Abstract
I locate possible fertile common ground among the natural law theory ofFinnis, Grisez, and Boyle, the traditional Thomism of Mclnerny, and natural law derivationism. I respond to Murphy's contention that the inclination-ism of Finnis cannot be successfully asserted along with what Murphy takes to be a basic requirement of natural law ethics, namely that basic practical principles are to be strongly grounded in human nature. I argue that the tension between the inclinationism of Finnis and Murphy's basic requirement is not irresolvable. In response to objections by Murphy to natural law derivationism, I argue, based in part on Searle's attempt to derive an ought from an is, that the new natural law theorists and Mclnerny can and should investigate natural law derivationism for possible adoption.
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