Transnational Criminal Network as a Factor of Internal Political Destabilization in the Form of Criminal Insurgency (Examples of Colombia, Mexico, and Ecuador)

IntroductionGlobalization has made the world much smaller than it was. The use of sophisticated technology and communications networks has made our lives more convenient, but at the same time it has also helped criminal elements become more efficient in their dealings. Transnational criminal networks and their activities remain one of the main concerns of governments today. Yet, what happens if the networks themselves are government-sponsored? Is there a possible solution when criminal elements themselves are supported by state organs, and sheltered under the eyes of the military and secret service?Such state-organized crime partnerships take criminal activities off the traditional street level and place them on the same pedestal as state activities. In other words, diplomatic, immigration/customs, and military resources have to be deployed to counter criminal activities that are equally supported by these resources. When politics, especially international relations, is involved, the situation becomes more fluid and complicated. State sponsorship can take place in two forms. The first is a more direct form, whereby criminal networks are integrated with a country's agencies, such as the military or the secret service. The second form is less direct-mafia and organized crime from other geographical locations seeking shelter from a willing state to protect their activities.The end of the Cold War may have signaled the demise of Stalinist-style state dictatorship (with a few exceptions) and nuclear confrontation, but its remnants continue to be active in several sectors, such as terrorism, the survivalism of pariah states, and their regrouping into a transnational criminal network. This is the subject of this paper, whereby the world's last remaining Stalinist state, North Korea, shelters or actively abets a handful of criminal networks in order to bypass the global power of the United States, the winner of the Cold War. The criminal network is formidable, as it spans the globe and utilizes gang, banking, diasporic, and state resources to overcome difficulties that would have been formidable without state help. It presents an interesting challenge for international law enforcement agencies and customs/immigration departments, as well as diplomatic corps. When criminal activities are combined with global politics, the scope of legal enforcement is vastly expanded.There are several distinguishing features that differentiate state-sponsored criminal activities from normal transnational criminal activities. The older criminal networks tend to have a kind of chivalrous code, to convey a sense of an urban legend, the image of vigilantes robbing the rich to help the poor. Yakuza and Chinese gang networks tend to convey such noble aspirations. Some make donations to public causes to legitimize their image in the eyes of the public. Japanese Yakuza have done this quite effectively. State-sponsored criminal activities do not share these concerns. They tailor their activities to the priorities of the state. In North Korea's case, this would be survival despite sanctions and other U.S. pressures.The normal transnational gang networks tend to base their activities on streetlevel trafficking, prostitution, and other traditional areas of crime, with clearly marked-out territories. State-sponsored organized crime networks do not have clearly marked-out borders and deal with any transactions that would yield a profit. Because they have the vast resources of the state (for example, the use of military boats and secret service intelligence), they are better able to diversify under the protection of the state, without the need to find niches for their criminal activities.All organized crime monies need to be laundered. Normal transnational criminal networks need to do this discreetly, through many layers of exchanges or wireless transfers of monies. Often these transfers involve much bureaucracy, sometimes elaborate stealth methodologies and even bloodshed. …

The South Atlantic most compelling maritime insecurities are the transnational criminal networks and the incapacity of the region’s states to steward their maritime and border domains. The chapter advances a regional perspective of the problem of transnational organized criminal networks around the South Atlantic, as well as addressing the efforts to face them. It follows an interdisciplinary approach, merging maritime security studies, political science, criminology, and strategic studies concepts with empirical research to contribute to current and future capacity-building initiatives in the security sector reforms. It brings new data on maritime criminal activities among South American and West African shores, as well as an assessment of diplomatic communication to address the matter.

Transnational Organized Crime (TOC) or more specifically transnational organised criminal activity is organised criminal activity that involves the crossing of international borders. This chapter examines transnational criminal activities and the criminal collaborations that underlie such activities using a network approach. It provides an overview of the network perspective and introduces social network analysis (SNA). The chapter focuses on the application of the network approach and SNA to flows of transnational illicit commodities, the structure of transnational criminal networks, patterns of criminal collaborations, and key players in transnational criminal networks. SNA is a method for the collection, categorisation, and analysis of the network structure that emerges from the ties between all nodes in a network and the patterns that emerge from the interconnections of actors in networks. TOC requires collaborations between actors, primarily due to the complex nature of activities that need to be undertaken, with such activities often spanning across several different countries.

