Two Candida auris Cases in Germany with No Recent Contact to Foreign Healthcare-Epidemiological and Microbiological Investigations.

Joint Healthcare Infection Society (HIS) and Infection Prevention Society (IPS) guidelines for the prevention and control of meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) in healthcare facilities

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What's trending in the infection prevention and control literature? From HIS 2012 to HIS 2014, and beyond

Candida auris is a rapidly emerging multidrug-resistant pathogenic yeast. In recent years, an increasing number of C. auris invasive infections and colonized patients have been reported, and C. auris has been associated with hospital outbreaks worldwide, mainly in intensive care units (ICUs). Here, we describe the first two cases of C. auris in The Netherlands. Both cases were treated in a healthcare facility in India prior to admission. The patients were routinely placed in contact precautions in a single room after admission, which is common practice in The Netherlands for patients with hospitalization outside The Netherlands. No transmission of C. auris was noticed in both hospitals. Routine admission screening both for multidrug-resistant (MDR) bacteria and MDR yeasts should be considered for patients admitted from foreign hospitals or countries with reported C. auris transmission.

Candida auris (C. auris) is an emerging multidrug-resistant fungal pathogen classified as a global public health threat with notable mortality and nosocomial transmission capacity. In China, the first C. auris case was reported from Beijing in 2018. However, large cases of nosocomial transmission have rarely been identified in this municipality. During March-September 2023, C. auris was isolated from 17 patients admitted to CY Hospital in Beijing. All strains were resistant to fluconazole and amphotericin B. In addition, three isolates were resistant to echinocandins. Whole-genome sequencing (WGS) analysis revealed that all strains found in this hospital belonged to C. auris Clade I. These strains were genetically closely related to the C. auris strains reported in two other hospitals in Beijing since 2021, forming a new sublineage different from the Clade I strains causing previous outbreaks in the Eastern Provincial-level administrative divisions and Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The dissemination of C. auris has become an increasing threat to healthcare facilities in China. The WGS analysis indicates the spread of a unique sublineage of C. auris Clade I isolates in Beijing. Further, enhanced surveillance and hospital infection control of C. auris are warranted to resolve the public health challenge.

BackgroundPreventing the transmission of multidrug-resistant organisms requires strict adherence to isolation precautions. Candida auris (CA), an emerging multidrug-resistant fungal pathogen, can cause widespread and persistent contamination of environmental surfaces within healthcare facilities and lead to outbreaks. While direct observation (DO) with “secret shoppers” is traditionally used to monitor adherence to isolation precautions and personal protective equipment (PPE) use by healthcare personnel (HCP), this method is limited by logistic and cost issues. We studied the use of remote video auditing (RVA) to monitor adherence to isolation precautions in a patient with CA fungemia.MethodsThis is a cross-sectional study of HCP who were in contact with a single patient with CA fungemia. This patient was placed on standard and contact precautions and held in isolation in a single room in an acute care setting. Adherence to isolation precautions by HCP was observed by DO and RVA. RVA consisted of recording videos of HCP entering and exiting the room and auditing adherence using a standardized protocol by remotely-placed observers. Hand hygiene (HH) on entry and exit, the use of gloves and gowns upon entry, correct gown donning and the proper doffing sequence upon exit were observed by both methods. In the DO method, data were recorded per visit and not by entry/exit.ResultsRVA captured data for 120 visits by HCP (entry data [n = 62]; exit data [n = 58]) and DO captured data for 173 visits by HCP during 23 days. Table 1 shows the compliance rates determined by both methods. RVA yielded lower compliance rates on most measures than the DO method. Also, there were a higher number of missing observations in the DO groupConclusionRVA, when used to monitor adherence to isolation precautions in a high-concern CA patient, demonstrated lower compliance rates compared with DO and had fewer missing data elements. These results suggest that RVA is a novel monitoring method that may be a more precise alternative to DO for ensuring adherence to isolation precautions and the prevention of nosocomial transmission of high-concern pathogens such as CA.DisclosuresAll authors: No reported disclosures.

