Abstract
The significance of bargaining in social interaction is widely recognized. The present article describes a pair of mathematical models of two-party bargaining. One model is a two-party version of the Bush-Mosteller linear operator learning model. The second model is a nonlinear operator learning model based on Duncan Luce's choice axiom. The adequacy of the two models is examined by means of a computer simulation of the models and a set of controlled experiments. The linear learning model describes accurately in all experimental groups. The nonlinear model is not as adequate in predicting trial by trial cooperation, but is equal to the linear model in describing agreement.
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