Tombstones and Tombstone Inscriptions Among the Greeks of Russia: What a Cemetery Can Tell Us

The history of Muslim populations in Russia and other former republics of the Soviet Union is long and varied. In a Pew–Templeton poll conducted in Russia in 2010, 10 percent of respondents stated that their religion was Islam, while Muslims also make up a majority of the population in six post-Soviet republics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Muslims have long lived in regions across Russia, with far-flung communities ranging from distant outposts of Siberia to western cities like Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the beginning of the 20th century, there were more Muslims in the Russian Empire than there were in Iran or the Ottoman Empire, the two largest independent Muslim-majority states in the world at the time. Historically, the Muslim communities of Russia have been concentrated in four main regions: the Volga–Ural region in central Russia, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. While Muslim communities across former Soviet space share both differences and similarities with one another with regard to language and religious practices, their respective relations with the various Russian states that have existed over the years have varied. Moreover, Russian and Soviet policymaking toward all of these communities has shifted considerably from one era, and one ruler, to another. Throughout the imperial and Soviet eras, and extending into the post-Soviet era up to the present day, therefore, the existence of variations with regard to both era and region remains one of the most enduring legacies of Muslim–state interactions. Muslims in Russia vary by traditions, language, ethnicity, religious beliefs, and practices, and with respect to their historical interactions with the Russian state. The four historically Muslim-inhabited regions were incorporated into the Russian state at different points during its imperial history, often under quite sharply contrasting sets of conditions. Today most, but not all, Muslims in Russia and the rest of the former USSR are Sunni, although the manner and degree to which religion is practiced varies greatly among both communities and individuals. With respect to language, Muslim communities in Russia have traditionally been dominated demographically by Turkic speakers, although it should be noted that most Turkic languages are not mutually comprehensible in spoken form. In the North Caucasus and Tajikistan, the most widely spoken indigenous languages are not Turkic, although in these areas there are Turkic-speaking minorities. Another important feature of Muslim–state interactions in Russia is their connection to Muslims and Muslim-majority states beyond Russia’s borders. Throughout the imperial era, Russia’s foreign policymaking vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Iran was often intimately connected to domestic policymaking toward Muslim communities inside Russia. While this was a less pronounced feature of Moscow’s foreign policymaking during the Soviet era, in the post-Soviet era, policymaking toward Muslims domestically has once again become more closely linked to Russia’s foreign policy goals.

This article provides an in-depth literature review of the different trends and debates in the English academic literature on the violent conflicts in the North Caucasus during the post-Soviet period. This literature review is separated into three major debates and focused on four major themes that consistently appear in the study of violent conflicts in the North Caucasus: nationalism and identity (grievance), criminality and opportunism (greed), repression (revenge and trauma), and religion (radicalization). The first debate concentrates on the structural factors explaining mass mobilization in the North Caucasus following the end of the Soviet Union. The second debate underscores the role of religious radicalization in mobilization patterns in Chechnya and the North Caucasus, as well as its potential links with other conflicts (Afghanistan and Syria) and the importance of suicide bombings. Finally, the third debate focuses on the study of counter-insurgency and counterterrorism, the development of the Caucasus Emirate, and the diffusion of insurgent violence across the region. The article concludes by underlining the need to engage on a larger theorization of violent mobilization in the North Caucasus seeking to integrate structural, organizational and individual variables linking the global dynamics and local specificities of the region.