Background Candida auris is a globally emerging multidrug resistant fungal pathogen causing nosocomial transmission. We report an ongoing outbreak of C. auris in a London cardio-thoracic center between April 2015 and July 2016. This is the first report of C. auris in Europe and the largest outbreak so far. We describe the identification, investigation and implementation of control measures.MethodsData on C. auris case demographics, environmental screening, implementation of infection prevention/control measures, and antifungal susceptibility of patient isolates were prospectively recorded then analysed retrospectively. Speciation of C. auris was performed by MALDI-TOF and typing of outbreak isolates performed by amplified fragment length polymorphism (AFLP).ResultsThis report describes an ongoing outbreak of 50 C. auris cases over the first 16 month (April 2015 to July 2016) within a single Hospital Trust in London. A total of 44 % (n = 22/50) patients developed possible or proven C. auris infection with a candidaemia rate of 18 % (n = 9/50). Environmental sampling showed persistent presence of the yeast around bed space areas. Implementation of strict infection and prevention control measures included: isolation of cases and their contacts, wearing of personal protective clothing by health care workers, screening of patients on affected wards, skin decontamination with chlorhexidine, environmental cleaning with chorine based reagents and hydrogen peroxide vapour. Genotyping with AFLP demonstrated that C. auris isolates from the same geographic region clustered.ConclusionThis ongoing outbreak with genotypically closely related C. auris highlights the importance of appropriate species identification and rapid detection of cases in order to contain hospital acquired transmission.

Candida auris is an emerging multidrug-resistant fungal pathogen, its infections have been reported in over 50 countries and regions to date. It has gradually become a global public health concern. Characterized by challenges in identification, high drug resistance, treatment difficulties, and rapid transmission, Candida auri is prone to causing hospital infection outbreaks. Given the varying recommendations in domestic and international guidelines for preventing and controlling Candida auris healthcare-associated infection, the National Medical Institution Infection Surveillance System of China, the Healthcare-associated Infection Control Branch of Chinese Preventive Medicine Association, and the National Training Center of Hospital Infection in China jointly organized a panel of national experts. Through reviewing global literature, evidence-based medical research, and experiences in curbing outbreaks and adopting the Oxford Centre for Evidence-Based Medicine's levels of evidence classification criteria and grading of recommendation strength, and after discussion and voting by the expert panel, 14 recommendation statements consensus on the prevention and control of Candida auris healthcare-associated infection were ultimately formulated. Key contents include an overview of Candida auris outbreaks, microbiological characteristics, laboratory identification, epidemiology, healthcare facility infection prevention and control strategies and specific measures, outbreak investigation and control protocols, and clinical management. The consensus aims to recommend practical and effective prevention and control measures, standardizing and enhancing the capacity to combat Candida auris healthcare-associated infection.

