Tweeting Advice and Consent?: How Congress Talks About Supreme Court Nominations and Legitimacy Online

Dementia research has frequently documented high rates of caregiver depression and distress in spouses providing care for a partner suffering from dementia. However, the role of marital communication in understanding caregiver distress has not been examined sufficiently. Studies with healthy couples demonstrated an association between marital communication and the partners' psychological well-being, depressiveness, respectively (e.g., Heene, Buysee, & Van Oost, 2005). The current study investigates the relationship between caregiver depression and communication in 37 couples in which the wives care for their partners with dementia. Nonsequential and sequential analyses revealed significant correlations between caregiver depression and marital communication quality. Caregivers whose husbands used more positive communication reported less depression and distress. Additionally, caregiver depression was negatively correlated with rates of positive reciprocal communication indicating dependence between the couples' interaction patterns. This study is one of the first to illustrate the relevance of spousal communication in understanding caregiver distress and depression.

Selecting Justice: Strategy and Uncertainty in Choosing Supreme Court Nominees: Christine L. Nemacheck

Critics claim that Supreme Court nominees have become more evasive in recent decades and that Senate confirmation hearings lack real substance. Conducting a line-by-line analysis of the confirmation hearing of every nominee since 1955--an original dataset of nearly 11,000 questions and answers from testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee--Dion Farganis and Justin Wedeking discover that nominees are far more forthcoming than generally assumed. Applying an original scoring system to assess each nominee's testimony based on the same criteria, they show that some of the earliest nominees were actually less willing to answer questions than their contemporary counterparts. Factors such as changes in the political culture of Congress and the 1981 introduction of televised coverage of the hearings have created the impression that nominee candour is in decline. Further, senators' votes are driven more by party and ideology than by a nominee's responsiveness to their questions. Moreover, changes in the confirmation process intersect with increasing levels of party polarisation as well as constituents' more informed awareness and opinions of recent Supreme Court nominees.

Does public opinion influence Supreme Court confirmation politics? We present the first direct evidence that state-level public opinion on whether a particular Supreme Court nominee should be confirmed affects the roll call votes of senators. Using national polls and applying recent advances in opinion estimation, we produce state-of-the-art estimates of public support for the confirmation of nine recent Supreme Court nominees in all 50 states. We find that greater home-state public support does significantly and strikingly increase the probability that a senator will vote to approve a nominee, even controlling for other predictors of roll call voting. These results establish a systematic and powerful link between constituency opinion and voting on Supreme Court nominees. We connect this finding to larger debates on the role of majoritarianism and representation.

Does public opinion influence Supreme Court confirmation politics? We present the first direct evidence that state-level public opinion on whether a particular Supreme Court nominee should be confirmed affects the roll-call votes of senators. Using national polls and applying recent advances in opinion estimation, we produce state-of-the-art estimates of public support for the confirmation of 10 recent Supreme Court nominees in all 50 states. We find that greater home-state public support does significantly and strikingly increase the probability that a senator will vote to approve a nominee, even controlling for other predictors of roll-call voting. These results establish a systematic and powerful link between constituency opinion and voting on Supreme Court nominees. We connect this finding to larger debates on the role of majoritarianism and representation.