<p>Linguistic execution and narrative structure of the memorial plaques demonstrates not only ideology, axiology etc. of certain ages, culture of memory as such, but also trends in linguistic applications, with respect/without respect to the state language policy representing the respective historical stage (period of the first Latvian independent state, Soviet times, years of the third awakening and independence). The language/languages used in narratives of memorial plaques in the Rēzekne City, structure and content of the narratives depends on 1) location of the memorial plaque (cemetery, city sights, downtown or outskirts, etc.) 2) time period for installation of the memorial plaque (periods of independence/Soviet times), 3) national/religious affiliation of the dead/killed, 4) the pathos to be achieved (patriotic, heroic, philosophical, ritual, etc.).</p><p>Monolingual memorial plaques in Latvian or bilingual memorial plaques (in Latvian and Russian) constitute the largest quantity in Rēzekne. During the independence periods these are mostly devoted to: 1) politicians, public and culture figures, clergy (8), 2) Latvian/Latgalian freedom fighters, warriors (3), 3) victims of the Holocaust and the communist terror (3). During the Soviet period a special focus is on the World War II fighters against fascism and the victims of fascism, as well as some prominent cultural figures of socialist era – directors, specialists in literature, artists (11).</p><p>Memorial plaques installed before June 1940 are monolingual; plaques installed from WW II to 1989 are bilingual; plaques installed or renovated during the period when Latvia regained national independence are monolingual (in Latvian or Latgalian) or multilingual (in Russian, Latvian, English and German).</p><p>Inscriptions of the Soviet-era memorial plaques (predominantly in Russian and Latvian) are dominated by heroic pathos, which is based in the respective ideology; in inscriptions of the independence time a tone of patriotism and religious rituals is topical, as well as there is also considerable use of the language diversity (utilization of Latgalian and English). Jewish memorial plaques installed during recent years of independence to the Holocaust victims, usually are in 3-4 languages (in Latvian, Yiddish, Russian and English). Text of memorial plaques in multiple languages may be slightly different (choice of lexemes) while maintaining the overall low-key pathos.</p><p>The Jewish Holocaust memorial plaques are one of the few multilingual signs in Rēzekne. Order of inscriptions in 3 or 4 languages enables to reason about the hierarchy of languages during the Soviet era and the years of independence, at the beginning of 21st century. In trilingual signs of the Soviet-era plaques Latvian language is featured as the last one – after Yiddish and Russian, while the plaque installed in 2006 already represents different layout hierarchy indicating the prevailing role of Latvian as the official language where the victims’ mother tongue moves to the second position, but Russian in memorial plaques is still more important than English. Layout and stylistics of the narrative in this memorial plaque inscription is seemingly neutrally informative (where, when, who, did what), but contains moderate dramatic qualities, modest reminder of active participation of the locals in extermination of Jews. The inscription can represent the direction of narration in the memory culture of the Holocaust victims: inscriptions have a reminiscent, recapturing function (so the recipient needs preliminary knowledge), therefore they lack emotionality and the dramatic qualities, evaluative style resources, unlike the Jewish tombstone inscriptions.</p><p>Latgalian memorial plaques in Rēzekne are still rare, total number of them are five and they are falling mainly within the religious (Catholic identity) discourse, largely devoted to prominent Latgalian clergy, the clergy patrons, the victims of communist terror. These memorial plaques in terms of narrative expansion of the inscriptions are not focused on reminder or reconstruction as it is, for example, in the inscriptions on plaques of the Holocaust victims, and are performing another important function of narrative – creating memory (knowledge) for those who lack it, providing a ready-made, educational, observational, emotional assessment – this is a very important feature of the Latgalian memorial plaques. Inscription narratives show respect to an addressee without knowledge, therefore subtexts are not intended there.</p><p>National and territorial identity of Latgale in the historical and contemporary perspective is featured by the syncretism of cultures. Use of languages on the inscriptions of Rēzekne memorial plaques is indicative of the existence of multilingual environment the least respect for which is shown during the first Latvian independence (1818–1940) and also during the restoration of independence period, as most of the Soviet-era plaques renovated in 90ies of the 20th century and early 21st century now are monolingual (in Latvian), but at the time of installation (50–70ies of the 20th century) they have been mostly bilingual (in Latvian, in Russian) or made only in Russian. Today, after regaining independence, the Latvian prevails in the multilingual urban landscape, the Russian still is quite enduring (especially in the outskirts of town), Latgalian is gradually moving away from formal constraints, and revived, but the Jewish is irretrievably withering away. Unfortunately, culture of memories in format of Hebrew memorial plaques and tombstone inscriptions will soon be the only lingual evidence of the existence of this historically so important element of the regional identity.</p>

