the absence of context, explanation and in-depth criticism, these descriptively dense chapters are at times hard to read. They require concerted effort to make sure the reader gets all the details right and can properly follow the analytical narrative. Overall, the monograph is markedly Anglo-Saxon in orientation and content, despite its title promising an analysis of the confusion test in European trade mark law. It is entirely logical that the abundant caselaw of the CJEU and General Court should comprise the authors’ main focus, augmented by relevant decisions of the EUIPO (formerly OHIM). Whilst that is a facially credible approach, it overlooks the quite significant contribution of the national courts in the Member States. Domestic judges deal with the vast majority of cases without needing referrals to the EU courts. Admittedly, referrals are made on the controversial and difficult points, but at least the application of the key principles emerging from the case law of the EU Courts is worth examining from the broader perspective of Member States’ domestic jurisprudence. With only one or two exceptions, this book ignores references other than those from UK courts, with the result that UK case law is afforded greater prominence than seems justified. There are interesting and valuable cases adjudicated in all the Member States: surely not all UK decisions, especially these at Appointed Person level, are to be taken as gospel. Chapter 8 is a nice present in this regard. Not only does it deal with the relatively neglected topic of non-traditional marks, but, quite refreshingly, it does so by including appropriate references to cases in other Member States. In that sense this chapter is perhaps a more valuable terminus than any attempt to present an overall, synthetic conclusion to the book. Let these points of criticism not detract from the overall value of this monograph. The confusion test is a focal point, or should one say central difficulty, in European trade mark law. Unravelling it over 250 pages is a major contribution, as is the successful collation and organisation of a massive case law often lacking structure or analytical coherence. This monograph is, in other words, essential reading for all those who work in this field and it deserves a prominent place on our bookshelves.

While geographical indications show geographical origin, trade marks show commercial origin. Therefore, it is possible to say that both geographical indications and trade marks have distinctive character. Indeed, when an application is filed to register a geographical indication as a trade mark, an important question is whether the sign is distinctive enough. In such cases, the distinctive character of these commercial and geographical ‘signs’ can overlap and intersect with each other. In this article, the intersection and relationship between geographical indications and trade marks will be evaluated by considering two different scenarios. In the first one, the trade mark application precedes the registration of the geographical indication, while in the second the application for the geographical indication is filed before the conflicting trade mark. The analysis is carried out by taking into account various provisions of the Turkish Industrial Property Code (IPC), the judicial practice of the Turkish Court of Cassation and international regulations. In this context, the relationship between several absolute grounds for refusal in such a situation and which of these provisions is the most applicable will be examined. In particular, an attempt will be made to explain the role of the absolute ground for refusal regulated in the new Turkish Industrial Property Code for the first time, namely that signs containing or consisting of a geographical indication cannot be registered as a trade mark (Art. 5.1(i)).

The focus of much of the analysis of the intellectual property (IP) system is on the role of IP rights as incentives. This neo-classical economics approach does not acknowledge the range of circumstances and decisions that constitute the IP system. If the work of behavioural economists is considered instead, then a more nuanced understanding is available. The research here adopts the concept of ‘motivators’ from the latter body of thought and applies it to decisions made around patents, copyright, trade marks and, in order to more fully explore the issues, know-how. Further, three sets of decisions will be considered – those before the innovation is created, those relating to the distribution of the creation and those relating to their unauthorized use. The analysis of the decisions will engage with the issues of risk, negotiation and the role of legal advice in some of the decisions; thereby rounding out the analysis of decisions in terms of the internal assessments of the parties themselves.

Introduction. The war in Ukraine has led to a change in behavioral patterns of economic agents (population, business entities, civil society organizations, governing bodies), which can be observed in the mobilization of economic agents to accumulate material and human resources in the process of countering the enemy. In this context, there is a need to apply the scientific foundations of behavioral economics to the peculiarities of the conflict and the adaptation of people's behavior to these extreme conditions, as well as their resilience in such circumstances. The purpose of the article is to identify and justify the changes in behavioral patterns of economic agents in the conditions of war in Ukraine. Methods. The research utilizes dialectical analysis, synthesis, logical generalization, as well as comparison and formalization methods. Results. The model of public behavior in times of war is examined through the theoretical principles of behavioral economics, namely the economics of violent conflicts, which is grounded on the monopoly of state violence, the compromise between utility maximization and physical security in decision-making, and changes in the system of individual preferences. The analysis reveals certain similarities in the behavioral reactions of economic agents in times of war and in times of pandemic, which has ensured a certain level of readiness of the public administration system, business, and civil society to the challenges and threats of war. The following changes in economic behavior are emphasized and thoroughly examined: the change in the level of civil society activity and the role of altruism in the economic progress of the state, changes in consumer behavior, and new trends in employment and education.

