Transformative Competition Law Adjudication: A Dworkinian Perspective

Unfair Trade Practices in India: A Comparative Analysis Between the Competition and Consumer Laws

Competition Law for the Digital Era: A Complex Systems’ Perspective

The present study aims to make comparative analysis of competition law in Pakistan and China by analyzing the leniency programs that whether or not they are in accordance with market structure or not, and investigating the mechanism to evidences while applying leniency policies and its value in competition law. The study adopts qualitative data analysis in order to analyze the respective aims and objective. It is found out by this research that progressive and unconventional are very important to be taken by both countries in order to ingeniously enforce competition law. Although competition law is supposed to prevent anti competition rituals and practices by nurturing free and fair competition in the market. It promotes a greater competition in the market by safeguarding customers against inaccurate means, which are adopted by firms. Therefore, competition law can be regarded as highly essential for regulating businesses by ensuring producer and consumer welfare. It ultimately promotes healthy growth of the economy and social justice. While on the other hand, a huge budget is entailed by investigation procedures which have been regarded as a huge financial resources’ loss by experts. In addition to this, there is also a greater risk of surcharges of violation, punishment and legal costs, which sometimes lead to harm corporate image. Moreover, the leniency programs in both Pakistan and China cover administrative liability only. Therefore, it is important to voluntarily comply with competition rules, regulations and laws, which would play an immensely significant role in minimizing the social costs which occur due to this law enforcement. Qualitative research methodology has been applied to the following article.

‘The goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws’ evaluates the goals and scope of competition and antitrust laws. Competition laws seek to protect the competitive process in the marketplace from companies that seek to distort it. By safeguarding free and fair markets, competition laws promote consumer welfare as well as efficiencies in the marketplace. While key competition law principles are similar across the world, competition laws are not internationally uniform, but are instead customized by each jurisdiction. A comparison can be made between US Federal Antitrust Law and the EU competition law. There are also other jurisdictions that apply competition laws, including China, Japan, and South Korea.

Rethinking Competition Law: From a Consumer Welfare to a Capability Approach

The introduction of the euro and the steady development of the internal market have both led to a growing number of retail sectors operating on a pan-European basis. As retailer consolidation occurs throughout Europe, and as supermarkets and shopping centres continue to replace traditional corner shops and smaller outlets, competition problems may begin to be perceived in these sectors. Consequently, now more than ever, the proper role of competition law in regulating conduct in the retail sector—including the use of private labels by retailers— deserves detailed consideration by legal scholars. Of particular concern is the place of consumers in a given competition law assessment of a retail market. More specifically, the status of a consumer welfare standard under EC competition law needs to be examined. According to the current Director General (DG) for Competition, the primary aim of modern European competition law and policy is to protect the functioning of competition on markets in order to enhance ‘consumer welfare’.Consumer welfare, then, apparently represents the standard according to which enforcement of EC competition law should be determined. Given the abundance of official statements to similar effect, it would not be an exaggeration to state that the position of the consumer in European competition law has never been stronger. Some commentators, however, have questioned the accuracy of these claims. One often criticizes the European Commission (the Commission) in this regard for paying insufficient attention to the interests of consumers in its investigations and for producing in its decisions only a cursory note on any potential consumer benefits. The courts too can arguably be criticized on a similar basis. Furthermore, it has also been argued that in any case the decisional practice of the Commission cannot be easily changed to encompass a consumer welfare standard as this would involve either ignoring or contradicting precedents set by the European courts.

The Impact of EU Competition Rules on Lithuanian Competition Law

The Interface of Competition and Intellectual Property Law – Taking Stock and Identifying New Challenges

Objective: The objective of this study is to investigate the STF's decision in the judgment of HC no. 154.248/DF, with the aim of understanding disagreements in law and the application of constructive interpretation from the perspective of Ronald Dworkin. Theoretical Framework: In this topic, the main concepts and theories that underpin the research are presented. Ronald Dworkin's theories of interpretation of law, the idea of ​​integrity in law and the theory of interpretative disagreements stand out, providing a solid basis for understanding the context of the investigation. Method: The methodology adopted for this research comprises a qualitative approach, using documentary analysis of court decisions and a bibliographic review of Dworkin's works. Data collection was carried out through the analysis of votes from STF ministers and specialized legal literature. Results and Discussion: The results obtained revealed a diversity of interpretations among the STF ministers in the judgment of HC no. 154.248/DF, highlighting the different understandings of constitutional principles and fundamental rights. In the discussion section, these results are contextualized in light of Dworkin's theoretical framework, highlighting the implications of the theory of constructive interpretation and the challenges faced by courts in maintaining the integrity of the law. Possible discrepancies and limitations of the study are also considered in this section. Research Implications: The practical and theoretical implications of this research are discussed, providing insights into how the results can be applied or influence practices in the field of constitutional law and jurisprudence. These implications may encompass the training of jurists, judicial practice and legal theory. Originality/Value: This study contributes to the literature by approaching the STF decision from the perspective of Ronald Dworkin's theory, offering an innovative analysis of constructive interpretation and disagreements in law. The relevance and value of this research are evidenced by its ability to deepen understanding of the practical application of Dworkin's theories in complex judicial decisions.