The experience derived from investigations on criminal networks with “Russian pattern” invite to consider the trafficking of persons as a unitary phenomenon operated by transnational criminal networks. If each target offence (exploitation of prostitution, enslavement, forgery of identity papers and visas, smuggling of migrants) is considered by itself, we miss the transnational and structurally associative nature of the trafficking. Therefore, it is necessary to avoid the subdivision of crimes and roles played by the single participants which lead to poor results in the action against the criminal networks managing the trafficking and maintain there cores always operational.

: In July 2011, President Barack Obama promulgated the Strategy to Combat Transnational Organized Crime. In the letter presenting the strategy, President Obama stated that the expanding size, scope, and influence of transnational organized crime and its impact on U.S. and international security and governance represent one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century. The President noted that criminal networks were not only expanding their operations but also diversifying their activities, resulting in a convergence of transnational threats that has evolved to become more complex, volatile, and destabilizing.These networks, Obama stated, also threaten U.S. interests by forging alliances with corrupt elements of national governments and using the power and influence of those governments to further their criminal activities. This report will show that transnational criminal networks (TCNs) are a critical destabilizing factor in the global security environment and an emerging threat to U.S. national interests. To effectively address these complex and adaptive threats, U.S. whole-of-government as well as international comprehensive approaches will be required. This report will also argue that combating transnational criminal organizations is a legitimate and important role for the U.S. Army, one in which its current efforts could be significantly expanded.

Organised crime and criminal networks are an outcome of Africa’s weak systems of state reach and governance, and in turn they further undermine effective state-building. Defining “organized crime” is challenging in the African context. African policy discussions did not use this term until recently, and it is so broad that it covers an enormous range of activity. Nevertheless, it is arguably now generally used and accepted, denoting organized illegal activities by a group of people over time that generate a profit. Such terminology is also now widely referred to internationally and in a UN Convention (which defines an “organized criminal group” but not organized crime itself) to which almost all African states have subscribed. The term “criminal networks” is often also used in African debates, denoting the more flexible and dynamic criminal arrangements that characterize the continent. Organized crime and criminal networks in Africa appear in many different forms, shaped largely by the strength of the state, and the degree that political elites and state actors are themselves involved in them. Broadly, organized crime can be said to occur along a continuum on the continent. On one side are well-established and -organized mafia-style groups such as the hard-core gangs of the Western Cape in South Africa or militia style operations engaged in ‘taxing’ local populations and economic activities, both licit and illicit. In the middle of the continuum, are relatively loose, and often highly effective, criminal networks made up both of Africans (West African criminal networks being the most prominent) and a range of foreign criminal actors seeking opportunities. On the other end, are sets of criminal style entrepreneurs, often operating as companies (the Guptas in South Africa, for example) but with a variety of forms of state protection. Illicit financial outflows in particular are a serious concern, but governance and regulatory reforms will be far more critical than the suppression of illicit markets themselves by law enforcement agencies, given also evidence that suggests a high degree of collusion between some African police and criminals in several illicit markets. Violence too remains a key tool for criminal control and advancement at all points along the spectrum, with the strength of the state and the collusion between state actors and criminal groups often determining the form, intensity and targets of that violence. That is one reason why the link between organized crime and conflict on the continent remains a concern, with actors (who in many cases exhibit criminal or mafia-style attributes) seeking to enhance their resource accumulation by control or taxation of criminal markets. Given this and other factors, the impact of organized crime on Africa’s development is severe, and although in some key markets the illicit economy provides opportunities for livelihood and a source of resilience, these opportunities are negated by the extent of environmental damage, the growth of drug use among the poor and marginalized, human rights abuses of migrants and those being trafficked, the violence engendered, and the economic distortions introduced.

This paper considers some of the challenges posed to law enforcement agencies in post-modernity by the emergence of transnational criminal networks. Law enforcement, once very much local in character, must now reshape its structures and processes to meet the new and emerging risks presented. Though the paper uses the topic of illegal immigration to reveal something of the nature of such networks and the threat they pose, it also observes that fundamentally, transnational criminal networks are profit-driven and that, perhaps, it is misguided to think of these groups either as commodity-specific or process-specific. The paper concludes that law enforcement agencies need to meet the challenge that such networks present by managing their business with equal flexibility and resourcefulness. Though mechanisms to support that business are being developed, law enforcement agencies must not lose sight of the fact that it is successful outcomes, in the form of the dismantling and disruption of transnational criminal networks, rather than the new processes themselves (that simply underpin law enforcement's efforts) that are important.