Supplement: STRIVE1 October 2019The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention STRIVE Initiative: Construction of a National Program to Reduce Health Care–Associated Infections at the Local LevelFREEKyle J. Popovich, MD, MS, David P. Calfee, MD, Payal K. Patel, MD, MPH, Shelby Lassiter, BSN, RN, CPHQ, Andrew J. Rolle, MPH, Louella Hung, MPH, Sanjay Saint, MD, MPH, and Vineet Chopra, MD, MScKyle J. Popovich, MD, MSRush University Medical Center, Chicago, Illinois (K.J.P.), David P. Calfee, MDWeill Cornell Medicine, New York, New York (D.P.C.), Payal K. Patel, MD, MPHUniversity of Michigan Medical School and Veterans Affairs Ann Arbor Healthcare System, Ann Arbor, Michigan (P.K.P., S.S., V.C.), Shelby Lassiter, BSN, RN, CPHQHealth Research & Educational Trust, American Hospital Association, Chicago, Illinois (S.L., A.J.R., L.H.), Andrew J. Rolle, MPHHealth Research & Educational Trust, American Hospital Association, Chicago, Illinois (S.L., A.J.R., L.H.), Louella Hung, MPHHealth Research & Educational Trust, American Hospital Association, Chicago, Illinois (S.L., A.J.R., L.H.), Sanjay Saint, MD, MPHUniversity of Michigan Medical School and Veterans Affairs Ann Arbor Healthcare System, Ann Arbor, Michigan (P.K.P., S.S., V.C.), and Vineet Chopra, MD, MScUniversity of Michigan Medical School and Veterans Affairs Ann Arbor Healthcare System, Ann Arbor, Michigan (P.K.P., S.S., V.C.)Author, Article, and Disclosure Informationhttps://doi.org/10.7326/M18-3529 SectionsAboutVisual AbstractPDF ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail Health care–associated infection (HAI) remains an important problem in the United States (1, 2). Central line–associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) and catheter-associated urinary tract infection (CAUTI) are among the most common device-associated infections, whereas Clostridioides difficile and methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) are among the most prevalent pathogens causing HAI. In 2011, there were an estimated 721 800 HAIs in U.S. acute care hospitals, with C difficile, S aureus, Enterococcus species, and gram-negative bacilli being the most common pathogens (3). To address the burden of these infections, evidence-based infection prevention strategies, including "bundles" or combinations of interventions, have been developed and successfully implemented in many hospitals to prevent HAIs (4–8). For example, bundles have been created to decrease CLABSI (4), CAUTI (5, 9), and MRSA bloodstream infection (6, 7). In U.S. intensive care units, there has been a substantial reduction in CLABSIs, thought to be in large part due to implementation of bundles (4, 10).Many U.S. hospitals, unfortunately, continue to experience high rates of HAI (11) because of low compliance with infection prevention practices, poor organizational culture, financial limitations, limited engagement from front-line personnel, and limited leadership support (12). Of note, assistance from external sources, such as local, state, and national groups (including public health departments, quality improvement organizations, hospital associations, and academic medical centers), can help reduce HAI (13, 14). However, the ways and extent to which these entities engage with hospitals to improve HAI rates vary, resulting in heterogeneity of outcomes (12). Comprehensive solutions to this complex dynamic within and across hospitals, states, and the country have not been developed. In particular, strategies to help hospitals that continue to have high rates of HAI are needed.To reduce infections in hospitals with high rates of HAI, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) funded a prospective, interventional, nonrandomized, quality improvement program that spanned multiple hospitals and states. Development, implementation, and execution of the program was performed by the Health Research & Educational Trust (HRET), a not-for-profit research and education affiliate of the American Hospital Association, along with several partners, such as state hospital associations (SHAs), professional societies, and scientific experts from academic medical centers. Collectively, the program was titled CDC STRIVE (States Targeting Reduction in Infections via Engagement). This article provides a summary of how STRIVE constructed the building blocks for a national effort intended to reduce HAIs in participating hospitals.Program Goals and StructureThe STRIVE initiative focused on bringing national health care professional societies, subject-matter experts, and state-level health care organizations together with short-stay and long-term acute care hospitals to improve infection prevention and control practices. The overall objective of the program was to identify, partner with, and collaborate with hospitals struggling to reduce HAI by pairing national subject-matter experts with state, regional, and local organizations to effect sustainable change (Figure 1).Figure 1. Overall flow of the CDC STRIVE program.CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; STRIVE = States Targeting Reduction in Infections via Engagement. Download figure Download PowerPoint To deliver on this ambitious goal, the STRIVE initiative had 3 specific aims: 1) strengthen infection control practices through dissemination and implementation of CDC's Targeted Assessment for Prevention (TAP) strategy; 2) strengthen relationships among SHAs, state health departments, and other state HAI partners, such as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services Quality Innovation Network–Quality Improvement Organizations, to create a structure to facilitate durable implementation of best infection control practices; and 3) provide technical assistance to facilities to improve implementation of infection control practices in existing and newly constructed health care facilities. Reductions in C difficile infection (CDI), CLABSI, CAUTI, and hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infection in participating hospitals were chosen as measures to determine initiative success.Program planning for STRIVE began in September 2015. Subject-matter experts from multiple organizations were identified by CDC and HRET and brought together to form a national program team to provide oversight for the program and build educational content. Members of the national program team included representatives from CDC, HRET, Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology, American Society for Health Care Engineering, Society of Hospital Medicine, and University of Michigan Health System.Stakeholder Considerations in Designing STRIVE InterventionsThe CDC outlined several objectives to increase alignment and coordination of HAI prevention efforts across stakeholders: First, identify strategies to improve infection control implementation activities on a state- and facility-level; second, identify indicators of capacity (infrastructure, staffing, partnerships, and training), ongoing regional collaboratives, and other contextual factors (such as state-level