Competition (Law) in the Era of Algorithms

In his seminal article ‘The Limits of Antitrust’, Easterbrook argued that ‘when everything is relevant, nothing is dispositive’; therefore, when applying competition law, judges should resort to clear presumptions rather than balancing the proand anti-competitive effects of particular conduct. In the intervening 20 years, much ink has been spilled on the issue of whether competition law should take into consideration wider policy objectives. This discussion has been given renewed impetus in recent months following the publication of a ‘preliminary opinion on the intersection of data protection, consumer protection and competition law’ in March of this year by the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS). The publication of this report was followed by a workshop held under Chatham House rules in Brussels in June, a summary of which was published by the EDPS in July. The report reflects lively discussions on several issues familiar to data protection experts, such as the role of personal data in the digital economy and how to foster privacy as a competitive advantage. However, it also serves to launch a debate regarding matters which have been overlooked or unsubstantiated thus far. Most significantly, the report queries whether the traditional tools of competition law, which focus on parameters such as price, quality, and choice can explain the impact of certain business practices on data protection and privacy. It also questions ‘wider issues’ in competition law enforcement, for instance whether the Commission’s current case-by-case approach is correct in the digital environment or whether specific guidelines or a study should be introduced to inform authorities dealing with antitrust and merger cases involving personal data. These are queries which need to be addressed and the EDPS is to be applauded for kick-starting this discussion, whatever its outcome. Many of web 2.0’s datacentric services are two-sided platforms which are characterised by network effects: the more users they have, the more users they acquire. This leads to winnertakes-all markets which makes the application of key data protection concepts, such as consent, more difficult. Quite simply, individual control over personal data (or ‘informational self-determination’) becomes illusory when individuals are dealing with monopolies. For this reason, competition law is frequently depicted as the silver bullet which will render data protection rules more effective by injecting competition into monopolised markets and facilitating individual choice. However, that competition law can or even should play this role is contested by experts in that field. A discussion on the potential—and limits—of competition law was therefore conspicuously lacking until the EDPS initiative in March. Nevertheless, it is not yet apparent whether, and if so how, the two fields actually intersect. In recent years, the enforcement activity of DG Competition has been guided by a consumer welfare standard, according to which competition law should seek to deliver benefits to consumers in the form of ‘lower prices, better quality and a wider choice of new or improved goods and services’. This approach assumes that consumer welfare is negatively affected only when a particular practice has the effect of foreclosing an equally efficient competitor

This outstanding collection of original essays brings together some of the leading experts in competition economics, policy and law. They examine what lies at the core of the ‘economic approach to competition law’ and deal with its normative and institutional limitations. In recent years the ‘more economic approach’ has led to a modernisation of competition law throughout the world. This book comprehensively examines for the first time, the foundations and limitations of the approach and will be of great interest to scholars of competition policy no matter what discipline.

European competition law is predominantly focused on maximizing consumer welfare. This overarching purpose (which is supported by economic theory) leaves little place for safeguarding non-economic values, such as sustainability. This makes it difficult to allow cooperation between companies to contribute to such non-economic goals. In this article we explore whether it is possible to establish a different normative framework, in which such goals can be taken into account and can be balanced against the economic goal of consumer welfare. To answer this question, we take four steps. First, we discuss current EU competition law and the difficulty of fitting non-economic goals into the dominant interpretation of that law. Second, we propose a different normative framework, based on the capability approach advanced by philosopher Martha Nussbaum and economist Amartya Sen. Third, we argue that there are good principled reasons to incorporate non-economic goals into competition law. Fourth, we apply both the capability approach and the consumer welfare approach to three (illustrative) cases in which non-economic goals are at stake. Overall, we argue that the capability framework, although not without difficulties of its own, may provide a more legitimate theory for the interpretation of European competition law.

This article offers a novel perspective on competition law’s role in concentrated markets. While progressive views arguably flout just about anything that traditional legal doctrine esteems—advocating that competition law should be reconfigured to address a broader set of values beyond the welfare of consumers— established viewpoints hold that the subject of these attacks is the sheer size of digital platforms, although this overlooks their character as networked industries that overwhelmingly generate consumer benefits. Both views miss a crucial issue: they blur the vital role that competition law’s emphasis on consumers plays in producing welfare and prosperity when competition- and non-competition-related problems of market power are entwined. In particular, an intensified extent of administrative action helps to put in place the discursive benefits gained by advancing a proper dialogue between leading actors and consumers, and encourages a greater extent of integration of consumers’ views into the market.

The objectives of competition policy and the application of competition law need defining and redefining along with changing structures of the economy and the maturing of the competition authority. Market structures associated with digital technology and globalization are often not in consonance with the prevalent law framed in economic analysis of traditional product markets. Antitrust interventions by the competition authorities are caught in a bind as was the case with the Competition Commission of India and the Competition Act, 2002. The emphasis on monopolistic competition, or on oligopolistic markets, as anti-competitive, which marked the earlier days of implementation of competition laws, is at variance with the prevalent monopolistic structures of platform markets or technology firms and the market for ideas. Competition authorities are grappling with identifying anti-competitive activities of these markets which tip towards monopolistic structures. In the process there has been a churning of possible diverse antitrust abuses and, as competition law grapples to incorporate these new market structures, there is another churn that is slowly emerging as a major concern — that of convergence of competition policy and public interest. This is an area in antitrust literature which is yet to receive sufficient attention. The core of antitrust intervention — that competition benefits consumers — is undisputed and perhaps axiomatic but what is not axiomatic is that monopolistic market structures can also lead to enhancing public welfare. Emergent trends towards monopolistic markets suggest a rethink of competition policy and law and their convergence for public interest. The focus of this article is on the importance of convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in new and emergent markets. It raises questions: Is there convergence or divergence between policy and law and public interest? What is public interest? Do consumers represent public interest and, if so, which set of consumers? Are innovation and technological development, which are part of public interest, also in the ambit of competition policy or are they in the realm of competition law? This is another question which has become acute in recent times. In India and the BRICS group, where usage of internet on smart phones is high, the convergence between competition policy, law and public interest suggests antitrust intervention is guided by public interest.