Trading for survival: trade policy as a credible signal, alliance strategy, and public preferences in Taiwan

Abstract

This article examines the connection between trade policy, alliance strategy, and public preferences. It argues that when a contentious trade agreement is perceived as a credible signal for aligning with a powerful adversary (bandwagoning), it is likely to provoke domestic opposition due to its negative impact on state survival. Conversely, when a contentious trade agreement is seen as a credible signal for counterbalancing an adversary with a non-threatening great power (balancing), it is likely to face less domestic resistance as it enhances state survival. Using a comparative case study design, this article compares two cases in Taiwan: the movement against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) in 2014 and the backlash against lifting the import ban on US pork containing ractopamine in 2021. In the CSSTA case, the government’s desired trade partner, China, was not sufficiently supported domestically due to public fears of negative security externalities. In the US pork case, the government sent a cue to the public that a trade deal with the US was a credible commitment required to strengthen the bilateral strategic relationship. This message was echoed by people who recognized the positive security externality and the preservation of Taiwan’s sovereignty and political institutions.