mandates) that may affect implementation of infection prevention efforts; and third, identify roles of state partners (state health departments, SHAs, Quality Innovation Network–Quality Improvement Organizations) in the coordination, integration, and alignment of infection prevention and control activities.Eligibility and Selection of Participating HospitalsThe CDC STRIVE initiative focused specifically on hospitals with a disproportionately high burden of HAI. To target these facilities, the CDC used National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN) data from the first 2 quarters of 2015 to identify states with hospitals that had a high burden of CDI and a high burden of at least 1 of the following HAIs: CLABSI, CAUTI, or hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infection. "High burden" was defined by examining the cumulative attributable difference (15) (using the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' 2020 HAI goals as the standardized infection ratio target). Hospitals with a cumulative attributable difference above the first tertile (that is, the top one third) were designated as having a high burden of HAIs. Data for all 4 infection types were combined to identify hospitals with CDIs plus at least 1 other HAI with cumulative attributable differences above the first tertile.Three methods were used to identify eligible states. First, CDC identified states with the largest number of hospitals that met inclusion criteria. These states thus became the main focus of STRIVE efforts. Second, to include sites that may also benefit from STRIVE, HRET applied the CDC approach with publicly available Hospital Compare state-specific data to identify additional hospitals with a high burden of HAIs not included in the cumulative attributable difference first tertile. Finally, a few interested states not included in the above were allowed to volunteer to participate in STRIVE. Using these methods, 34 states and the District of Columbia were identified for possible inclusion in STRIVE.Rather than approach hospitals directly (and in keeping with the STRIVE goal to strengthen state and local partnerships to combat HAI), HRET shared the list of potentially eligible hospitals with SHAs and asked them to recruit sites. In this way, the CDC and HRET engaged SHAs to reach out to hospitals to inform them about the program, solicit their interest, and recruit them to participate. As word of the intervention and program spread, a few states that were not identified by the CDC also requested to participate in the STRIVE program, because they viewed this program as important to help improve hospital infection control practices.To better consolidate efforts and understand the impact of interventions, recruitment within STRIVE occurred within waves, leading to 4 cohorts of hospitals (Table): cohort 1 (June 2016 to April 2017), cohort 2 (November 2016 to October 2017), cohort 3 (April 2017 to March 2018), and cohort 4 (June 2017 to May 2018). Cohort 1 was identified as a pilot cohort in which interventions to reduce HAI were developed and pilot-tested in conjunction with key stakeholders. In total, 443 short-stay and long-term acute care hospitals from 28 states and the District of Columbia participated in 4 overlapping, 10- to 12-month cohorts (Appendix Figure). In 2015 (before the intervention), the median cumulative attributable difference values for cohorts 2, 3, and 4 were as follows: CAUTI, 0.67 (interquartile range [IQR], –0.62 to 4.22); CLABSI, 1.46 (IQR, –0.02 to 5.44); CDI, 5.04 (IQR, 0.16 to 17.48); and MRSA, 0.45 (IQR, –0.15 to 2.67).Table. Characteristics of Hospitals Participating in the STRIVE ProgramAppendix Figure. States that enrolled with the STRIVE program.In total, 443 hospitals from 28 states and the District of Columbia participated. Recruitment occurred as follows: cohort 1 (June 2016 to April 2017), cohort 2 (November 2016 to October 2017), cohort 3 (April 2017 to March 2018), and cohort 4 (June 2017 to May 2018). Hashing indicates states that participated in more than 1 cohort. STRIVE = States Targeting Reduction in Infections via Engagement. Download figure Download PowerPoint Informing Change—Designing InterventionsPractice Change AssessmentDuring STRIVE, participating hospitals were asked to complete a survey instrument to identify and address gaps in HAI prevention at the beginning of cohort enrollment (baseline) and at the end of the study wave (comparison) (Figure 2). This gap assessment could be done using either the CDC's Infection Control Assessment and Response (ICAR) survey (16) or the STRIVE Practice Change Assessment (PCA). The ICAR had been previously developed for state health departments to assess infection prevention practices in hospitals. The PCA, based on the ICAR, was modified to focus on 8 domains germane to the STRIVE program. Four of the domains focused on specific HAIs—CDI, CLABSI, CAUTI, and hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infection—whereas the remaining 4 domains focused on hand hygiene, personal protective equipment, environmental cleaning, and antimicrobial stewardship.Figure 2. Education and engagement interventions implemented for participating hospitals.CDC = Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Download figure Download PowerPoint Baseline surveys were administered by each participating hospital with support and (at times) a site visit by the state partners. If a hospital had completed an ICAR in the year before STRIVE, they were able to reuse that survey for their baseline assessment. A summary report from these assessments was provided to each site, highlighting opportunities for improvement and a list of STRIVE content and resources to assist in addressing these gaps.Education: Foundational and HAI-Specific Web-Based ModulesSubject-matter experts created educational materials for 12 different topics. Development of educational materials by experts occurred via in-person meetings and work group conference calls. Two primary topic domains were identified around which program education would be focused: foundational and HAI-specific elements.The foundational domain emphasized core infection control practices that are known to have variable compliance but are critical for success of any HAI prevention initiative (for example, hand hygiene, personal protective equipment use, and environmental cleaning). Many are considered "horizontal" infection control strategies in that they affect not one but many pathogens and HAIs. Eight elements for the foundational domain were identified: 1) competency-based training, auditing, and feedback; 2) hand hygiene; 3) personal protective equipment; 4) environmental cleaning; 5) antimicrobial stewardship; 6) making an effective infection prevention business case; 7) patient and family engagement; and 8) socioadaptive strategies for preventing infection.The HAI-specific domains were concentrated on best practices for preventing CDI, CLABSI, CAUTI, and hospital-onset MRSA bloodstream infection. In total, subject-matter experts created 