Transnational social media communication and erosion of trust in US democracy: Evidence from a survey of Latinx Americans

type="graphical" xml:id="gpol12235-abs-0001"> Democracy requires the critical engagement of practitioners and experts alike.

Purpose– The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of damage incurred by the trustor as a result of a trust violation and the impact of different levels of post-violation trust repair behaviours by the trustee on the subsequent erosion of trust.Design/methodology/approach– Data were collected from 232 middle to senior level managers using a two-part scenario-based experimental design to test the impact of damage incurred (avoided) and post-violation repair behaviour. Respondents’ levels of trust were measured pre- and post-violation as well as forgiving and a range of demographic variables.Findings– Results showed that trust eroded independent of the level of damage that may have been caused. Further, post-violation trust repair behaviour by the trustee led to a significantly lower erosion of trust as compared to not engaging in such behaviours. Furthermore, erosion of trust was minimized, when the trustee engaged in increasing levels of trust repair behaviour. Results also showed that trustors who were relatively more forgiving were less likely to lose trust in the trustee after a violation.Research limitations/implications– In this study we focused on two key factors influencing the erosion of trust. Further factors need to be identified and empirically tested in order to get a more holistic view on how trust erodes. The results serve as one step towards building an integrated model of trust erosion.Practical implications– For practicing managers, the results imply that the actual incurrence or avoidance of damages from a trust violation appears to be peripheral – trustors are more concerned about the violation as a principle and a harbinger of similar future incidents. Further, quickly engaging in trust repair behaviours, such as offering an a good explanation, a heartfelt apology, and appropriate remedy, helps minimize the erosion of trust.Originality/value– This paper addresses an under-investigated facet of trust research in organizations – erosion of trust – which is especially crucial in light of the growing awareness that most organizational relationships actually start off with high levels of trust rather than low trust. Thus, this study offers insights into maintaining (as opposed to building) trust.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of the trustor's responsibility‐attributions for a trust violation and the trustee's frequency of prior violations on the subsequent erosion of trust in the relationship.Design/methodology/approachData were collected from 120 middle‐senior level managers using a two‐part scenario‐based experimental design to test the impact of attributions and frequency of violations. Respondents' levels of trust and distrust were measured pre‐ and post‐violation as well as forgiving and a range of demographic variables.FindingsResults showed that trust eroded (and distrust increased) more when trustors perceived the trustees as not wanting to fulfill the trust‐expectations than when they could not do so. Further, trustors were willing to tolerate a maximum of two violations before trust in the relationship eroded significantly. The results also showed that trustors who were relatively more forgiving were less likely to lose trust in the trustee after a violation, as were younger and less experienced individuals.Research limitations/implicationsAlthough scenario‐based experiments assess the cognitive states of the respondents rather than actual behaviors, they serve as a valuable first step. By highlighting the two‐step sequence that may underlie the trust erosion process and emphasizing the importance of using an attributional perspective, the paper invites future research on a range of factors such as patterns of violation, degrees of damage, etc. Collectively, they ought to lead to an integrated model of trust erosion.Practical implicationsFor practicing managers, the results underscore the importance of maintaining trust by constantly meeting expectations. While they may be forgiven for one‐time mistakes in maintaining trust, they cannot be repeated without severely damaging the trust in the relationship. Also, employees need to be convinced that the erring manager or colleague has done his/her very best to prevent the violation.Originality/valueThis paper addresses an under‐investigated facet of trust research in organizations – erosion of trust – which is especially crucial in light of the growing awareness that most organizational relationships actually start off with high levels of trust rather than low trust. Thus, this study offers insights into maintaining (as opposed to building) trust.

This piece examines the substance of EU democracy promotion from a comparative point of view and from a perspective placing under inquiry the meaning of the idea of liberal democracy itself. Instead of assuming that the democratic ideal that the EU promotes (‘liberal democracy’) has a clear, fixed meaning, the article examines in detail what actually constitutes the ‘ideal of democracy’ at the heart of EU democracy promotion, and compares this vision to that which informs the democracy promotion of the US. It argues that interesting differences, and shifts and oscillations, in the models of liberal democracy that the EU and the US promote exist and that these are important to note in order for us to fully appreciate how the substance of EU and US democracy support can be shaped by conceptual and ideological debate on the meaning of democracy. This dynamic is particularly relevant today, in the context of the recent attempts to develop transatlantic dialogue on democracy support. This dialogue, it is suggested, plasters over some subtle but important ideological cracks over what is meant by democracy in EU and US democracy support.

This study, guided by family communication patterns theory, examined the role of family communication in political socialization. We tested whether certain communication styles were associated with higher levels of political similarity within the family. Additionally, the independent influences of the mother and father, as well as the direction of these influences, were considered. Results suggest that different communication styles are associated with higher levels of political similarity. Additionally, it was found that children were more likely to share their mothers' political attitudes than their fathers'. Explanations for these findings are discussed and implications focusing on the role of communication in the socialization literature are considered.

