Twists and Turns in the Life of a Remarkable Scholar

Subject. The article addresses the exports of high-technology products and services. Objectives. The purpose is to assess the impact of exports of high-technology goods and services on the condition of national economies. Methods. The study rests on a hierarchy of hypotheses from the general to the specific, i.e. that the increase in exports leads to the economic growth of the country (H1), the exports of goods and services, with varying force, affect the economic growth of the country (H2), the increase in exports of certain categories of high-technology goods directly affects the economic growth of the country (H3). In the first stage, our analysis revealed that under the world economy globalization, exports of almost all countries of the world continue growing. In the second phase, to test the hypotheses we applied methods of multivariate statistical analysis, including the study of a fixed effects model enabling to consider non-measurable individual differences of objects. Results. The study confirms H1 and H2 hypotheses. While testing the H3 hypothesis, we found that the exports of machinery and equipment, pharmaceutical products, services in the field of computer and telecommunications services affect GDP, and the exports of electronics, insurance and financial services have no statistically significant impact on GDP. Conclusions. Although the findings require further investigation of identified causal relationships, we can conclude that they may have a significant impact on feasibility and effectiveness of government measures for boosting international trade and introduced trade barriers.

This paper explores the complex role penicillin played in the relations between Britain, the USA and the USSR between the Second World War and the beginning of the Cold War through the lens of science diplomacy and the category of negotiation. In the post-war years the Soviets tried to acquire know-how on large-scale penicillin production from Britain and the USA. While the USA refused to collaborate, the British strategy was more complex. The British government allowed the Oxford team, which had discovered the antibacterial properties of penicillin, to disclose all the technology and know-how concerning large-scale penicillin production of which they were aware to the Soviets, while simultaneously trying to slow down penicillin research and production in the Soviet Union by controlling the export of certain industrial machinery, Podbielniak extractors, to Eastern Europe. By contrast, the USA put a stop to scientific and technological collaboration with the Soviets, but were less strict about the export of industrial machinery. The different strategies generated tensions between Britain and the USA, and ultimately mirrored both the British fear of an American disengagement from Europe and the American will to protect the interests of their national industry.

MODERN SOCIETIES IN EUROPE are increasingly multicultural. Sweden today is part of a multicultural and multilingual Europe, where politics, business, education, and the private sphere confront linguistic and cultural diversity. The lives of young people are, in this regard, quite different from those of their parents. Young people travel, work, and study in other countries and move in and out of their home countries more frequently than ever before. New technology facilitates access to multimodal communication with people around the world. Swedish society itself also faces changes as almost 20 percent of its inhabitants have family or roots in other countries. This development brings with it challenges and new ways of thinking in many fields of society. One important and interesting aspect of a multicultural society is the role of language, communication, and mutual understanding. Interest in seems to be growing. Various debates in Swedish media focus on issues such as the role of the Swedish as compared to that of English, the role of knowledge of the Swedish in the context of education and the labor market, and the role of tests for citizenship. Sweden can be seen in a European context as having a Swedish language model with the right to stipulated in a new law, the designation of five official minority languages, the Plain Language movement in public administration, and the state offering free training in Swedish as a second as well as instruction in children's native languages at school. This article focuses on the voices of young people in Sweden today and portrays a number of young Swedes with multicultural backgrounds. Through their voices, I wish to explore multilingualism as a crucial and contested feature of our current world from a Swedish perspective. How can the local practices of young adults in Sweden of today inform policy makers and the ideologies behind a Swedish model? THE LANGUAGE ACT OF JULY 1, 2009 Sweden has, for the most part, been described as a rather monolingual and culturally homogeneous society, embracing a majority-centred monolingualist (Wingstedt 1998, 343). At the same time, national minority groups--such as the Finns, the Romany, and the Sami--have used their languages in Sweden for several hundred years. At the same time, a process of Swedification was taking place in the new areas of the country with virtually no deliberate policy enacted by the nation-state (Teleman 2002, 27). Swedish sign has also been used and developed over a long period of time. During the period between 1850 and 1960, however, a centralized, monolingual ideology held the central position as a part of the modern nation-state building project. Minority languages, such as Tornedalian Finnish, were oppressed and the use of dialects actively discouraged in schools and public life. Since the Second World War, the sociolinguistic landscape of Sweden has become even more diversified in the context of globalization just as in many other European countries. One reason for this diversification is the use of English as the lingua franca in the economic community. Another is the arrival of new languages brought by the increasing number of immigrants. A third reason is the European Union and its declared policy of multilingualism. In this context of globalization and European Union membership, and linguistic issues receive considerable attention. Furthermore, as Milani claims (2007, 23), a nation-state receiving new forms of linguistic, symbolic resources will also experience conflicting ideologies as they seek a new form for linguistic and hence social as well as moral order. Various debates in the Swedish media focus on issues such as the role of the Swedish as compared to that of English, the role of knowledge of the Swedish in the context of education and the labor market, and the role of tests for citizenship. …