51 short (10 to 20 minutes), Web-based, on-demand educational modules covering key topics in the 2 domains (Appendix Table).Appendix Table. Overview of the 51 Web-Based Learning Modules Developed for the STRIVE ProgramA 2-tiered intervention approach was developed for the HAIs targeted in STRIVE. Tier 1 interventions were defined as basic, evidence-based interventions that every hospital should have in place (for example, ensuring that central lines are placed aseptically). Foundational elements remained a critical aspect across tier 1 for the HAI-specific modules as these elements generally have demonstrated success, are economically efficient, and have multiplicative effects across HAIs. Foundational elements are also crucial to have in place before more complex technical and social interventions are introduced. Tier 2 interventions were generally considered more complex, "advanced" steps for hospitals to take once tier 1 interventions were reliably in place but not leading to a decline in a particular HAI. In general, tier 2 interventions were considered to require increased human and economic capital compared with tier 1.Engaging Sites: Learning Action ForumsIn conjunction with the Web-based modules, monthly learning action forums were hosted by HRET for all cohorts. These monthly, 1-hour webinars were discussion-based and interactive and were built on supporting the didactic content from the curriculum's on-demand courses. They provided hospitals with an opportunity to share their infection prevention strategies, challenges, and successes, thereby strengthening engagement and learning across member sites. The learning action forums also allowed national subject-matter experts to interact with hospitals and answer questions related to webinar content or materials. The lead for most learning action forums was often an infection preventionist or someone with a role in quality at the local hospital. The lead would distribute the webinar information to staff, which typically included nurse managers, environmental services, frontline clinicians, and other clinical and nonclinical staff, depending on the topic of the learning action forum.Education: TAP StrategyThe TAP strategy (15) developed by the CDC can be used not only to identify facilities and units with a high burden of HAIs, but also to highlight gaps in infection prevention. In this way, finite infection prevention resources can be directed to areas of greatest opportunity. The TAP strategy incorporates the TAP reports generated in the CDC's NHSN, along with standardized assessment tools and implementation strategies for CLABSI, CAUTI, and CDI.Feedback from the cohort 1 pilot revealed that additional, more intense education and training on how best to use TAP reports was needed. Although most hospital infection preventionists had heard of the TAP strategy, most lacked in-depth knowledge, and few organizations were actively using TAP resources. Therefore, many state-level in-person meetings incorporated TAP training, provided by their state health departments, to drive increased understanding of this strategy. In addition, from June 2017 to January 2018, the CDC collaborated with HRET to develop and deliver four 90-minute webinars on how to run and interpret TAP reports and use TAP strategies and resources to maximize HAI prevention. To further support state partner knowledge of this valuable resource, the CDC provided a webinar in December 2017 for state partners, providing additional education around how to use TAP reports and strategies at the state level to promote HAI prevention work.Strengthening Partnerships Through Coaching and CollaborationState health departments and SHAs collaborated to support hospitals in administering the PCA or ICAR, interpreting results, and finding resources to address identified gaps. In addition, state health departments were instrumental in educating hospitals on running and using TAP reports, utilizing STRIVE venues, such as in-person meetings and site visits in each state, along with the SHA. In addition, the SHA program lead (and often their health department partners) supported hospitals via monthly one-on-one calls, webinars, or office hours open to all STRIVE hospitals. These touch points were used for shared learning and coaching from the state mentors and experts around barriers and action planning to reach goals. Upon request, subject-matter experts from the national program team would also join such calls to add expertise. The state partners often acted in the role of encourager and cheerleader for teams to support momentum as well.State In-Person MeetingsOn the basis of feedback from cohort 1 pilot sites, state-level in-person meetings were implemented for all participating states in cohorts 2 to 4. Although the online and virtual materials were felt to be helpful, sites in cohort 1 felt that bringing hospitals and state partners together in person was necessary to support building relationships. Such meetings also provided protected time and space for hospital participants' learning and networking with peers as well as state and national experts.ImplementationIn contrast to single-unit interventions often found in infection control projects, the focus of this program was large-system transformation (17) to influence multiple hospitals, organizations, and health care providers. The national program team developed a full STRIVE implementation plan focused on leveraging content for both foundational and HAI-specific practices. The curriculum was divided into 3 phases: onboarding to the STRIVE program, foundational infection prevention strategies, and education targeted to the program's 4 HAIs.In May 2016, onboarding started for cohort 1, which included a general program overview, team formation, and education regarding ICAR/PCA assessments and TAP strategy. The rollout for Web-based modules then occurred for cohort 1 as follows: July to October 2016 (foundational elements modules), November 2016 to January 2017 (HAI-specific tier 1 modules), and February 2017 to March 2017 (HAI-specific tier 2 modules). These modules were available to all subsequent cohorts throughout their 12-month collaborative after their onboarding. Web modules for STRIVE can be found at www.cdc.gov/infectioncontrol/training/strive.html.ConclusionThe STRIVE initiative, coordinated by the HRET and funded by the CDC, brought together state-level organizations with short-stay and long-term acute care hospitals across the country to improve infection prevention and control practices for hospitals with a disproportionately high burden of HAIs. Federal funds for this initiative were in part in response to the lessons learned with Ebola and how stakeholders were interested in strengthening state partnerships and infection control measures in preparation for any future emerging infectious disease. Through the STRIVE initiative, the architecture of preventing HAI shifted from hospital-based to instead utilizing national efforts to effect local improvement efforts in hospitals across the United States.