Previous articleNext article No AccessResearch NotesIdeology as a Factor in Senate Consideration of Supreme Court NominationsWayne SulfridgeWayne Sulfridge Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUS Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinkedInRedditEmail SectionsMoreDetailsFiguresReferencesCited by The Journal of Politics Volume 42, Number 2May, 1980 Sponsored by the Southern Political Science Association Article DOIhttps://doi.org/10.2307/2130474 Views: 20Total views on this site Citations: 11Citations are reported from Crossref Copyright 1980 Southern Political Science AssociationPDF download Crossref reports the following articles citing this article:Christopher R. Darr Civility and Social Responsibility: “Civil Rationality” in the Confirmation Hearings of Justices Roberts and Alito, Argumentation and Advocacy 44, no.22 (Feb 2017): 57–74.https://doi.org/10.1080/00028533.2007.11821678Stephen R Routh The contingency of Senate consent: a study of the determinants of roll call confirmation voting on executive branch appointments, 1945–1996, The Social Science Journal 41, no.11 (Dec 2019): 67–82.https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2003.10.006Karen J. Maschke, Susan J. Siggelakis TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: SENATORS‘ OPENING STATEMENTS AT SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATON HEARINGS, Southeastern Political Review 24, no.11 (Nov 2008): 77–97.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.1996.tb00433.xScott H. Ainsworth, John Anthony Maltese National Grange Influence on the Supreme Court Confirmation of Stanley Matthews, Social Science History 20, no.11 (Jan 2016): 41–62.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0145553200021532James G. Gimpel, Lewis S. Ringel Understanding court nominee evaluation and approval: Mass opinion in the Bork and Thomas cases, Political Behavior 17, no.22 (Jun 1995): 135–153.https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01498811L. Marvin Overby, Beth M. Henschen, Julie Strauss, Michael H. Walsh African-American Constituents and Supreme Court Nominees: An Examination of the Senate Confirmation of Thurgood Marshall, Political Research Quarterly 47, no.44 (Dec 1994): 839–855.https://doi.org/10.1177/106591299404700403 P. S. Ruckman, Jr. The Supreme Court, Critical Nominations, and the Senate Confirmation Process, The Journal of Politics 55, no.33 (Oct 2015): 793–805.https://doi.org/10.2307/2132002L. Marvin Overby, Beth M. Henschen, Michael H. Walsh, Julie Strauss Courting Constituents? An Analysis of the Senate Confirmation Vote on Justice Clarence Thomas, American Political Science Review 86, no.44 (Sep 2013): 997–1003.https://doi.org/10.2307/1964351André Bzdera L'Accord du lac Meech et le nouveau mode de sélection des juges de la Cour suprême du Canada: une réforme chimérique?., Canadian journal of law and society 4 (Jul 2014): 1–37.https://doi.org/10.1017/S0829320100001526DAVID ADAMANY, JOEL B. GROSSMAN SUPPORT FOR THE SUPREME COURT AS A NATIONAL POLICYMAKER, Law & Policy 5, no.44 (Oct 1983): 405–437.https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9930.1983.tb00307.xDavid A. Yalof Confirmation obfuscation: Supreme Court confirmation politics in a conservative era, (): 141–171.https://doi.org/10.1016/S1059-4337(08)00805-3

Wilson, Brandeis, and the Supreme Court Nomination MELVIN I. UROFSKY In late January 1916, many readers ofthe New York World chuckled as they looked at Rollin Kirby’s editorial cartoon entitled, “The Blow that Almost Killed Father.” In the drawing, Kirby showed a Wall Street big-shot—one who looked a little like J. P. Morgan—prostrate in his desk chair, the ticker-tape machine broken and leaning against the desk, a picture of the New York Stock Exchange askew on the wall, and a newspaper dropped to the ground, its headline blaring “Brandeis for the Supreme Court.” The nomination of Louis Dembitz Brandeis of Boston to replace Joseph Rucker LamarofGeorgiatriggereda four-monthbattle waged before the Senate Judiciary Committee and inthe newspapers andjournals ofthe coun­ try. For historians—and formany reformers of the time—Woodrow Wilson’s appointment of Brandeis to the nation’s highest court consti­ tutes one ofthe high points ofthe Progressive crusade and a major legacy of Wilson’s New Freedom. Forconstitutional scholars, Brandeis has long been considered one ofthe most im­ portant persons to serve on the Court, the Justice who—among other accomplishments in his twenty-three years on the bench—first suggested that the Due Process Clause of the FourteenthAmendmentshouldincorporatethe liberties protected by the Bill ofRights,1 artic­ ulatedatheoryoffree speechtiedto citizenship that remains at the core of our First Amend­ mentjurisprudence,2 put forth the proposition that the Constitution protected an individual right to privacy,3 and limited the power of the federal courts in an attempt to reinvigorate the federal system.4 We are, however, not concerned in this ar­ ticle with Brandeis’ enduring achievements on the Supreme Court, nor even with the bruising confirmation battle that took place before he could take the oath ofoffice.5 Rather, we want to look at thereasons thatPresident Wilson had for making such a controversial appointment, as well as the reasons why Brandeis, who for so many years had been a fierce critic of the courts, decided to accept. I would like to sug­ gest that, as in so many things in public life, we find here a mix ofthe overtly political and the deeply personal. 146 JOURNAL OF SUPREME COURT HISTORY The appointment of Louis Dembitz Brandeis (left) to replace Joseph Rucker Lamar (right) on the Supreme Court in 1916 marked a high point of the Progressive crusade but was a controversial move for President Woodrow Wilson. For Wilson, the Brandeis appointment can be seen as a means not only of shoring up his chances to be re-elected to the White House in 1916, but also ofrewarding a loyal political ally and putting a man on the Court who fulfilled ideals that Wilson himselfhad once held to be unattainable.6 Wilson had been elected by less than a majority of the popular vote in 1912, although he had a comfortable margin in the Elec­ toral College.7 Had Theodore Roosevelt not bolted from the Republican party in 1912, it is possible—even likely—-that Wilson would have lost to William Howard Taft. The coun­ try was at peace and prosperous, two condi­ tions that usually favor an incumbent seek­ ing re-election. In 1916, Theodore Roosevelt had seemingly made his peace with the GOP, which united behind the austere Charles Evans Hughes ofNew York, a successful reform gov­ ernor ofNew York who had resigned from the Court to run for the White House. For Wilson to win the election, he had to gain the support of those social-justice progressives who had rallied behind Roosevelt’s Bull Moose Party in 1912. The core of Wilson’s original New Free­ dom had little that appealed to that group, other than the reduction of tariffs embodied in the 1913 Underwood Tariff. The establishment of the federal reserve system constituted an im­ portant step in creating a modern banking sys­ tem needed to avert crises like the “bankers’ panic” of 1907, but it did little to speak to the concerns of people such as Jane Addams of Hull House. The reform of the antitrust law in the 1914 Clayton Act may have pleased some labor leaders because of its supposed exemp­ tion of unions from antitrust prohibitions...