The aim of this paper is to look at the historical roots of what is frequently called the "Swedish model". This expression, already coined before World War II, can and has been used in many different ways. In Sweden it is not at all unusual to restrict it to the government-enterprises-unions relationship, characteristic of the Swedish labour market since the late 1930s, or in some cases, the early 1950s. The Swedish model will not be used here in this restricted sense but in its broadest possible meaning, that is, as synonymous with the entire social fabric of contemporary Sweden. This social fabric could briefly be depicted by the following: overwhelming social democratic hegemony, high degree of political stability, pervasive public regulation of the civil society, monopolistic state control over the welfare sector (education, health care, social security and service), a very high tax burden making the real distribution of income more a question of political decisions than of contributions to the productive process, strong organisations completing the public regulatory system, low net-wage differentials but not negligible levels of wealth inequality, insignificant degrees of poverty, and last, but by no means least, the paradox of massive institutional mechanism of support on the one hand and control on the other hand of deviant or marginal groups or individuals.

The article analyzes the current state and tendencies of development of industrial goods export from Lviv кegion to the countries of the European Union. The paper reveals that in the period 2000–2018 there was a growing tendency of the volume of industrial production, which in 2018 increased 27.6 times compared to the beginning of the analyzed period. The situation on the foreign market was also found to be positive: in 2018 the volume of export of manufactured goods increased more than 30 times compared to 2000. The peculiarities of export of goods from Lviv Region are investigated. The share of exports of goods to EU countries in the total export of goods from the Lviv Region is estimated to be significantly high and ranging from 64.2 per cent in 2010 to 78.6 per cent in 2018. A number of the largest trading partners among the European Union countries to which industrial goods from Lviv Region are exported are highlighted. The largest export of industrial goods from the EU countries was sent to Denmark, Italy, Germany, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. The dynamics and structure of export of industrial goods from Lviv Region to the countries of the European Union are presented. It is estimated that, in terms of the structure of export of industrial goods, a significant share is occupied by the export of wood and its products (11.0–11.9 per cent), textile materials and textile products (12.2–16.4 per cent), machinery, equipment and mechanisms, electrical equipment (30.6-35.1 per cent) and various industrial goods (13.7-16.5 per cent). The main reasons for the decline in exports of industrial goods from Lviv Region to the EU countries in 2018 are highlighted. In particular, such reasons are: decrease in production of some industrial products in the region, dependence on the level of world prices for these goods and on the market situation of industrial goods in EU countries, increase in export of manufactured goods to other countries of the world.

Summary The notion of a (socio-) metabolic transition has been used todescribe fundamental changes in socioeconomic energy andmaterial use during industrialization. During the last century,Japandevelopedfromalargelyagrarianeconomytooneoftheworld’s leading industrial nations. It is one of the few industrialcountries that has experienced prolonged dematerializationand recently has adopted a rigorous resource policy. This arti-cle investigates changes in Japan’s metabolism during industri-alization on the basis of a material flow account for the periodfrom 1878 to 2005. It presents annual data for material ex-traction, trade, and domestic consumption by major materialgroup and explores the relations among population growth,economic development, and material (and energy) use. Dur-ing the observed period, the size of Japan’s metabolism grewby a factor of 40, and the share of mineral and fossil materialsin domestic material consumption (DMC) grew to more than90%. Much of the growth in the Japanese metabolism wasbased on imported materials and occurred in only 20 yearsafter World War II (WWII), when Japan rapidly built up largestocks of built infrastructure, developed heavy industry, andadopted patterns of mass production and consumption. Thesurge in material use came to an abrupt halt with the firstoil crisis, however. Material use stabilized, and the economyeventually began to dematerialize. Although gross domesticproduct (GDP) grew much faster than material use, improve-mentsinmaterialintensityarearelativelyrecentphenomenon.Japanemergesasarolemodelforthemetabolictransitionbutis also exceptional in many ways.www.wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jie

This article examines the professionalization of Swedish football after the Second World War, and especially from 1967 — when the rules for amateurism were abolished — until 1990. In the middle of the 1970s, the football movement split in two groups, as a result of a long dispute about the future of the game as practiced both at club and at national level. The lines were drawn between a system introduced by two English coaches, Bob Houghton and Roy Hodgson, and the ‘Swedish model’ which developed within the framework of the Swedish Football Association. The sociological relevance of this conflict lies in the relation between changes in the existing social conditions of the game and the manner of how the game was to be played.