Responsibility for managing healthcare-associated infections: where does the buck stop?

Candidozyma (Candida) auris has emerged over the past two decades as a formidable global health threat due to its multidrug resistance, persistence in healthcare environments, and rapid nosocomial spread. Recently reclassified into the genus Candidozyma based on phylogenomic analysis, C. auris poses major challenges for both clinical management and infection control. Its ability to tolerate heat, salinity, and disinfectants supports long-term survival on surfaces and medical devices, facilitating transmission. Biofilm formation further enhances virulence and resistance to antifungal therapy. Clinical presentations range from asymptomatic colonization to invasive infections, with mortality rates approaching 50%. Echinocandins remain an important first-line treatment option, but their fungistatic activity, limited tissue penetration, and emerging resistance contribute to suboptimal outcomes, highlighting the need for new agents and optimized dosing strategies. The role of triazoles and amphotericin B is significantly limited by resistance and associated toxicities, while newer agents such as ibrexafungerp, fosmanogepix, and rezafungin show promising invitro activity but lack substantial supporting clinical data. Combination therapy may also offer potential benefit, though supporting evidence is sparse. Infection control methods including active surveillance, contact precautions, and environmental disinfection with sporicidal agents and avoidance of ineffective quaternary ammonium compounds are key to preventing the nosocomial spread of C. auris. Despite growing awareness, effective decolonization strategies are lacking, and recurrence and transmission continue to pose challenges. Ongoing efforts to refine antifungal therapy, improve rapid diagnostics, and strengthen infection control practices are essential to mitigating the spread of this pathogen and optimizing outcomes for patients.

