Trade-in pricing game between manufacturer, selling platform, and recycling platform

Considering that the real competitions in service market contain two important factors, price and service, we build a dynamical price and service game model and study the complex dynamics of this bivariate game. Some special properties about the adjustment of service are noted by comparing our innovative bivariate game model with previous univariate game model. Besides, we discuss the stabilities of fixed points and compare the price and service game with price game. What is more, the recursive least-squares (RLS) estimation is introduced to substitute naive estimation; then the impacts of RLS estimation are studied by comparing it with naive estimation.

The utility for players or agents is the quantification of their happiness or satisfaction. It can be the function of single parameter or many. In game theory literature, utility is the function of strategy they wish to play. In many cases, it is assumed that the utility for a player is the function of single strategy. In this paper, we have considered the multiple strategies of players to define their utilities. We have developed the model to analyze these utilities of players involved in pricing games (Supplier-buyer game). We have taken a numerical example to validate the model. Also we have extended our analysis to the combination of pricing and production game (Supplier-supplier game) which serves as an input for supplier selection process.

Spatial price and variety competition in an urban retail market: A nested logit analysis

This study considers a duopoly market in which two competitors operate their own service-inventory systems. Both competitors determine their prices to maximize their profit while considering the inventory holding cost, ordering cost, and cost incurred by lost sales. Customers are price sensitive, and customer attractiveness is expressed by arrival rates. We use a game theory approach to formulate and analyze three types of pricing games: (i) a parallel pricing game, (ii) a sequential pricing game, and (iii) a unified pricing game. The uniqueness of equilibrium prices is analytically proven, after which, a solution procedure for obtaining equilibrium prices is outlined.

Subsidy policy optimization of multimodal transport on emission reduction considering carrier pricing game and shipping resilience: A case study of Shanghai port

We investigate the impact of incomplete information on the problem of pricing and incentives in a two-hop parallel relay network with one source and multiple relays. We consider a pricing game with incomplete information where the relays advertise traffic dependent charging functions to the source, which then allocates its traffic in a multipath manner and pays the relays according to the advertised charging functions. In our setting, the state of the links for a given relay is not observable by the source or the other relays, although the prior distribution of the types is observable. To provide a benchmark, we first show that in the pricing game with complete information, Nash equilibria exist and are all efficient. In particular, there exist efficient equilibria resulting from linear charging functions. On the other hand, we show that in the game with incomplete information, linear charging functions may lead to inefficiencies. In particular, we quantify the efficiency loss in the symmetric case, where the type distributions and cost structure are identical for all relays.

Hong et al. (2019) presented a paper on optimal risk management policies for firms in the sharing economy. This note extends the work of Hong et al. (2019) to three types of pricing game: i) a parallel pricing game, ii) a sequential pricing game, and iii) a unified pricing game. Assuming that there exists the price competition in a duopoly market consisting of the sharing platform and the traditional firm, the uniqueness of equilibrium and optimal pricing is analytically proved.

We discuss in this paper whether two members in duopoly market will make benefit from dynamic pricing based on price discrimination. In addition, we want to know which one in duopoly market will make more profits through dynamic pricing in a pricing game. We set the case to a pricing game in Hotelling model where two firms will perform a fierce price war to grab the market share of switchers under the prerequisite of ensuring the profit of the loyal through dynamic pricing based on price discrimination. We conclude that firms which implement dynamic pricing based on price discrimination will be better off than those not. In addition, we can reach a crucial conclusion that the firm which embraces a strong power of monopoly advantage and charges a higher price in the duopoly market is sure to make more profits through dynamic pricing based on price discrimination, while the other firm will make less profit in the pricing game undoubtedly.