Abstract. The article explores the issue of emotional well-being among Ukrainian youth during wartime and identifies key socio-political factors affecting the level of subjective happiness of Generation Z. The study highlights the specifics of well-being formation in the context of political socialization, information overload, and institutional trust. The research is based on an online survey of young people aged 15 to 30, using descriptive statistics, correlation and regression analysis, clustering, and thematic analysis of open-ended responses. The analysis reveals that the most significant predictor of subjective well-being is the respondent's vision of Ukraine’s future: optimism correlates positively with happiness, while pessimism corresponds to a decline in well-being. It is also generalized that a happier social environment is associated with a higher personal level of happiness. The study emphasizes that political interest and trust in institutions do not independently determine happiness, but their interaction (particularly with trust in the President) can substantially impact emotional well-being. Key risk factors for low happiness include older age (25–30), frequent consumption of war-related news, and low trust in the Parliament. It is argued that regular exposure to wartime news contributes to information overload and emotional exhaustion. Cluster analysis identifies four youth groups differing in happiness and political attitudes. The happiest are those disinterested in politics, whereas the least happy are politically active yet disillusioned citizens. The study substantiates that deep distrust in institutions and pessimism about the future are core drivers of emotional instability. The practical value of the study lies in identifying key determinants of youth happiness under crisis and formulating recommendations to foster positive expectations, social support, and information hygiene strategies. Keywords: subjective happiness, Generation Z, war, Zoomers, political socialization, political culture.

On a democratic society, it is desirable to consolidate the relation between citizens and political system through a participatory political culture. Romania – as others post-communism spaces – is characterized by a low level of political communication, poor civic involvement and insufficiently cooperation between government and citizens. During this context, the position of the new generation is crucial in consolidating democracy. Previous studies showed that the young Romanian is perceived rather as an outsider in the relation with the system, have a low trust in institutions by comparison with other age categories, and is not optimistic regarding the capacity of public contestation. On long term, these issues can lead either to a decrease of interest on civic engagement and – in time – to the emergence of a democratic deficit or a subject political culture, or to the emergence of anti-system positions. Nowadays, young people have new tools to help developing a participatory culture, such as new media, new forms of political socialization, an increasing interest in non-governmental organizations et. al. The purpose of the paper is to approach a set of indicators specific to civic and political involvement, using data from a sociological quantitative study conducted on a sample of 430 undergraduates’ students from three specializations: Sociology, Social Work and Human Resources (“Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iasi), in order to observe their civic and political attitudes.

We The PeOPleS' 95 intensity on an individual rights issue (Snow, 2001).At a later stage, analysing the organization's collective identity, ideology, belief, expertise, objective and goal point to its lobbying strategies in terms of the venues or arenas it chooses to act in (Pralle, 2010). At international levelAt international level, collective action, analysed with mobilization theory, coupled with international relations theory, provides a new analytical framework, namely that of a 'transnational advocacy network' (Keck and Sikkink, 1999).These networks reflect a category of relevant actors working internationally, on behalf of networks, on an issue, bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information and services (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p 2), but also in light of political opportunity (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p 33).These transnational networks, understood through the prism of global civil society, can be portrayed as contributors to democratic global governance for they give voice to stakeholders and thus shift global politics towards greater participatory democracy (Scholte, 2004a).In this sense, civil society's political opportunity and presence contribute to global governance in two ways: first, governments and bureaucrats' needs for technical support and expertise; and, second, governance agencies' needs for information provision, testimonials and analyses of governance agencies (Charnovitz, 2002).As such, civil society groups open a political space to give voice, for instance, to the poor and to women who tend to get limited hearing through other channels and thus make a full democratic contribution to global spaces (Scholte, 2004a).yet all interested parties must have access and preferably equal opportunities to participate otherwise civil society can reproduce or even enlarge structural inequalities and arbitrary privileges connected with age, class, gender, nationality, race, religion, urban versus rural location, and so on (Scholte, 2004b).Member States governments continue to play a primary role in policy making especially in international organizations contexts.On the one hand, before the european Union, transnational advocacy networks express political preferences about europe in domestic rather than transnational venues (Imig, 2002).On the other, they use states and international organizations as structural frames and focal points to put pressure on them and in turn have an impact at the national level.This is the principle of the boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink, 1999).little research has investigated civil society individuals who mobilize and constitute international organizations let alone the processes through which individuals and organizations create or resist something resembling a global civil society (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p 33).These issues are all the more relevant in a context where the UN, especially, includes civil society as a source of legitimacy (Schwartzberg, 2013).looking closely

The paper elaborates on the challenges civil society coalitions face in advocating for democratic norms and human rights in humanitarian conflicts in Myanmar. The article discusses the challenges the coalition, FORUM-ASIA, encountered in dealing with the non-intervention principle of ASEAN countries. The analysis in this article utilizes the concept of transnational civil society (TCS) with a qualitative method involving document studies and media reports. While the dominant power and authority of the state undermine the influence of transnational actors in advocating for the interests of marginalized groups, the article argues that transnational networks and institutions must establish cultural and ideational foundations that encompass political and social interests to drive this transformative process successfully. Another significant aspect highlighted is how these actors function as media systems, both in traditional and contemporary forms, influencing public opinion and catalyzing social change.

