Transformative securitization: Rethinking the Copenhagen School in light of COVID-19, climate change, and the war in Ukraine

Decision-makers and commentators are calling Europe’s present political predicament a polycrisis: a period of overlapping, urgent, and mutually reinforcing crises with climate change and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as key challenges. Our knowledge about how citizens perceive and respond to polycrisis is limited. This paper presents a preregistered survey experiment from Denmark with 4,017 nationally representative respondents. We study crisis perceptions and willingness to act for the climate and Ukraine after concurrently priming both issues. Overall, threat perceptions increase, but so does inaction. Climate change drives increases in threat perception and worry, while the war in Ukraine drives a reduction in willingness to act and pay. The results challenge the “finite pool of worry” hypothesis, which presupposes that worry about new, urgent threats will crowd out worry about existing problems, especially in the case of climate change. Rather, willingness to act under polycrisis is issue-specific and shaped by concrete pocketbook costs, as the experimental evidence illustrates. The results also have important policy implications at a time when decision-makers frequently justify political action through polycrisis discourse.

Where do European minority issues stand following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? What are the dimensions of this crisis that pose a particular challenge to the European minority rights regime? Does the renewed sense of purpose among liberal democracies augur a revitalization of minority issues or continued business as usual? The ECMI’s Director Vello Pettai looks at the stakes involved with the war in Ukraine. Already before the crisis, minority issues were operating in an increasingly crowded landscape of societal concerns: populism, climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic. Russia’s aggression has brought together a further cocktail involving autocratization, kin-state activism and geopolitical disorder. Key institutions governing and promoting the European minority rights regime will need to be regrouped before a new impulse for minority issues can be found.

The 2022 Europe report of the Lancet Countdown on health and climate change: towards a climate resilient future

Issues in Australian Foreign Policy January to June 2022

Securitization theory has attracted much attention since it was first developed by the so-called ‘Copenhagen School’. In a nutshell, the Copenhagen School argues that an issue is transformed into a security issue (i.e. securitized) after a securitizing actor presents it as an existential threat and this ‘securitizing move’ is accepted by the ‘audience’ (Waever 1995; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). The original formulation of securitization theory is heavily influenced by linguistics, and more precisely the concept of ‘speech acts’, that is, discourses that do not ‘report on things’, but rather ‘do things’. Whilst the potential of this approach for contributing to the debates on the meaning of security in the post-Cold War era has been widely acknowledged, a consensus has also emerged around the idea that securitization theory in its original formulation by the Copenhagen School suffers from several weaknesses, including the significant under-theorization of several aspects of securitization processes (Barthwal-Datta 2009; Balzacq 2005; McDonald 2008; Stritzel 2007; Wilkinson 2007).

The timid response of member governments of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has puzzled many western observers as it flagrantly violates the most basic norms of international law to which ASEAN expressly subscribes. This article seeks to provide answers to this puzzle. Informed by practice theory, the article transcends conventional realist explanations of how small and medium-sized countries respond to great power politics. Combining material and cognitive arguments, practice theory allows identifying the cultural and ideational roots of these policies and uncovering mismatches between rhetoric and agency. It suggests that, conceptualized as communities of practice, ASEAN member countries' foreign policy elites have developed a path-dependent pragmatism, which guides their response to great power politics and hence the war in Ukraine. Employing a qualitative mixed-methods approach, the empirical part of the article examines how south-east Asia's diplomatic communities of practice define pragmatism and shows that, historically, pragmatism has strongly guided their foreign policies. It traces ASEAN governments' pragmatic responses to the war in Ukraine at three levels: the national, regional and the (global) multilateral level. The article concludes that liberal proselytism does not help the West to win over ASEAN member countries to support its pro-Ukraine course.