In this paper we study the implications of service level guarantees (SLGs) in a model of oligopoly competition where providers compete to deliver a service to congestion-sensitive consumers. The SLG is a contractual obligation on the part of the service provider: regardless of how many customers subscribe, the firm is responsible for investing in infrastructure, capacity, or service quality so that the congestion experienced by all subscribers is equal to the SLG. First, we analyze a game where firms compete by setting prices and SLGs simultaneously. We establish that this game can be reduced to standard oligopoly models of price competition, greatly simplifying the analysis of this otherwise complex competitive scenario. Notably, we find that when costs in the original game are convex, the resulting equivalent pricing game also has convex costs. Further, for a broad class of models exhibiting constant returns to investment, the resulting pricing game is equivalent to a standard price game with constant marginal costs; many loss systems, such as those modeled by the Erlang loss formula, exhibit constant returns to investment. We then consider another commonly used contractual agreement between firms and customers: firms first set prices and investment levels simultaneously, and then consumers choose where to subscribe. In this case, firms provide the best possible service given their infrastructure, but without an explicit guarantee. Using the Nash equilibria of the games played by firms, we compare this competitive model with the model where firms set prices and SLGs, in terms of the resulting prices, service levels, firms' profits, and consumers' surplus.

In this study, we consider a coalition analysis on the pricing problem for a decentralized supply chain model in which two manufacturers and two retailers with price competitions. In the pricing game, we analyze the equilibrium solutions with perfect competition, grand coalition and partial cooperation between manufacturers and retailers. The results show the externality between coalitions for supply chain members. Therefore, the pricing game is represented as a partition function game. The stable profit allocation in each alliance structure is obtained based on cooperative game theory for the partition function game. We derive the new finding that if there are multiple partial alliances within the same alliance structure, the profit within the partial alliance is smaller than the profit when there is only one partial alliance. Then, it is shown that the pessimistic and optimistic Shapley values of the manufacturers are lower than the optimistic personal alliance value of the manufacturer when the product substitutability is lower and the store substitutability is higher.

In this paper, we formulate a non cooperative pricing game over the quadratic Gaussian CEO problem with two agents. The agents observe independently corrupted versions of a source process X which the CEO is interested in estimating within an average distortion D. The agents quote a price per unit rate to generate revenue. They also incur a cost for communicating at the required rate. Given the agent prices, the CEO chooses a rate pair which minimizes its total cost. For a class of CEO problems, we show that when agent costs are convex in their respective rates, the aforementioned pricing game has a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. For a special case when the agents incur no costs, we explicitly determine the unique Nash equilibrium.

Combining with the actual competition in Chinese property insurance market and assuming that the property insurance companies take the marginal utility maximization as the basis of decision-making when they play price games, we first established the price game model with three oligarchs who have different rationalities. Then, we discussed the existence and stability of equilibrium points. Third, we studied the theoretical value of Lyapunov exponent at Nash equilibrium point and its change process with the main parameters' changes though having numerical simulation for the system such as the bifurcation, chaos attractors, and so on. Finally, we analyzed the influences which the changes of different parameters have on the profits and utilities of oligarchs and their corresponding competition advantage. Based on this, we used the variable feedback control method to control the chaos of the system and stabilized the chaos state to Nash equilibrium point again. The results have significant theoretical and practical application value.

The existence of tobacco is intended to meet the demand for cigarette factories. The indirect marketing chain is the cause of the price game by stakeholders. This situation has led to a loss of trust in trading partners, farmers suspect that there is a selling price game being played by middlemen and warehouses. The price game creates negative prejudice to stakeholders. The aim of this research is to analyze conflicts between farmers and stakeholders and solutions for farmers to the problems that occur. This research uses a qualitative method with a phenomenological approach. Data collection was carried out by observation, interviews, and document study from related research. The results show that determining the category of tobacco can certainly trigger conflict between farmers, bandol, and factory warehouses because it affects general selling price indicators in the market. Farmers' expectations of selling prices and intimidation by bandol elements give rise to conflicting opinions about the two, thus triggering conflict. The uncertainty of tobacco prices has made some farmers use an alternative substitute for this commodity by cultivating corn.

We model long-run price competition as a two-stage entry-capacity and pricing game among many potential entrants. Each solution of the game is found to reproduce a long-run competitive equilibrium provided the latter is characterized by a sufficiently large market. This result extends to the long run the oligopolistic foundation of perfect competition provided for the short run by Allen and Hellwig (1986a, 1986b) and Vives (1986a).

A time-based pricing game in a competitive vehicle market regarding the intervention of carbon emission reduction