Following the global upsurge in conflict in the late 1980s and early 1990s, no confrontation turned out to be more devastating than the Great African War, which led to mass excess mortality with estimates ranging between 2.7 million and 5.4 million people dead in the 1998–2007 period. Unlike the First World War, with which it is often compared because of the multitude of states which battled each other on Congolese territory, Africa’s Great War cannot be defined by unambiguous start and end dates. The violence since the 1990s is perhaps more usefully thought of in analogy with Europe’s Thirty Years’ War in the 17th century or, as some historians argue, the cataclysmic conflict centered on Eurasia that encompassed both World Wars, separated only by a failing truce between 1919 and 1937. With not only alliances changing regularly in the Great African War but also a whole cast of participants joining and leaving the battlefield and the frontlines gradually blurring to the point of becoming virtually indefinable, many scholars prefer using “Congo Wars” to refer to a series of regularly interlinked but sometimes also clearly distinct conflicts—local, national, regional—waged on the territory of what was formerly known as Zaire and now as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Thus, while a narrow definition separates out a “First Congo War” (beginning in September or October 1996 [once again, depending on one’s definition!] and ending on 17 May 1997) from the “Second Congo War” (the Great African War “proper,” from 2 August 1998 to 17 December 2002), other perspectives date the start of the conflict(s) back to the Rwandan genocide and argue that the Congo Wars, in parts of the territory like North and South Kivu and Ituri, are still ongoing. This bibliography takes a relatively expansive view of the conflagration, focusing publications analyzing the central events between 1996 and 2002, but acknowledging the impressive body of scholarship that not only scrutinizes the consequences of six years of catastrophic violence but also traces ongoing localized and/or transnational conflict in the DRC. At the time of writing (summer 2019), some optimism is taking hold after the peaceful (if controversial) handover of presidential power by Joseph Kabila to Felix Tshisekedi in January 2019 following elections in December 2018; violent confrontations among militias and between rebel groups, the MONUC/MONUSCO UN force, and the state still occur regularly, but not since 2013 have insurgents (i.e., the M23 rebellion) credibly threatened to take over an entire province, let alone seek to oust the president in Kinshasa: progress by Congolese standards. Although foreign actors still meddle in Congo’s politics, they do not do so as overtly and probably also not as profusely and effectively in the 2000s. The task will fall to historians a generation from now to assess whether the Congo Wars really have been coming to an end, twenty-five years after they began raging, or whether the current moment merely turned out to be a relatively peaceful interlude separating one set of violent outbursts from another.

The Swedish welfare state was often seen as the most highly developed welfare state and a model for others to follow. In the early 1990s, however, the Swedish economy was in big trouble; the state budget had enormous deficits which the government had to cover by loans in the finance market, exposing the Swedish welfare state model to the evaluation of international capital. This article describes what happened to the welfare state in the 1990s. Was it dismantled? The Swedish experience can shed some light on two competing hypotheses. Globalisation is often seen as an irresistible force that dismantles national autonomy and particularly the possibility of generous welfare arrangements. Another line of thought, however, points out that the welfare state is highly resilient to cutbacks. Cuts are very unpopular among voters and are therefore very dangerous for politicians or parties that aspire to be re‐elected. I argue that my data show that although the Swedish welfare state was reformed in many ways in the 1990s and some cutbacks were made, the welfare state has not been dismantled. Its major attributes when compared with other countries —— e.g. its generosity, universality and developed welfare services —— are almost as prominent as before the crisis. This result is in line with the thesis of the welfare state's resilience and contradicts the globalisation thesis.

Foreign sector and welfare state in Sweden: From complementarity to tensions

In recent years, import and export activities have changed drastically, indicating that this role is important for Vietnam's economic growth and development. The purpose of this paper to assess the export development goals according to the sustainable growth model of Vietnam. Data was collected from the website of the General Statistics Office of Vietnam in the period from 1995 to 2020, using the ARIMA model, analytical results with Eviews and SAS software show that Vietnam's goods exports have achieved a sustainable growth target with a stable growth percentage of the export goods with high-tech and technical content, and the export proportion of these sectors is now up to 87% of the total. Specifically in the manufacturing industry, with top export value, accounting for 44%, machinery, transport vehicles and spare parts with export value are second, equivalent to 24%, export value of processed other goods ranked, 13%, the processed goods classified according to the fourth largest export value of 6%. The forecast results also show that this structure continues to be stable and increased with the forecast figure of up to 91.9% by 2030, especially the export of machinery, means of transport and spare parts by 2030 will increase to 33%.