CDC: Coordinated Strategy Will Curb Resistant Infections

Background: Candida auris, a multi-drug resistant fungal pathogen, was first detected in Tennessee healthcare facilities in 2022. C. auris can colonize a patient’s skin and cause clinical infection. Patients with clinical infections have high mortality, with a wide range of reported rates between 30 – 72%. Here we compare the risk factors associated with 30-day all-cause mortality among colonized and clinical cases in Tennessee. Method: Clinical and colonization C. auris case data was obtained from the Tennessee State Public Health Laboratory. Cases with only a skin specimen were classified as colonization, while patients with any other sterile or non-sterile collection site were classified as clinical. Mortality data was obtained through the Tennessee Office of Vital Records and matched with C. auris case information. Risk factors for multi-drug resistant organism acquisition were collected using a REDCap survey completed by facility staff. Chi-square tests were used to compare mortality and risk factor differences. All analyses were conducted in SAS Enterprise Guide v8.3. Result: Between 2022 and 2023, 130 out of 418 colonized patients (31.1%) and 33 out of 108 clinical cases (30.1%) died with no significant differences in age. Of the patients that died, 20 (60.6%) with clinical infection and 50 (38.5%) with colonization died within 30 days of specimen collection (p<.05). However, eight patients with clinical infection who died within 30 days of specimen collection were previously colonized. Risk factors associated with C. auris acquisition were available for 55 patients with clinical infection and 120 with colonization. Patients with clinical infection who died within 30 days of specimen collection were more likely to have incontinent urine (p<.05), a draining wound (p<.05), and have a gastric tube placed (p<.05) than those who survived. Patients with colonization who died within 30 days of specimen collection were more likely to have a previous stay in an inpatient rehabilitation facility (p<.01), an ambulatory surgery center (p<.01), and less likely to have a tracheostomy tube placed (p<.05) than those who survived. Conclusion: Patients with clinical C. auris infection are more likely to die within 30 days of specimen collection than patients with colonization in Tennessee. However, risk factors associated with C. auris acquisition varied between patients with clinical infection or colonization and are not consistently associated with higher mortality. Clinical teams should emphasize infection prevention and control practices that reduce the risk of invasive infection in colonized patients in all settings, regardless of perceived risk.

How does antifungal resistance vary in Candida (Candidozyma) auris and its clades? Quantitative and qualitative analyses and their clinical implications.

Health care-associated infections with methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) have been an increasing concern in Veterans Affairs (VA) hospitals. A "MRSA bundle" was implemented in 2007 in acute care VA hospitals nationwide in an effort to decrease health care-associated infections with MRSA. The bundle consisted of universal nasal surveillance for MRSA, contact precautions for patients colonized or infected with MRSA, hand hygiene, and a change in the institutional culture whereby infection control would become the responsibility of everyone who had contact with patients. Each month, personnel at each facility entered into a central database aggregate data on adherence to surveillance practice, the prevalence of MRSA colonization or infection, and health care-associated transmissions of and infections with MRSA. We assessed the effect of the MRSA bundle on health care-associated MRSA infections. From October 2007, when the bundle was fully implemented, through June 2010, there were 1,934,598 admissions to or transfers or discharges from intensive care units (ICUs) and non-ICUs (ICUs, 365,139; non-ICUs, 1,569,459) and 8,318,675 patient-days (ICUs, 1,312,840; and non-ICUs, 7,005,835). During this period, the percentage of patients who were screened at admission increased from 82% to 96%, and the percentage who were screened at transfer or discharge increased from 72% to 93%. The mean (±SD) prevalence of MRSA colonization or infection at the time of hospital admission was 13.6±3.7%. The rates of health care-associated MRSA infections in ICUs had not changed in the 2 years before October 2007 (P=0.50 for trend) but declined with implementation of the bundle, from 1.64 infections per 1000 patient-days in October 2007 to 0.62 per 1000 patient-days in June 2010, a decrease of 62% (P<0.001 for trend). During this same period, the rates of health care-associated MRSA infections in non-ICUs fell from 0.47 per 1000 patient-days to 0.26 per 1000 patient-days, a decrease of 45% (P<0.001 for trend). A program of universal surveillance, contact precautions, hand hygiene, and institutional culture change was associated with a decrease in health care-associated transmissions of and infections with MRSA in a large health care system.