This study examines public opinion in European countries on the Russo-Ukrainian war and the EU’s sanctions against Russia. In particular, it investigates the different perceptions of issues related to the war in Ukraine in terms of security and economic implications and seeks to explain the differences in public opinions among European countries. Leading public opinions in Europe strongly condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and agree to impose strong sanctions. However, there are different attitudes in public opinion depending on the expected economic damage and energy mix. Countries concerned about significant economic damage due to rising energy prices tend to prefer measures that take the economic impact into account rather than value-oriented hard-line responses. Additionally, countries with a high proportion of fossil fuel use also show the same tendency. On the other hand, countries that can endure economic damage and better respond to energy crises with a high share of renewable energy prefer a hard-line response. Countries with a favorable image of Russia have a relatively solid public opinion insisting on considering the economic situation, while countries with a pro-American tendency demand a hard-line response based on values. In terms of diplomacy and security, it was found that the more countries feel the security threat from the war, the more public opinion supports a value-centered policy stance and insists on military aid to Ukraine. In particular, the three Nordic countries, which have a long tradition of neutrality, judge Russia’s invasion of Ukraine as a threat to fundamental European values and are more in favor of military aid to Ukraine than other countries. This study provides significant implications for forecasting the EU’s response to Russia. For the EU to maintain a strong stance against Russia, it is essential to secure solidarity among the members. The EU will need to coordinate the different economic burdens of its Member States and fully reflect the varying security awareness of European countries on its common security and defense policy. These efforts are necessary to maintain a solid and coherent policy stance on the war in Ukraine.

Events of recent years both in the United States and around the globe have highlighted the fragility of democracy. The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has prompted educators to seek evidence-based civic engagement methods for helping students understand the invasion and its implications. This paper offers a set of recommendations on how to teach the war in Ukraine through the lens of civic engagement education. Over the years, a sizeable body of scholarship has developed addressing the critical role civic education plays in safeguarding democracy and producing effective pedagogical approaches for instilling democratic knowledge, skills, and dispositions. Using this scholarship as a starting point, this paper offers recommendations on how educators in a variety of settings and across disciplines might modify these civic learning models to address the war in Ukraine. Based on my experience as a scholar-practitioner-educator at an institute of politics focused primarily on American democracy, I also offer suggestions on how to integrate teaching the war in Ukraine using these practices to enhance appreciation of civic engagement and the role of the citizen.

British Journal of NursingVol. 31, No. 11 CommentThe impact of the war in Ukraine on HIV servicesIan HodgsonIan Hodgson(E-mail Address: [email protected])Researcher in Global Health, SheffieldSearch for more papers by this authorIan HodgsonPublished Online:9 Jun 2022https://doi.org/10.12968/bjon.2022.31.11.S6AboutSectionsView articleView Full TextPDF/EPUB ToolsAdd to favoritesDownload CitationsTrack CitationsPermissions ShareShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InEmail View article References Anonymous. Russia's war in Ukraine is killing cancer care in both countries. BMJ. 2022;376:o701. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o701 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarHoff F, de Volder E; Freedom Fund. Preventing human trafficking of refugees from Ukraine: a rapid assessment of risks and gaps in the anti-trafficking response. 2022. https://tinyurl.com/2p8ptr4m (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarThe Lancet HIV. Fate of people with HIV in jeopardy in Ukraine. Editorial. Lancet HIV. 2022;9(4):e223. https://doi.org/10.1016/S2352-3018(22)00074-1 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarMannell J. Sexual violence in Ukraine. A devastating war crime with far reaching consequences. BMJ. 2022;377:o1016. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o1016 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarMurphy A, Fuhr D, Roberts B, Jarvis C, Tarasenko A, McKee M. The health needs of refugees from Ukraine. BMJ 2022;377:o864. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.o864 Crossref, Medline, Google ScholarSimoneau M, Khan H; Center for Strategic and International Studies. War amid a pandemic: the public health consequences of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. 2022. https://tinyurl.com/c8v64ekh (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. Global AIDS Monitoring 2019: Ukraine. Summary. 2020. https://tinyurl.com/27afpxkx (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. UNAIDS warns that the war in Ukraine risks a humanitarian catastrophe for people living with and affected by HIV. Press release. 13 April 2022a. https://tinyurl.com/2p948pab (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUNAIDS. SITREP: UNAIDS' response to the crisis in Ukraine. 9 May 2022b. https://tinyurl.com/2p989wtn (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarUN High Commissioner for Refugees. Ukraine refugee situation (live statistics). 2022. https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWheaton S; Politico. How to needle Vladimir Putin on HIV prevention. 13 July 2021. https://tinyurl.com/2p8f9sst (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWorld Health Organization. Ukraine public health situation analysis (PHSA). 3 March 2022a. https://tinyurl.com/2p8csrt4 (accessed 25 May 2022) Google ScholarWorld Health Organization. Ukraine crisis public health situation analysis—refugee-hosting countries. 17 March 2022b. https://tinyurl.com/yk5tnwte (accessed 25 May 2022) Google Scholar FiguresReferencesRelatedDetails 9 June 2022Volume 31Issue 11ISSN (print): 0966-0461ISSN (online): 2052-2819 Metrics History Published online 9 June 2022 Published in print 9 June 2022 Information© MA Healthcare LimitedPDF download

Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy by Rita Floyd. Cambridge University Press, 2010. Pp. 230. $99 (Hardback). ISBN: 9780521197564[Article copies available for a fee from The Transformative Studies Institute. E-mail address: journal@transformativestudies.org Website: http: //www, trans formativestudies. ors ©2013 by The Transformative Studies Institute. All rights reserved. JThe aim of the book Security and the Environment: Securitisation Theory and US Environmental Security Policy is to devise a stronger and even more compelling securitization theory. This book proposes a revision of the Copenhagen School's influential securitisation theory that both allows insights into the intentions of securitising actors and enables the moral evaluation of securitization and desecuritisation in the environmental sector of security. Securitisation theory holds that in international relations, an issue becomes a matter of emergency politics/a security issue not because something constitutes an objective threat to the state or to some other entity, but rather because a powerful securitising actor argues that something constitutes an existential threat to some object that needs to be dealt with immediately if the object is to survive.The idea that security is a self-referential practice is not only the essence of securitisation theory; it is also the secret of the theory's popularity and its explanatory potency. More readily than rival security theories, it allows the security analyst to account for the essentially contested nature of security where one and the same concept may mean entirely different, and even opposing, things. Yet although this is a clear, strong point on the part of securitisation theory, the Copenhagen School's preoccupation with it two major shortcomings. According to Floyd, a Fellow at the Institute for Environmental Security and British Academy Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, UK, the securitisation analyst studies who can securitise on what issues, under what conditions, and with what effects, whilst questions beyond the practice of security, such as those concerning the intentions of securitising actors (e.g. 'why do actors securitise?'), are ignored.And also, the idea that security is a self-referential practice allows no conceptual room for the theorising of what really is a security issue, nor for what ought to be securitised. Under the Copenhagen School's theoretical framework, the security analyst and the securitising actor are 'functionally distinct' entities with the security analyst in no position to assume the role of the securitising actor at any point of the analysis. This, however, does not mean that the Copenhagen School feels 'obliged to agree' with any given securitisation. On the contrary, the school holds strong views about the value of both securitization and also of desecuritisation. They argue that, in all but a few circumstances, securitisations are morally wrong, whereas desecuritisations are morally right. Notably, they arrive at these conclusions by way of what they take to be the effects or consequences of either action.In the case of securitisation, they take the consequences to be dedemocratisation, depoliticisation, the security dilemma and conflict. In the case of desecuritisation, they expect politicisation, understood as a general opening up of debate. Although it is not the securitization analyst's aim to bring about desecuritisation, the securitisation analyst is potentially able, by providing insights into the effects of securitisation, to reduce both the scale and number of escalations and security dilemmas found in the world. The Copenhagen School anticipates that the securitisation analyst will arrive at the very same conclusions regarding the outcomes of securitisation and desecuritisation.This book, by use of the example of the environmental sector of security, shows that securitisations are not categorically morally wrong, but, rather, that depending on the beneficiary of environmental security policies, securitisation can be morally permissible. …

Since Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine, there have been thousands of instances of civilian casualties, damage to the natural environment and cultural property, destruction of buildings and infrastructure, blockading of ports, siege, capturing installations containing dangerous forces, and other consequences that accompany hostilities. In addition to the fatalities related to humans (civilians and combatants alike) and their property or environment, the war in Ukraine has also accounted for non-human tolls – namely, the destruction of animals or damage to their habitats.The primary objective of this article is to study three patterns of animal suffering documented during Russia's invasion of Ukraine: (i) targeting zoos and killing zoo animals; (ii) extermination of the Black Sea dolphin population; and (iii) eating pigeons or other pets in besieged localities, and to analyse these patterns in the light of applicable rules of international humanitarian law (IHL).The idea of this research is to underline that war can have a significant effect on various categories of animals, and Russia's invasion of Ukraine is just another example of this. The article also discusses how, and the extent to which international law can provide protection for animals in armed conflict, and whether there are any gaps in the applicable IHL rules related to the protection of animals.