A análise apresentada neste estudo demostra que níveis elevados de integração vertical de organizações criminosas no âmbito jurídico-econômico – no qual, por exemplo, uma rede criminosa transnacional desenvolve a capacidade de licitamente gerar suas próprias matérias-primas, produzindo, transportando e distribuindo os bens ou serviços que posteriormente serão traficados, bem como controlando seu comércio atacadista ou varejista – estão sempre relacionados à corrupção política no financiamento de campanhas eleitorais e em contratações públicas, nos países em que falhas estatais mais agudas impedem o desmantelamento legal e judicial de redes criminosas por meio do confisco de ativos. Nesse contexto, esta análise amplia conclusões anteriores, fornecendo bases conceituais e empíricas para explicar a maior diversificação dos crimes econômicos organizados e sua relação com um maior grau de integração vertical em negócios jurídicos politicamente resguardados por financiamentos ilícitos de campanhas eleitorais e envolvimentos ilegais em licitações de contratos públicos. Com base nas estruturas teóricas de Williamson, observa-se que a integração vertical das atividades econômicas pelas organizações criminosas tem por objetivo reduzir os custos de transação ligados à frequência, especificidade, incerteza, racionalidade limitada e comportamento oportunista nas transações de mercado em ambientes econômicos, nos quais outras organizações criminosas também competem com violência e corrupção para conquistar mercados lícitos e apoiar atividades criminosas das mais variadas naturezas. Além disso, os conceitos e dados empíricos ora apresentados demonstrarão que uma maior integração vertical das atividades econômicas de uma rede criminosa em um ambiente em que existem falhas estatais na prestação de serviços públicos (tais como a garantia de transparência e higidez nas eleições políticas e na tomada de decisões judiciais) também será acompanhada do maior fornecimento pelo crime organizado de bens e serviços quase-públicos (como, por exemplo, mecanismos alternativos de resolução de conflitos), voltados a atender aos segmentos economicamente mais vulneráveis da população, localizados nas áreas geográficas de atuação de tais organizações criminosas. Nesse cenário, a violação sistemática dos direitos políticos e civis, tais como a violação do direito humano de acesso à justiça ou à forma transparente e hígida de eleger mandatários de cargos públicos, funciona como um pré-requisito para o fortalecimento social do crime organizado. Em suma, há uma reação em cadeia em que as falhas do sistema judicial incentivam recursos mais frequentes a mecanismos alternativos de resolução de conflitos fornecidos pelo crime organizado e por grupos armados, os quais por sua vez estão ligados a uma maior diversificação de mercados ilícitos e a uma maior integração vertical a mercados lícitos que sustentam tais mercados ilícitos. Uma das principais conclusões deste trabalho é que uma atuação judicial mais eficiente no confisco de ativos provenientes de crimes reforça o direito humano de acesso à justiça para os segmentos mais vulneráveis da população, além de impactar positivamente o direito de eleger, com menor interferência do crime organizado, mandatários de cargos públicos. Por conseguinte, uma atuação judicial mais eficiente no desmantelamento de redes criminosas não só reforçará a dissuasão/punição dessas organizações, como também evitará o crescimento de bolhas de proteção sociopolítica, nas quais o crime organizado prospera.

This study investigates the interplay between illicit arms trade, transnational criminal networks and regional security in West Africa, with a particular focus on Nigeria. It examines the sources, drivers and actors involved, highlighting Nigeria’s pivotal role as a source and transit point for illicit arms in the West African subregion. The research employs a mixed-methods approach, integrating qualitative and quantitative data for a comprehensive analysis. Thematic analysis of the data reveals the evolving tactics of transnational criminal networks, including their adaptation to countermeasures and their impact on local conflicts. Statistical methods further uncover previously underreported trends in arms trafficking routes. Notably, the study identifies a significant link between the influx of illicit arms and the intensification of sociopolitical instability in rural areas of Nigeria. The findings highlight the necessity for a multidimensional strategy that incorporates regional and international cooperation to dismantle these criminal networks and address the root causes of the illicit arms trade.

