Abstract
This chapter will analyse how France came to agree with both Morocco and Tunisia that talks should be opened for independence, and explain how the two negotiations were concluded in March 1956. Paradoxically, the rather hasty French recognition of Moroccan independence derived from the lack of its internal cohesiveness provoked by the radicalisation of nationalism. Nonetheless, Paris’s vague recognition of it without mentioning the termination of the protectorate status did not meet the nationalists’ satisfaction, particularly the Istiqlal’s. Consequently, in order to co-opt el-Fassi and the Istiqlal to the political regime, Paris resolved to concede the right to control foreign policy and defence as a means of reinforcing Mohammed V’s authority. Evidently, in order to secure the cohesiveness of Morocco’s political community, the French undertook a fresh course: the recognition of state sovereignty which was not necessarily accompanied by popular sovereignty, which had been pursued following the Tunisian case. Paris could not tolerate a lengthy process of establishing a regime based on the latter.
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