This study investigates the main tendencies of literary translation in Georgia during the Soviet and post-Soviet (post-colonial) periods. It highlights how Soviet authorities censored modernist literature to align with ideological principles and protect readers from “harmful” influences. The research explores the ideological and cultural mechanisms that shaped translation practices during the Soviet era. Grounded in translation studies and post-colonial theory, the study demonstrates how translation functioned both as a tool of ideological control and as a means of preserving literary heritage. It also examines contemporary challenges in Georgia’s translation landscape, including the absence of a national translation policy and the economic limitations of a small book market. Methodologically, the research relies on qualitative analysis of translated literary works and includes interviews with contemporary Georgian translators and publishers to assess current strategies and constraints. The findings reveal a shift from ideological control under Soviet rule to a more globally influenced literary translation system in the post-Soviet era. This underscores the resilience and adaptability of Georgia’s translation field and offers critical insights into the cultural and economic factors shaping its evolution. The study contributes to the literature by offering a comprehensive examination of Georgia’s translation history and current challenges. The study also proposes recommendations for developing a sustainable and ethically grounded translation ecosystem in post-Soviet Georgia. Received: 2 April 2025 / Accepted: 14 June 2025 / Published: 05 July 2025

The concept of a ‘cosmopolitan’ or of ‘cosmopolitanism’ has in general rarely if ever been understood as something genuinely positive in Russian lands. This fact applies to Russia under the tsars, as well as to the Soviet and post-Soviet periods. With regard to concepts of the Russian Right, existing primarily since the Revolution of 1905, and on the basis of the terminology of the Stalinist period, one could also point to the existence of an ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ paradigm. The analysis of this anti-cosmopolitanism paradigm in the Russian context shows that despite such fundamental historical ruptures as the 1917 Revolution there were, and still are, notable ideological continuities. The comparison of significant elements of the ideologies of the Russian Radical Right before 1917 and the Soviet era, in particular of Stalinism, shows that in both systems the ‘cosmopolitan’ was ultimately conceptualised as the sum of all characteristics that appeared highly foreign to the ‘Russian nature’. The aim of this article is to highlight the emergence, possible origins and modifications of an ‘anti-cosmopolitanism’ paradigm in Russian and Soviet history as well as to explore its concrete function in modern Russia in particular in regard to Soviet nationalism and chauvinism.

This article examines foreign fighters and the insurgency in the North Caucasus. The first part of the article addresses conceptual issues concerning the ways that foreign fighters are analysed, posing this more widely in terms of transnational activism. Here I examine the importance of kin and relatedness. I develop this argument in the second part of the article, which examines pan-Islamism and transnational activism in the post-Soviet period. The third section draws attention to the different groups of foreign fighters, as part of a wider activist movement in the North Caucasus. Here I show that a complex group of transnational activists from the Greater Middle East, North Africa, parts of Europe, and Central Asia participated in the conflicts in the North Caucasus. Finally, the article turns to examine volunteers from the North Caucasus who travelled to fight in Syria, concluding with some considerations about the reintegration of returnees and former activists.

Tarih yazıcılığının gelişimini önemli ölçüde etkileyen alanlardan biri olarak millî tarih yazıcılığı ulusların siyasal, sosyal ve kültürel hayatının önemli olaylarının kayda alınmasının ötesinde, özellikle son iki yüzyılda siyasal varoluşun ve kültürel kimlik oluşturmanın en etkin aracı olmuştur. Azerbaycan’da milli tarih yazıcılığı son yüzyılda ideolojik, politik ve kültürel değerleri bir-birinden farklı Azerbaycan Demokratik Cumhuriyeti (1918-1920), Azerbaycan Sovyet Sosyalist Respublikası (1920-1991) ve Azerbaycan Respublikası (1991- ) dönemlerini yaşamıştır. Azerbaycan’ın 71 senelik sovyet ve 25 yıllık bağımsızlık dönemi araştırmanın dönemsel sınırlarını oluşturacaktır. Bütün uluslar gibi Azerbaycan Türkleri’nin de tarihi diğer uluslarla askeri, politik, ekonomik, sosyal ve kültürel etkileşime bağlı olarak gelişmiştir. Bu bağlamda Azerbaycan’ın millî tarih yazıcılığı açısından Türkiye, diğer devletlerle kıyaslanamayacak kadar önemli tarihi figür olmuştur. Selçuklu ve Türkiye Cumhuriyeti gibi öncesi ve sonrası da önem arzetmekle birlikte, Osmanlı döneminde Türkiye, Azerbaycan tarihinin bizzat içinde rol almıştır. Araştırmanın başlıca amacı Azerbaycan tarihçiliğinde Osmanlı imajının tespit edilerek millî tarih yazıcılığında dönemlerarası süreklilik ve değişikliğin karşılıklı analiz edilmesidir. Gerek sovyet, gerekse bağımsızlık dönemi Azerbaycan’da okullarda Eğitim Bakanlığı’nca tek tip ve zorunlu olarak okutulan tarih ders kitapları araştırmanın başlıca kaynaklarını oluşturacaktır. Azerbaycan tarihçiliğinin bağımsızlık öncesi ve sonrası dönemlerinde Osmanlı algısı, bazen siyasi ve derslik yazarlarının kimliği gibi bireysel faktörlere bağlı olarak kendi içinde homojenlik arzetmediği için her dönemin kendi içindeki değişikliğin iz sürümü de sovyet ve post-sovyet dönemlerin farklı senelerinde yayınlanmış ders kitaplarından tespit edilecektir. Ders kitaplarının yanısıra, Azerbaycan tarihçiliğinin her iki dönemle ilgili belli-başlı eserlerinden bütünlüğün sağlanması ve karşılaştırma amacıyla yararlanılacaktır.

