Transference of Authority: The Institutional Struggle Over the Control of the War Power

Abstract

Presidential authority to wage war has increased throughout American history. Congress attempted to reassert its institutional position with the War Powers Resolution of 1973, but has been unable to achieve its goal. This leads to the questions of how Congress, with its constitutionally granted powers to make war and control the nation's purse, has come to hold such a reactive role in foreign policy and, more importantly, how it can break out of the position in which the institution currently finds itself. This article examines the authority relationships related to the exercise of the war power. It does so based on an informal notion of political authority, which can be shifted among institutions without formally amending the Constitution. Using this conception, this article evaluates the War Powers Resolution as well as several proposals made by scholars and politicians regarding the relationship between Congress and the presidency in this area. The article concludes by offering a recommendation for how Congress might return to a concurrent role with the presidency in making the foreign policy decision to commit troops abroad.