Defying expectations of EU integration scholars, Russia's 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine did not spur the European Union (EU) to create an army or new territorial defence capabilities. While the EU undertook novel actions to support Ukraine in this war, these fell far short of turning the EU into a traditional defence organisation. Instead, the EU responded largely through policy, using non-traditional security measures such as sanctions, energy boycotts, aid to Ukraine, migration, and enlargement to fight Russia's invasion. This article analyses the EU's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine through the lens of Copenhagen School securitisation theory, rather than traditional EU integration theory. Securitisation theory recognises war as a distinct type of crisis and explains how a non-traditional collective security actor like the European Union responds to security threats. EU leaders responded swiftly by securitising EU policy through ‘speech acts’. Public audiences immediately recognised the Russian threat. Strong leadership and a sudden shift in attitudes enabled norm-defying changes across core areas of EU policy. Instead of asking why Russia's invasion of Ukraine has not produced more integration, this article shows that the EU rapidly transformed key areas of EU policy to face a new, more insecure, and geopolitical world.

How Should We Define Global Catastrophic Biological Risks?

About twenty years ago, Robert Kagan, Victoria Nuland's husband, published the book "Europeans act like they're from Venus, while Americans act like they're from Mars." The personification is more than clear. Venus is the symbol of love and peace, Mars is the god of war. The European dimension of NATO had a historical handicap, due to the "doctrine of agreement" according to which the Europeans "did not need to worry about interventions within the borders of the Alliance because the Americans have always been there". They designed and financed the defense of Europe. Europe successfully sheltered behind the shadow of Uncle Sam". Gradually geopolitics evolved especially after the NATO air campaign against FR Yugoslavia in 1999. Two decades later with the war in Ukraine, the world returned to the student war with serious threats of nuclear conflict. And Putin's Russia showed that it is from Mars. This encouraged NATO and EU allies to strengthen their ranks. The war in Ukraine cured NATO of apoplexy as diagnosed by Macron. The alliance also became attractive to its most indifferent allies Sweden and Finland. On the map of Europe, a big turn happened due to the NATO membership of the two neutral Scandinavian countries, Finland and Sweden. From a geopolitical point of view, Russia opposed the membership of Finland and Sweden in the Alliance, because the border with NATO was extended by two hundred kilometers. It can also be considered the biggest upheaval in Europe since 1989. On the other hand, Russia, with its invasion of Ukraine, violated the provisions of both international law and political declarations that protected the immutability of borders. "The whole project of the EU, European association and cooperation relies on such norms. The war happened and changed the perspectives of all countries, both those that are in NATO and those that have not been. The entire Western world stood on the side of the victims, on the side of the defense of the order that had maintained the stability of Europe since 1945." The war in Ukraine has disrupted the world geopolitical order. Globalization has been put in danger by the establishment of the largest sanctions against Russia. The alliance has consolidated and is looking for new allies and partners. On the other hand, Russia is also reorienting itself towards new allies, primarily China, N. Korea, Iran, the BRICS countries

While prosecuting its invasion of Ukraine, Russia has relied heavily on nuclear threats, turning the war in Ukraine into a dangerous nuclear crisis with profound implications for the global nuclear order and its two constitutive systems of nuclear deterrence and nuclear restraint. These two interconnected systems, each aiming to manage nuclear possession and reduce the risk of nuclear use, are at once complimentary and contradictory. While tensions between these systems are not new, the war in Ukraine exacerbates them in unprecedented ways. The system of nuclear deterrence seems to be proving its worth by inducing restraint on Russia and NATO, while the system of restraint is undermined by demonstrating what happens to a country not protected by nuclear deterrence. The latter lesson is particularly vivid given Ukraine’s decision to forgo a nuclear option in 1994 in exchange for security assurances from nuclear powers. Russia’s use of nuclear threats as an enabler for escalation and the specter of Russian tactical nuclear use against Ukraine goes well beyond its declared nuclear doctrine. The outcome of the war in Ukraine thus has critical importance for deciding the value of nuclear weapons in global security architecture and for resolving the conundrum between the systems of deterrence and restraint.