The state building process in the North Caucasus since the domination of the Russians in the area started in the 19th century is helpful in understanding territorial claims of North Caucasian peoples since 1991. It also clarifies the relation between the central authorities in Moscow and the authorities in the North Caucasus. On 21 March 1838, General Golovin was appointed the new Russian chief commander for the Caucasus. His plan of action for the Caucasus was comprising, a descent on the Black Sea coast, the final subjugation of the Upper Samur communities and the conquest of Chechnya and Northern Daghestan. The Circassians are thus one of the biggest minorities in the former Ottoman Empire. Amjad Jaimoukha estimates that there are about 600 Circassian villages in Central and Western Anatolia.Keywords: Black Sea Coast; Chechnya; Circassians; North Caucasus; Northern Daghestan; Ottoman empire; state building

The present paper explores the hitherto unknown beginnings of the Ottoman-Russian imperial rivalry by focusing on the mid-16th-century encounter between the Ottoman Empire and the Tsardom of Muscovy over the North Caucasus, where the ambitions of these two asymmetric powers—the Ottomans being an established “super power” and the Muscovites a rising power—became entangled for the first time. This first encounter, which was the harbinger of many future engagements not only in this region but also in the broader steppe frontier around the Black Sea, was more of a “cold war” rather than a military confrontation, as both the Ottomans and the Muscovites rather preferred to establish spheres of influence and eventually their hegemony over the North Caucasus through their vassals and clients. In addition to demonstrating the Tsardom of Muscovy’s initial claims and policies over the North Caucasus, this study will shed light on the reasons of the Ottoman failure to transform their nominal claims over the region to a de facto hegemony similar to what they had established over Eastern European principalities.

The following paper investigates the Russian-Chechen relations in XVI-XVII centuries. The authors note that the Caucasus was in the sphere of Russian foreign policy at the time of the Russian centralized state formation. With the annexation of the Astrakhan khanate, Russia came to the Caucasus border and the Caucasian direction started to occupy a leading place in the Eastern policy of the tsarist government. The Caucasus in the XVI century was an object of a tense struggle between the two most powerful States of the then Middle East - Ottoman Empire and Safavid Iran - and at the same time a bridgehead, where there was a constant threat to the southern outskirts of Russia from these States and the Crimean khanate. The strengthening of Russia on the Caucasian lands could become the most reliable means to ensure the safety of the South of Russia. So in the XVII and XVII centuries, the North Caucasus was Russia’s military-strategic interest or, in modern language, a geopolitical one. Chechnya came under the influence of Russia in 1567, when the first Russian militarized city Terek in the North Caucasus was founded. For the peoples of the North Caucasus and of Chechnya the appearance of a Russian fortress on their land was of great political importance. Thus, it was vital for Russia to gain a foothold in the North Caucasus, as the enemy (Iran and Turkey) could do it, which was unsafe for Russia’s southern borders. It was during this period (late sixteenth century) when close military and political ties of the Moscow government and the Chechens were established. The Moscow government was interested in Chechnya because of its geographical location - the immediate proximity to the towns of Terek and the fact that its territory was the most convenient means of communication with Georgia. The relationship between Chechnya and Russia at the end of XVI - first half of XVII century was almost an «ideal model» of a peaceful rapprochement of the Chechen with the Moscow government for those conditions and at that time. The Russian authorities did not interfere in the internal affairs of the Chechen societies, they did not impose their own rules or laws, being satisfied with the results of the hostages, the payment of tribute and, if necessary, temporary military service. This led to the fact that in the XVII century allied relations of Chechnya societies with Russia were established. However, at the end of the XVII century Russian-Caucasian connection was significantly weakened.