The 1997 Ottawa Convention banning the use, stockpiling and production of anti-personnel landmines has been widely hailed as a triumph of an emergent global civil society—a claim that has done much to underwrite the legitimacy of the ban, efforts to extend it and ongoing mine action more generally. Transcending limitations of space, a watershed aspect of the mine ban movement was its use of new information and communications technologies to forge a transnational activist network and raise a global groundswell of popular sentiment pushing states to accede to the ban. While the centrality of civil society actors to this process is beyond dispute, the idea that the campaign is appropriately regarded as an initiative of global civil society may not as easily withstand scrutiny. It is precisely in many of the world's most mine-affected areas, for example, that access to email and the Internet can least be taken for granted. To the extent that majority populations in these locales are effectively excluded from equal participation in its transnational networks, then, the global civil society rhetoric of the larger mine action movement may ring rather hollow. It is argued that this circumstance poses a serious challenge not only to ethical practices in mine action but to the notion of global civil society as well.

By 2030 Latinx and African Americans are expected to be the largest non-White groups of older adults. In the past 20 years, older adults’ civic participation has received considerable attention. However, until now most scholarship has focused on formal volunteerism and voting, activities that remain inaccessible to many marginalized groups. As a consequence, other civic activities are going unrecognized. The aim of this study is to understand how civic participation is experienced throughout the lives of 24 African American and Latinx adults 60+ living in New Jersey. Because civic participation is a concept that has many names and meanings depending on culture, language, and history I employ photo-elicitation techniques followed by in-depth interviews to understand civic participation through participants’ lens. Findings from this study can serve to improve conceptualizations and measurements of civic participation for future studies and inform efforts to strengthen civic participation among these populations. Part of a symposium sponsored by the Qualitative Research Interest Group.

Civic learning is increasingly recognized as important by the higher education and workforce communities. The development of high‐quality assessments that can be used to evaluate students' civic learning during the college years has become a priority. This paper presents a comprehensive review of existing frameworks, definitions, and assessments of civic‐related constructs from approximately 30 projects relevant to higher education, and includes a discussion of the challenges related to assessment design and implementation. Synthesizing information from the review, we propose an assessment framework to guide the design of a next‐generation assessment of individuals' civic learning that takes advantage of recent advances in assessment methods. The definition identifies 2 key domains within civic learning: civic competency and civic engagement. Civic competency encompasses 3 areas (civic knowledge; analytic skills; and participatory and involvement skills), and civic engagement also captures 3 areas (motivations, attitudes, and efficacy; democratic norms and values; and participation and activities). We discuss item formats and task types that would ensure fair and reliable scoring for the assessment. The review of definitions of civic learning and its components developed by organizations, the proposed assessment framework, and assessment considerations presented here have potential benefits for a range of higher education institutions. This includes institutions that currently have students engaged in relevant curricular or cocurricular activities and also institutions that would find assessments of civic competency and engagement helpful in program development or in evaluating students' accomplishments.

With the transnational turn in the social sciences attention has now turned to ‘global civil society’, ‘transnational civil society’, ‘transnational networks’ and, most recently, ‘migrant’ or ‘diasporic civil society’. Claims are being made about the developmental potential of these new configurations of civil society, and the global connections forged by migrant and diaspora associational life have been reified into things called ‘networks’ for the purpose of enrolling them into development policy. In this article, we challenge the network model through an analysis of transnational Cameroonian and Tanzanian home associations. The idea of a network suggests an overly robust and ordered set of linkages for what are in effect often loose and transient connections. African home associations draw attention to the historically‐embedded and mundane ways in which forms of associational life can be ‘transnational’ outside the formalized structures and Eurocentric development hierarchies created by international NGOs and other development institutions. Although they form largely invisible connections operating outside these hierarchies, African home associations unsettle assumptions about the geography of civil society and its relationship with development. Close attention to the histories and geographies of African home associations reveals that power and agency more often lie with migrants and elites within Africa than with the transnational diaspora.

Trade, Hierarchy, and Cooperation in the Age of Globalization

ABSTRACTHow does learning about democratic erosion in other countries shape opinions about the state of democracy in the United States today? We describe lessons learned from a collaborative course on democratic erosion taught at nearly two dozen universities during the 2017–18 academic year. We use survey data, student-written blog posts, exit questionnaires, and interviews with students who did and did not take the course to explore the effects of studying democratic erosion from a comparative perspective. Do comparisons foster optimism about the relative resilience of American democracy or pessimism about its vulnerability to the same risk factors that have damaged other democracies around the world? Somewhat to our surprise, we find that the course increased optimism about US democracy, instilling greater confidence in the relative strength and longevity of American democratic norms and institutions. We also find, however, that the course did not increase civic engagement and, if anything, appears to have exacerbated skepticism toward activities such as protest. Students who took the course became increasingly sensitive to the possibility that some forms of civic engagement reflect and intensify the same threats to democracy that the course emphasized—especially polarization.