The export of Japanese television programs overseas started in the 1970s and the rapid
\ngrowth of Japanese television programs globally especially in Asia started in the early 1980s.
\nHowever, in the 21st century, the glory of Japanese dramas seems to have faded and replaced by the
\n“Korean wave”. Perhaps the younger generation nowadays has not heard of “J-Pop” and here is an
\nexamination of the past consumption of the Japanese television culture outside of Japan, especially
\nAsia.

Pacifist utopias: humanitarianism, tragedy and complicity in the Second World War

Japanese kimono and the Japanese schoolboy uniform continue to interact with, and interrogate, global fashions as contemporary designers continue to call on the tropes of ‘military chic’ (Tonchi) and Japanese-inspired clothing (Kawamura).

Keywords: immigration, labor migration, Estonia, 1920s. This article studies the Estonian immigration policy of the 1920s in comparison with immigration policies implemented in other European states at that time. The aim of the article is to determine the principles influencing decisions made regarding the immigration of foreigners – that is, citizens of other states as well as persons without citizenship as a result of the First World War. In brief, the implementation of immigration controls in Europe after the end of the First World War can be explained both by economic and political factors. First, most European countries faced an economic breakdown leading to increasing unemployment rates and shortages of consumables. Thus European authorities did not welcome newcomers, who would most likely face unemployment in the receiving countries and become an additional burden to already overloaded welfare systems. However, the introduction of strict immigration restrictions for foreigners searching for jobs or residence after the end of the war has also been associated with the Great War itself, in that it inflamed nationalistic hatred among belligerents and thus had an influence on the general rise of nationalism and xenophobia in the post-war years. As this study has shown, the Estonian immigration policy did not differ much from the practice implemented in other European nation-states at that time. Like the majority of other “new” states that were established in Europe as a result of the First World War, Estonia was heavily suffering from economic breakdown in the early 1920s. The influence of rising unemployment and food shortages can be seen in the restrictive immigration policy. The desire of the Estonian authorities to control and stop the inflow of foreign citizens seeking jobs in Estonia can be seen both in limitations set for the issuance of entry permits as well as permissions to reside within the state’s territory. A direct correlation between the worsening of the economic situation and the introduction of restrictions on the immigration of foreigners can be distinguished. The most strenuous attempts to restrict the immigration of foreign citizens to Estonia were made during the years directly following the proclamation of independence, and again in 1923 when the economy was hit with a new depression. However, the influence of ethnic relations in Estonia on the formation of the immigration policy cannot be neglected. Although Estonia is known for its liberal minority policy, the loyalty of minorities – and especially of those who had belonged to the former power elites – was doubted in Estonian administrative circles in the early 1920s. Thus, the restrictions set on the immigration of persons belonging to certain ethnic groups (i.e. Russians or Germans) could also be associated with the unwillingness of the Estonian authorities to increase their numbers in Estonia. However, the restrictive policy could also be explained by attempts to stand against “nepotism” in the industrial and banking sectors (e.g., to avoid the recruitment of German rather than Estonian citizens to businesses run by the local Baltic-Germans). Several problems were also associated with the immigration of Russian refugees, whose number in Estonia has been estimated to exceed 20,000 in the early 1920s. Similarly to loyalty risks associated with the influx of communists, the loyalty of White Russians who had fought for the re-establishment of the Russian empire was seriously doubted in Estonian political circles, leading to strict surveillance of their activities in Estonia by the local police authorities as well as to restrictions set for their entry. Although refugees already residing in the state’s territory were treated differently from other persons who were not holding Estonian citizenship (e.g., they were not expelled from Estonia and were given limited unemployment benefits), their further influx was nearly banned in 1923. In all, it can be said that Estonia, similarly to other “new” European states, was suffering immense economic hardships after the end of the First World War, and the economic and security interests of the state were kept in mind by the Estonian political circles when forming the immigration policy in the 1920s. As a result, restrictions on the immigration of foreigners were introduced in order to favor the recruitment of Estonian citizens in the local labor market. Helen Rohtmets (b. 1977) is a Ph.D. student at the Institute of History and Archaeology, University of Tartu.