156 SEER, 8o, I, 2002 become an author, and not have escaped reservist'scall-up for the RussoJapanese War.He lived long enough to survivethe Russianrevolutions,trying to reconcile revolutionaryaspirationswith Christianpacifism. Centrefor Russian andEastEuropean Studies J. N. WESTWOOD University ofBirmingham Noack, Christian. Muslimischer JNationalismus imRussischen Reich.Nationsbildung undNationalbewegung bei Tataren undBaschkiren i86I-I9I-7. Quellen und StudienzurGeschichtedesostlichenEuropa,56. FranzSteiner,Stuttgart, 2000, 6I4 pp. Glossary.Tables. Notes. Bibliography.DM I96.00. THE Volga-Ural region, running eastwards from Moscow to encompass Kazan, Perm and Ufa, and southwards to Orenburg and the Caspian, has constituted a distinct social and ethnic region within modern Russia. In contrast to the Muslim areas of Central Asia and the Caucasus, which were incorporatedinto the Tsaristempire in the nineteenth century, the Tatarand Bashkirpeoples of this region fell under Russian rule in I552 with the fall of the Khanate of Kazan. By the end of the nineteenth centurythe population of this region was predominantlyRussian, the three million Muslimsaccounting forjustunder I4 percent of thetotal.The populationencompassedmerchants, clergy,teachersandprofessionalsin themajorcities,but above alla substantial peasantry. This book analyses both the process of nation formation and the development of a nationalistmovement amongstthe Tatarsand Bashkirsin theperiod from I86I to I9I7. The history of nationalist and reform movements in this region goes backbefore I86I, with the emergence of a Muslimpressand book publishing, and with the firstdebates on the reformof Muslim education. But itwas after i 86 , in responsein partto changes in thebroaderRussiancontext and to the growing interestof the statein modernizingeducation and society, that a reformistmovementjadidism ( fromArabicj'adid, new) began to develop: initially concerned with education, literature, and the press, it developed in time into a movement for Muslim political representationwithin Russia, and, in the I905-I907 period, to the formation of Muslim committees in this region and to Muslim representation in the Duma. Noack is keen to show, however, how diverse thinkingwas: thejadidistmovement was opposed by a subsequent kadimist reaction (fromArabic qadim, old). The latter expressed a social conservatismwidespreadamongst the Muslimpopulation, while within the reformistwing there were diverseviews on the role of women, the reform of language, and participationin Russianpoliticallife. Noack'sbook can be readnot only as a contributionto the historyof Tsarist Russia in the nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuriesbut also as engagement with theories of nationalism. His stressis on the emergence of a nationalism that was specificallyMuslimand located in this particularregion. In making this argument he aims to counter other, predominant, explanations of this nationalism.First,he wishes to takehis distance from the predominant Soviet approach, one that projected back into the pre-Soviet period the nationality categories of the USSR: thus the 'scientific'approach to Tatar nationalism, REVIEWS I57 tatarovedenie, focused on the development of a national consciousness, at the expense of religion. As the author reminds us, the term 'Tatar', like 'Turk', has had many a meaning in modern times. Noack is also concerned to distinguishhis analysisfrom that which has come to predominate in the postSoviet period, with its focus on the cultural,linguisticand social, dimension of nationalism:he insistson the centralityof Islam in this regional nationalism. He is also at pains to show how this Muslim consciousness in the Volga-Ural region was, while aware of what was happening elsewhere, in the newly conquered Central Asia and in the Ottoman empire, a distinctivelyregional one. To complete the argument, he also questions how far the Muslim nationalism that emerged in this period could be seen as drawing on a prenationalist 'substratum',based on the Tatar state or on myths denoting the area as a sacred one, and invoking the conversion of these lands to Islam on the orders of the Prophet Mohammad and accounts of saints and heroes buriedthere. Noack's historyis, therefore,one that combines an account of the internal, discursivedevelopment of thisMuslimnationalismwith analysisof the context in which idea and movement of nation developed: he gives a detailed picture of the changing character of Tatar society, and the social background of political activists,but also of something too easily omitted from endogenous accounts of the emergence of nationalism, the role of the broader political context and, very crucially, of the Tsarist state in both stimulating and inhibiting this consciousness. Parallels suggest themselves both with other reform and national movements within...