The study of non-state armed groups (NSAGs) has traditionally been limited to those actors with a political agenda that pose a specific threat to the state and undermine its ability to claim a monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territory. In contrast, this introduction – and the articles that follow – expands upon this narrow conceptualization and redefines NSAGs to encompass such actors as militias, warlords, private security providers, urban gangs, and transnational and criminal networks. This understanding facilitates a wider exploration of how such groups form in relation to the state, and how the state in turn is shaped through its interactions and conflict with the armed group(s). This article provides an overview of a set of research issues, frameworks, and methods that represent a starting place for a broadened agenda on armed groups which moves beyond those actors who mount direct challenges to the Weberian state. A more nuanced understanding of the different forms and historical trajectories of the interactions between armed group and states also highlights the dynamics through which various types of violent actors influence the use of force and violence in contemporary world politics.

Mexico's Drug War and Criminal Networks examines the effects of technology on three criminal organizations: the Sinaloa cartel, the Zetas, and the Caballeros Templarios. Using social network analysis, and analyzing the use of web platforms Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube, Nilda M. Garcia provides fresh insights on the organizational network, the central nodes, and the channels through which information flows in these three criminal organizations. In doing so, she demonstrates that some drug cartels in Mexico have adopted the usage of social media into their strategies, often pursuing different tactics in the search for new ways to dominate. She finds that the strategic adaptation of social media platforms has different effects on criminal organization’s survivability. When used effectively, coupled with the adoption of decentralized structures, these platforms do increase a criminal organization’s survival capacity. Nonetheless, if used haphazardly, it can have the opposite effect. Drawing on the fields of criminology, social network analysis, international relations, and organizational theory and featuring a wealth of information about the drug cartels themselves, Mexico's Drug War and Criminal Networks will be a great source for all those interested in the presence, behavior, purposes, and strategies of drug cartels in their forays into social media platforms in Mexico and beyond.

This study investigates the effect of irregular migration on Nigeria’s security in the North-West, a region increasingly vulnerable to complex security challenges. Irregular migration, characterized by undocumented movement across porous borders, has become a critical concern as it intersects with local instability, weak border governance, and transnational criminal networks. The research problem centers on how irregular migration contributes to the escalation of security threats in Nigeria’s North-West, an area already burdened by armed banditry, communal clashes, and socio-political tensions. Drawing on qualitative analysis of policy documents and security reports, the study explores the political, social, and security dimensions of this phenomenon. Findings reveal that politically, irregular migration undermines the legitimacy of state institutions by exposing their inability to control borders and manage demographic pressures effectively. Socially, it intensifies competition over scarce resources, deepens communal divisions, and contributes to rising xenophobic sentiments against perceived “foreign” settlers. From a security perspective, irregular migration creates opportunities for armed groups and criminal networks to recruit fighters, smuggle weapons, and establish cross-border safe havens, thereby complicating counterinsurgency and anti-banditry efforts. The study concludes that irregular migration significantly amplifies existing vulnerabilities in Nigeria’s North-West, requiring comprehensive and coordinated policy responses. It recommends strengthening border management through technological surveillance and community-based reporting systems, enhancing regional cooperation with neighbouring countries, and addressing the socio-economic drivers that compel irregular movement. By adopting a multidimensional approach, Nigeria can mitigate the destabilizing impacts of irregular migration and enhance human security in the North-West region.

In the 21st century, international diplomacy has been reshaped by non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), terrorist groups, and transnational criminal networks. “Beyond Borders: A Comparative Analysis of Non-State Actors' Impact on Contemporary Diplomacy” examines how MNCs use corporate diplomacy and economic statecraft to influence policy, and how NGOs employ Track II diplomacy to advocate for social justice and sustainability. It also addresses the challenges posed by terrorist and criminal networks to traditional diplomacy. By synthesizing various perspectives and case studies, the chapter highlights the importance of inclusive, multi-stakeholder approaches and strategies that balance state sovereignty with non-state actor participation in global governance.

Terrorist threats and acts carried out by transnational criminal networks who use terror for their own economic interests or political goals should be defined as organized crime. The same knowledge and tools used with results in countering criminal organizations should be applied.

The Big Question: Fixing Roles