The traditional process of educating undergraduates is often relegated to the passive lecturing format. One means of engaging students in active learning is through the use of simulations. Students were asked to take on the roles of United States senators and a Supreme Court nominee during a United States Supreme Court confirmation hearing simulation. Each student participated by researching a sitting senator and the nominee selected and engaged in a question-and-answer session as is done in the Senate Judiciary Committee. Students came away from this valuable experience by not only learning a great deal about the operation of the confirmation hearing as well as the substantive material learned but participating in a process that few people will ever actually experience.

ObjectiveThis study uses counterfactual analysis to assess whether a hypothetical Supreme Court with Robert Bork as a member would have decided cases differently than the actual Supreme Court.MethodsI utilize both a qualitative analysis, and a quantitative Bayesian counterfactual model to predict Supreme Court case outcomes from 1988 to 2012.ResultsThe results show that several salient cases would have been decided differently, most of the decisions decided over the time frame would have remained unchanged. I also find that a hypothetical Supreme Court with Robert Bork as an associate justice would not have radically shifted rightward. Rather, the results show a brief rightward shift from 1991 to 1994, and a much longer and stronger rightward shift occurring after 2001.ConclusionThe results suggest that scholars and pundits need to think more carefully about which Supreme Court nominees are should be contested in the advice and consent process – at least on political or ideological grounds.

Since the appointment of John M. Harlan II in 1955, every Supreme Court nominee has testified in a Senate Judiciary Committee hearing. These hearings provide a fertile ground for senator ideologies, partisanship, and political forces to be on full display. However, little research has systematically analyzed confirmation hearings for Supreme Court nominees. In this paper, quantitative sentiment analysis is used on the transcripts of Supreme Court confirmation hearings between 1969 and 2018. By leveraging sentiment analysis, the attitudes of each of the senators during the hearings can be measured. Investigating the correlative impact that variables at the senator, institution, and nomination levels have on sentiment creates a better understanding of the factors that may influence a senator’s attitude during the hearings. A positive correlative effect on sentiment was found with an increase in the percentage of the vote the nominating president received during his most recent election in the senator’s home state. A positive correlation was also found when the nominating president and a senator were members of the same political party. Additionally, a statistically significant negative correlation was measured when the departing justice was a swing voter and when the hearing was aired on television. This research points to new avenues for using textual data to study partisanship and ideological polarization.

This study evaluates the influence of partisan identity on individuals’ reactions to interest group advertisements about US Supreme Court nominees. Using a survey experiment, we expose partisan respondents to authentic interest group advertisements strategically crafted to sway public opinion on the nominations of Amy Coney Barrett and Ketanji Brown Jackson to the US Supreme Court. With advertisements from both co-partisan and out-partisan groups, we investigate how exposure to interest group advertisements shape a partisan’s stance toward each nominee. Our analysis focuses on messages that either align with or challenge a respondent’s existing partisan beliefs, aiming to further understand the interplay between exposure to political advertising, the strength of partisan identity, and attitudes about Supreme Court nominees. In addition, we explore the differences in how Democrats and Republicans respond specifically to these advertisements.