... The USPTO has continued to fulfil its core mission of servicing clients and has maintained a particularly high level of service in trade mark matters. It expects applications comprising approximately 568,000 fee-paid classes in the fiscal year 2017, representing a 7.1 per cent increase from the previous year. Metrics indicate that, despite an increased caseload in the first quarter of 2017, the USPTO was meeting or exceeding its targets for timeliness and accuracy in disposing of new applications. The USPTO’s internal adjudicative body, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB), anticipates a corresponding increase in matters, but is similarly meeting or surpassing its targets for issuing decisions and disposing of cases. Even so, the USPTO is not satisfied with this excellent performance and remains focused on improving its trade mark services. The USPTO has undertaken to address the high number of trade mark registrations that are maintained despite the owners’ failure to make bona fide use of the marks in commerce as required by the Trademark Act.1 In connection with the Proof-of-Use Pilot Program,2 the USPTO recently found that, of a random sample of trade mark owners claiming use of their marks in commerce, 51 per cent failed to provide further proof of use when the USPTO requested it.3 In part of its ongoing effort to clear such ‘dead wood’ registrations, the USPTO issued modifications to the Trademark Rules, effective 21 March 2017, that permit the USPTO to request additional specimens of use as reasonably necessary to confirm that the requirements for Section 8 and 71 Declarations or Affidavits of Continued Use or Excusable Non-Use are being met.4 These requests will be made in connection with a permanent audit programme, whereby the USPTO will initially review up to one tenth of Section 8 and 71 filings at random by requesting information, exhibits, affidavits or declarations, and specimens showing use in commerce. These requests will come in the form of an Office action affording the owner of a mark six months to respond. Brand owners and their attorneys should be aware that they might receive Office actions auditing their renewal applications and, hopefully, will take greater care in ensuring that they have sufficient basis for maintaining their registrations.

The article focuses on the topical issues of studying the impact of digital transformation on business models and operational processes of retailers in Ukraine. It is noted that digital transformation radically changes the functioning of business processes, business models, consumer behaviour and the competitive environment of retailers. The author emphasises that understanding the current trends and challenges in the field of bringing goods from producer to consumer, in particular, economic instability, martial law and global technological changes, is critical to ensuring the competitiveness of retailers and the sustainable development of the industry as a whole. In analysing the dynamics of the introduction of information and digital technologies into the activities of domestic trade enterprises, the article focuses on structural changes in the market, analysis of the dynamics of the use of digital tools, websites, social media, e-commerce and the functionality of online platforms. The author analyses in detail the statistical data of the State Statistics Service of Ukraine for 2018-2024, which made it possible to trace the key trends in the transformation processes. It is noted that despite the overall reduction in the number of enterprises with Internet access, the share of employees who actively use it is growing, and the use of fixed-line connections and interactive services is also spreading. Particular attention is paid to the dynamics of website functionality - the increase in interactive services, personalised content, chatbots and multilingualism, which are indicators of the digital maturity of enterprises. The article confirms the growth of e-commerce and its share in the structure of sold products. It is concluded that the process of digital transformation is irreversible, but the pace of innovation is insufficient to fully meet modern requirements. The key problems are highlighted: slow integration of digital channels, limited flexibility of SMEs, low share of online sales and underdeveloped language adaptation of websites. The author proposes guidelines for further development of the digital environment in retail, including encouraging businesses to digitalise, adapting to changes in consumer behaviour and improving digital infrastructure.

Stigmatization has only recently been linked with the perception of risk, and research into this area has mainly concentrated on measuring the differences between nationalities, gender and socio‐economic status. The concept of stigmatization helps us understand why the public views certain places, products, technology and environments as dangerous and in a negative manner. To date, little has been done to assess the relationships between the effects of stigmatization on situations and people's decision‐making capabilities with regard to food. The aim of this research is to examine food consumers’ knowledge of food‐related risk issues to provide insight into the process of stigmatization and its relationship to food risk management, thereby improving awareness of the information consumers require from food risk communication. To meet this aim, two phases of data collection were implemented. Phase 1 used a baseline survey to investigate consumer knowledge of food‐risk‐related issues, identify how much attention consumers pay to information and what they remember about the particular issues. Factors affecting participant's recollection included how recently the event associated with the issue occurred, the level of media coverage and the reported severity of risk outcome. Phase 2 involved a follow‐up survey to investigate consumer knowledge of food risk issues and determine any changes in consumer behaviour. Research results and conclusions of Phases 1 and 2 of the study will be presented to highlight the relationships between participant recollection of particular food issues and whether knowledge of such issues caused any change in behaviour.