During the post-Soviet period, the Russian government actively used public service advertisements to establish their new identity and to find ways to move forward and solve their concerns. In particular, public service advertisements in the post-Soviet era are different from public service advertisements in the Soviet era in that messages from the central government were emphasized unilaterally. Some public service advertisements produced in the early days of the post-Soviet era contain enlightening elements. However, in most cases, the focus was on delivering a two-way cultural message based on the norms and values commonly used in society. By doing so, they aimed to elicit understanding and sympathy for the society and its members. In this respect, public service advertisements produced during the post-Soviet period are differentiated from the Soviet propaganda, which spread like a one-way message. Meanwhile, some advertisements produced at the private level in the early days of the post-Soviet form a link between the present and the past in a way that stimulates the nostalgic sensibility of the Russians at the time. Through this, the advertisements suggested the possibility of resolving the gap and conflict that existed between the former Soviet era and the new Russia. Furthermore, it indirectly shows how life in the public realm and national time, which was the focus of the post Soviet era, transformed into and harmonized personal time and the private realm in the post-Soviet era.<BR> Therefore, in this article, we look at the types of Russian public service advertisements in the modern sense that began to develop in earnest in the early days of the post-Soviet era and examine the social and cultural issues of Russia in the 1990s through the messages and images in the advertisements. Furthermore, we examine how public service advertisements produced during this period built the image of a

(2005). Attitudes Toward Labor Held by Young Blue-Collar Workers at Industrial Enterprises in the Soviet Era and the Post-Soviet Period. Russian Education & Society: Vol. 47, No. 5, pp. 30-56.

The point of origin in the comparison of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire were not as different from each other unlike the similarities. Both empires has chosen to shape with their own internal dynamics and enclosed social life over the years. In addition, they have taken samples the West as their model for modernization. These Empires have been described as “other” by Western because of “Islam” in Ottoman Empire and “Orthodoxy” in Russian Empire. Similar social patterns, political unrest and modernization moves has been the starting point of the study. The study referred to in the title of “comparison” did not include the concept of the just determination of similarity. Although both empires have many similarities, there were many striking differences each other. The most obvious differences in etymologic, Ottoman bureaucracy designate modernization as “Westernization”, other side Russian administrators named modernization as “Europeanism”. Another notable element was observed in various economic lives. The transition to capitalism in the Ottoman Empire directed by external forces on the other hand, Russia gave direction to this transformation of its own volition. The purpose of study is to show the similarities and differences in the Ottoman and Russian modernization with using the comparative historical sociological method.Keywords: ottoman empire, russian empire, modernization, westernization, political life

The point of origin in the comparison of the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire were not as different from each other unlike the similarities. Both empires has chosen to shape with their own internal dynamics and enclosed social life over the years. In addition, they have taken samples the West as their model for modernization. These Empires have been described as “other” by Western because of “Islam” in Ottoman Empire and “Orthodoxy” in Russian Empire. Similar social patterns, political unrest and modernization moves has been the starting point of the study. The study referred to in the title of “comparison” did not include the concept of the just determination of similarity. Although both empires have many similarities, there were many striking differences each other. The most obvious differences in etymologic, Ottoman bureaucracy designate modernization as “Westernization”, other side Russian administrators named modernization as “Europeanism”. