Trump’s Politics Continue to Weaken BRICS Countries’ Functionality But Also Bring Opportunities

Las elecciones de Donald Trump, como candidato presidencial del Partido Republicano prime-ro y como presidente de Estados Unidos después, evidenciaron la crisis ideológica y operativa preponderante en los dos principales partidos políticos estadounidenses; aún más, la resultan-te administración de Trump ha desafiado abiertamente parte de los cimientos demoliberales del sistema político estadounidense. El presente ensayo analiza instancias distintivas del desa-fío que la elección y la presidencia de Donald Trump han representado para los fundamentales, pero delicados equilibrios de poder del sistema político estadounidense, así como sus implica-ciones para las elecciones generales de 2020. Especial énfasis se pone sobre el formato sui géneris invertido del populismo de Donald Trump.

Donald Trump’s victory as the 45 th President of the United States had negative responses on the ASEAN countries, especially on the stock market performance. This study conducted to investigate the existence of integration and contagion effect on the capital market of the ASEAN-5 countries after the election of Donald Trump. The five countries used in the research were Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. The five countries selected based on the highest FDI (foreign direct investment) flows among other ASEAN countries. Vector Error Correction models (VECM) and Granger Causality tests used as the analysis tools in the study. The daily closing stock price index of ASEAN-5 countries in 2016–2017 collected to be analyzed. The result of VECM model analysis and Granger causality test found the integration and contagion effect of the capital market in ASEAN-5 countries. The Granger Causality test showed that the Philippines had a contagion effect from other ASEAN-5 countries after the election of Donald Trump as the 45 th President of the United States. In addition, it also found a two-way causal relationship between Singapore and Thailand, which showed that these two countries gave each other contagion effects. JEL Classification : G31, G32, G34 DOI : https://doi.org/10.26905/jkdp.v22i4.1990

U.S.–Southeast Asia Relations under the Trump Administration Joseph Chinyong Liow (bio) The election of Donald Trump as the 45th president of the United States has occasioned intense discussion over the likely shape of his administration's foreign policy toward Southeast Asia. Two broad views have emerged in this regard. The first contends that the political neophyte will attempt to make good on his campaign promises to reconsider U.S. commitments to friends and allies, and this will lead him to depart from prevailing policy toward East Asia and upend the order that has undergirded the region's prosperity and economic dynamism. A second view maintains that, after an initial period of bluster, good sense will prevail and policy toward Asia will fall back into a more familiar pattern as a result of geostrategic realities, combined with the appointment of cabinet members who by most measures are of the order of previous incumbents. Needless to say, the dust has yet to settle on this debate, and it continues to be followed with great interest—not to mention a fair amount of trepidation—around the world, not least in Southeast Asia. The first part of this essay highlights the key differences that have emerged in U.S. policy toward Southeast Asia under the Obama and Trump administrations. The essay then concludes by discussing the outlook for U.S.–Southeast Asia relations and identifying several reasons for concern. Differences between the Obama and Trump Administrations' Policies toward Asia The Barack Obama years were heady days for Southeast Asia. Not since the ill-fated Vietnam War era had the United States paid as much attention and devoted as many resources to the region. Obama's Asia policy, christened the "pivot" and later the "rebalance," saw the United States initiate the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue and accede to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation established by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the way to joining the East Asia Summit. During his presidency, Obama visited all Southeast Asian countries except for Brunei (which he would have visited in October 2013 if [End Page 53] not for the U.S. government shutdown). To demonstrate the comprehensive nature of the rebalance, the Obama administration joined—and eventually led—discussions for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which was pitched as the "gold standard" for global trade and involved twelve Pacific Rim countries, including four from Southeast Asia. At the time, the hope and ambition surrounding the TPP also held out the prospect of other regional states coming on board in the future. With the inauguration of the Trump administration in January, Southeast Asian countries found themselves staring at the prospect of a considerable rollback of U.S. interest in the region. In nursing these fears, they were not alone. U.S. allies Japan, South Korea, and Australia shared similar concerns. Candidate Trump's decision to adopt a cantankerous line toward China is hardly unusual for U.S. presidential campaigns. What caused greater consternation was his suggestion that he would withdraw the United States from the TPP and review the country's security commitments to regional allies South Korea and Japan. Trump did little to dispel these concerns following his electoral victory in November. He chose to break with tradition and receive a phone call from the independence-leaning Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen. This was followed by capricious comments about possibly reviewing Washington's long-standing one-China policy. Days after assuming office, Trump withdrew the United States from the TPP by means of executive order. The appointment of China hawks to key positions on trade did little to dampen the growing adversarial climate. Meanwhile, during his confirmation hearing, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson suggested that efforts should be made to prevent China from having access to the artificial islands it had built in the South China Sea, raising concerns that Sino-U.S. relations were headed for conflict. Four and a half months since his inauguration, President Trump's approach to East Asia appears to be more considered than many pundits and observers were expecting. Visits by Secretary of Defense James Mattis, Secretary Tillerson, and Vice President Mike Pence to...

The 2016 U.S. presidential election of Donald Trump generated a newfound surge in political advocacy that greatly benefitted certain nonprofits and grassroots organizations. One of these organizations was the American Civil Liberties Union, a nonpartisan nonprofit dedicated to protecting and defending civil liberties and rights in the U.S. The ACLU received an unprecedented number of donations following Election Day and has since pursued an aggressive campaign against President Donald Trump. In order to explore this phenomenon, this thesis analyzed the ACLU’s rhetoric between Presidents George W. Bush and Donald Trump (both Republicans) and between Presidents Barack Obama (Democrat) and Donald Trump (Republican) to see if their rhetoric changed according to the president’s political party affiliation. This study utilized qualitative content analysis to not only count the number of times the president was mentioned negatively but to also analyze the meaning behind their rhetoric. While the ACLU prides itself on being nonpartisan, it was found that the organization has been tougher on Republican administrations in the past two decades both in how often they use negative rhetoric toward a president and their aggressive diction. The election of President Donald Trump, however, has provided a stark example of the organization’s change in rhetoric toward presidents over time. The ACLU has both drastically increased the how often they talk about the president and how often they use negative rhetoric against him. This thesis then explored the ethics behind their decision to pursue an aggressive, arguably partisan campaign against the President, taking into account how this affects the ACLU’s stakeholders. These groups include their donors/dues-paying members, those they represent in court, the American public and the U.S. government. This thesis contributes to the growing body of knowledge surrounding the Trump presidency and its effects on the American landscape. In particular, this study adds to our understanding of how a political, nonpartisan nonprofit changed their rhetoric toward a president whose policies go against their mission statement.

The current phase in international relations can be best characterized by one word – transition. The Post-Cold War order is rapidly disappearing, creating strategic ambiguity for all actors. The U.S. hegemony is over or close to over despite the fact that militarily Washington will be safely far out of reach for several decades to come. However, the growing national debt, the looming crisis in the Social Security and Medicare systems, uncontrolled migration, growing populism and partisan fighting does not bode well for the future of U.S. dominance. At the same time, no nation, be it China, Russia, India or Brazil, has the necessary resources or will to compete for the new world hegemony. The absence of a world hegemon means that no state has the power to enforce the implementation of key international rules and norms. Regardless how one perceives the international principles – as balanced or biased – the rule-based order at least provides a minimal level of stability since the actors involved on the international stage have a clear understanding what may and may not be done. However, since the late 2000s the situation has changed. We are increasingly facing an international security architecture where key actors may easily break the norms and rules, and this will eventually bring us to a situation upon which no rules can be based. The election of President Trump sent shock waves through the United States’ political establishment and surprised international relations pundits worldwide. Despite the apparent growth of the right-wing populist movements in different parts of the world, the culmination of which was presumably the BREXIT referendum held in June 2016, few if any could imagine that a real estate developer and reality TV star had any chance of defeating one of the most respected representatives of the US political establishment. The November 2016 elections had widespread implications on both American domestic and foreign policies. President Trump’s decision to denounce globalism created a situation where the so-called “vertical globalism” (Western-led efforts to spread a liberal international order all over the world through the promotion of democracy and a market economy) might be transformed into a “horizontal globalism” based on regional integration models covering vast territories of Europe and Asia, Africa and Latin America. In this paper we will analyze President Trump’s foreign policy in several key geographical areas and its implications. However, in order to better understand the significant changes in U.S. foreign policy ushered in by President Trump and make predictions for future developments, it is worth starting with an examination of Trump’s foreign policy perceptions as well as of the ongoing debates within the foreign policy establishment itself.

This study intends to explore the rise of Donald Trump to the White House. Why was Donald Trump considered a populist leader, and how did his populist rhetoric and actions impact the contours of American domestic and foreign policies? The study adopted qualitative exploratory and explanatory research techniques. Specific methods utilised to conduct the study remained political personality profiling. It finds that the populist leaders construct the binaries in the society by dividing the nation into two groups: �us� the people, against �them� the corrupt elite or other groups presented as a threat to the lives and livelihood of the nation. Though populism as a unique brand of politics remained active through most of the US history, yet these were only two occasions that populists were successful in winning the American presidential elections � Andrew Jackson in 1828 and Donald Trump in 2016. Structural and historical reasons became the biggest cause behind the election of Donald Trump, who successfully brought a revolution in American domestic and foreign policies. And if structural issues in the United States are not addressed, there is a clear chance that Trump � who is not withering away � will come back to contest and challenge any competitors in the 2024 presidential elections.

The election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States meant that the American people for the first time in 70 years elected a president who was against transatlantic cooperation including the cooperation on security within the framework of NATO. During his first 30 months in office, Donald Trump kept a remarkable number of the foreign policy promises he issued during the election campaign in 2016. It is surprising that the president did not take drastic steps toward the American commitment to NATO. The chapter asks why there was this disconnect between words and deeds when it came to transatlantic cooperation on security. It is the argument of the chapter that a number of domestic circumstances contribute to explaining the puzzling lack of coherent action by Donald Trump when it comes to NATO. The combination of three domestic variables, the crucial position of NATO within American strategic culture, a favorable public opinion and clear signals from Congress, has been capable of restraining the impact of an impulsive and unpredictable president. It explains why the United States remains in the NATO in spite of Donald Trump’s heavy attacks on the European partners.

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy

Since the election of President Trump and the dawning of the #MeToo movement, gender-salient issues have had a primary place in recent American politics. This was particularly evident in 2018 in th...

President Trump’s tariff announcements have taken a wrecking ball to the global system of international trade, pushing US tariff rates back to early 20th century levels. Following the suspension of ‘reciprocal’ tariffs, the UK’s exposure to automotive and possible “major” pharmaceutical tariffs, means we are set to be affected by more than many other countries, with the notable exception of China. But as well as the direct impacts of the tariffs, President Trump’s approach to policy making has led to huge uncertainty about the ‘new normal’ for tariffs. This uncertainty has triggered wild swings in financial markets and could lead to a global recession, affecting the UK economy through lower confidence and tighter financial conditions, exacerbating the trade impact.

The impact of US tariffs imposed by the Trump administration on Thailand raises concerns about the strategies the government and corporations should follow to mitigate the negative effects on Thai exports. This paper analyzes the mathematical and statistical certainties of US tariff impact absorption by the RCEP countries, considering the worst-case scenario of a 36% US tariff on Thai exports. Two independent analyses are applied here: the first relates to the certainties that RCEP countries could fully rescue Thai exports, and the second considers that these exports could be rescued by just 95%. Both scenarios use a Monte Carlo simulation method of analysis, assuming in all cases that export sales increase by 5% in all RCEP member countries where Thai exports already take place. The research focuses on the top 50 Thai exports, considering a 4-digit HS code, which accounts for a total of 65.2% of Thai exports. The results vary depending on product categories, industry, the concentration of exports in different countries, and the relative weight of the US and RCEP countries in the analysis. Nonetheless, the findings suggest that the likelihood of RCEP fully rescuing Thai exports is low, although the chances increase significantly when the rescue covers 95% of the potential damage.

The Crisis of Liberal Internationalism:The Legacies of the League of Nations Reconsidered David Petruccelli The liberal order appears to be coming apart at the seams. The global economic crisis, rising authoritarianism, growing resentment of foreigners, and populist revolt against the political establishment have led many commentators to look to the 1930s as a point of reference. Nowhere has this impulse been more pronounced than in the United States, where a procession of historians rushed to offer their expert opinions for or against the frequently drawn parallels between the Donald Trump's victory in the 2016 presidential election and the rise of fascism and Nazism in interwar Europe.1 Historians of the United States, meanwhile, have explored the domestic fascist traditions that provided fertile soil for Donald Trump's ascendance.2 Such historical analogies have not been confined to the United States. In Europe, the [End Page 111] electoral gains of populist political parties railing against globalization, liberalism, and immigration has evoked similar comparisons to the 1930s.3 Such historical analogies risk obscuring more than they illuminate. They draw their urgency from an implicit warning—the crises of the 1930s led to the Second World War and the Holocaust—without directly confronting the critical question of whether the mounting challenges to the liberal order make major conflict and genocide more likely. Foreign policy experts warning of the impending demise of the liberal international order have, on the whole, been more measured in their diagnoses, rarely resorting to the kinds of comparisons to the 1930s so common in commentaries on domestic politics. Such prognostications predate the recent crisis. Already during the presidency of George W. Bush, foreign policy experts pointed to America's turn from its longstanding traditions of liberal internationalism as marking a historic watershed. But the twin shocks of the vote for Brexit and election of Donald Trump in 2016 have lent them credence outside of the narrow circles of foreign policy experts.4 If debates about the future of liberal internationalism have eschewed [End Page 112] direct comparisons to the 1930s, however, the specter of the interwar decades nonetheless looms large. "Liberal internationalism" is, in one sense, a term in search of a history. Beginning in the 1980s and gaining steam after the Cold War, scholars in the field of international relations developed the concept of liberal internationalism to characterize an approach to foreign relations that emphasized the role of international institutions and networks rather than principally sovereign states. In the United States, an influential cohort of foreign policy experts pushed the U.S. government to adopt what they labeled a "liberal internationalist" agenda that would bind it to the open, rules-based order even as it emerged as the world's sole superpower.5 The propagation of the idea of liberal internationalism has rested on three layers of historical revisionism. First, its advocates have attempted to reread America's Cold War foreign policy, emphasizing not the Realpolitik of Washington's approach to the Soviet Union but rather its successful construction of a liberal international order among its allies in Europe and East Asia.6 This has allowed them to argue that the ideology of liberal internationalism has been the key component of a kind of benign American hegemony that has ensured the relative peace and prosperity enjoyed by the West since the Second World War. Second, liberal internationalists have sought to reinterpret the crisis of interwar internationalism and the origins of the Second World War. They have rejected the longstanding view that Woodrow Wilson's program for the spread of liberal democracy through the League of Nations was irredeemably flawed, though they admit that the post-1945 "liberal internationalism 2.0" successfully addressed at least some of the very real weaknesses of this order.7 It was largely the vagaries of American domestic politics and personal failings on the part of Wilson, who proved incapable of brokering a deal to secure American entry into the [End Page 113] League, that had doomed his earlier project. Liberal internationalists have therefore shown a curious preoccupation with reviving "Wilsonianism," offering it as a roadmap for American foreign policy in the twenty-first century.8 This rehabilitation of Woodrow Wilson is...

“The return of isolationism”, “the demise of multilateralism”, “the end of globalization”… these alarmist headlines have dominated analyses of America’s place in the world since the election of Donald Trump. This applies to the trade policy sphere, where Donald Trump’s nationalist and protectionist discourse has strongly departed from the dominant free trade narrative of his predecessors. Yet, if America’s retreat from multilateral and regional institutions is clear in many policy spheres – c...

Donald Trump, US foreign policy and potential impacts on Iran's tourism industry: Post-nuclear deal

PurposeThe recent vote for Britain to exit the European Union and the election of Donald Trump as the President of the USA has been described as events that bring an end to globalization and indeed seen as a reversal of the globalization process. A possible reason for this is that both choices are thought to be premised on inward-looking objectives rather than having global objectives. This paper aims to offer an opinion that this view is flawed. This is because integration, which is used to approach globalization, is not a one-way process seeking greater levels of integration, but rather a tool to address global challenges, which will involve making choices on the degree of integration that is thought necessary at a particular time. In other words, based on what is perceived as necessary at a given time, selective interconnectivity is used to reflect the level of integration desired. Owing to the degree of global income inequality, a high degree of integration will pose difficulties as a shift in production centres. Further, immigration will bring not only economic but also socio-cultural and political implications in even the economically strongest nations.Design/methodology/approachThe paper considers the definition of integration to justify why there are limits placed on the level of integration. In this regard, when the position of individual components is so unequal, there will be limits put on levels of integration due to economic, socio-cultural, and political concerns.FindingsDelocalization does not exist. The Brexit vote and President Trump’s Presidential bid success are all part of the globalization process, where from time to time, the levels of integration will slow down. This does not suggest backtracking on globalization.Research limitations/implicationsThe discussion and analysis in this paper are significant as they offer an unexplored perspective into current discussions on the Brexit vote and President Trump’s election into office. The discussion and analysis are rigorous in that they are precise and robust in examining the historical evolution to the international trading system to explain why the predominant view on deglobalization is a misunderstanding of the matters that influence globalization and integration.Practical implicationsThe paper offers a practical and logical explanation to concerns regarding what is termed as deglobalization by providing an analysis and insight into the current global challenges, in particular income inequality, as an environment within which choices have to be made.Social implicationsIn the discussion, subsequent to Trump’s successful bid for US presidency and the Brexit vote, there has been a frenzy in opinions regarding the implications of these milestones. This paper debunks the exaggerations offered by explaining how and why these milestones are nothing new by examining the history of the international trading system.Originality/valueThis paper is original as it offers a fresh perspective on the deglobalization debate. It provides a discussion from the global income inequality perspective to explain why and how important are global challenges upon domestic choices and how this, in turn, relates to globalization and integration.