The Senate's rejections of the nominations of Clement Haynsworth and G. Harrold Carswell to the Supreme Court were the second and third in the present century and the ninth and tenth nominees formally rejected by the Senate in the history of the Court.' Not since Grover Cleveland has a President had two successive nominees to the same seat on the Supreme Court-or even two nominees-rejected by the Senate.2 That there should be two bitter battles over a Supreme Court nomination is neither surprising nor, in itself, any cause for alarm. When the Court is closely divided on current issues, any single appointment may be viewed as having a decisive impact on a wide range of future decisions. Controversy over the Supreme Court nominations is but a healthy reflection of the key role which the Court plays in the political system. Opposition to a presidential nominee is a traditional and effective way of challenging and focusing attention

Contents: Series preface Introduction. The Selection and Retention of Judges: Senate voting on Supreme Court nominees: a neoinstitutional model, Charles M. Cameron, Albert D. Cover and Jeffrey A. Segal The politics of Supreme Court nominations: a theory of institutional constraints and choices, Brian J. Moraski and Charles R. Shipan Constituent influence in State Supreme Courts: conceptual notes and a case study, Melinda Gann Hall. Judicial Decision Making: Divisions of opinion among justices of the US Supreme Court, C. Herman Pritchett On the mysterious demise of consensual norms in the United States Supreme Court, Thomas G. Walker, Lee Epstein and William J. Dixon The study of judicial decision-making as an aspect of political behavior, Glendon A. Schubert Sophisticated voting and gate-keeping in the Supreme Court, Gregory A. Caldiera, John R. Wright and Christopher J.W. Zorn Predicting Supreme Court cases probabilistically: the search and seizure cases, Jeffrey A. Segal Voting behavior in the United States Courts of Appeals 1961-64, Sheldon Goldman Judicial policy-making and southern school segregation, Michael W. Giles and Thomas G.Walker, Civic virtue and the feminine voice in constitutional adjudication, Suzanna Sherry What do judges and justices maximize? (the same thing everybody else does), Richard A. Posner Strategic policy considerations and voting fluidity on the Burger Court, Forrest Maltzman and Paul J, Wahlbeck. Constraints on Judicial Power: Lower court checks on Supreme Court power, Walter F. Murphy Judicial partisanship and obedience to legal doctrine: whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, Frank B. Cross and Emerson H. Tiller Overriding Supreme Court statutory interpretation decisions, William N. Eskridge Jr The logic of strategic defection: court-executive relations in Argentina under dictatorship and democracy, Gretchen Helmke. The Role of Courts in Democracies: Decision-making in a democracy: the supreme court as a na

The standard “political capital” model of going public assumes presidents do not face mobilized opponents. But often presidents must fight against opponents who themselves go public. We propose studying such situations with an “opinion contest” framework and use new data on Supreme Court nominations to contrast the political capital and opinion contest approaches. From 1930 to 2009 presidents went public over Supreme Court nominees primarily when groups mobilized against the nominee. Republican presidents did so particularly when their nominee would move the Supreme Court's median to the right. When going public, presidents typically engaged in “crafted talk.” Finally, going public was associated with more negative votes in the Senate, not fewer, because presidents went public over Supreme Court nominees only when battling an active opposition.

Critics claim that Supreme Court nominees have become more evasive in recent decades and that Senate confirmation hearings lack real substance. Conducting a line-by-line analysis of the confirmation hearing of every nominee since 1955—an original dataset of nearly 11,000 questions and answers from testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee—Dion Farganis and Justin Wedeking discover that nominees are far more forthcoming than generally assumed. Applying an original scoring system to assess each nominee's testimony based on the same criteria, they show that some of the earliest nominees were actually less willing to answer questions than their contemporary counterparts. Factors such as changes in the political culture of Congress and the 1981 introduction of televised coverage of the hearings have created the impression that nominee candor is in decline. Further, senators' votes are driven more by party and ideology than by a nominee's responsiveness to their questions. Moreover, changes in the confirmation process intersect with increasing levels of party polarization as well as constituents' more informed awareness and opinions of recent Supreme Court nominees.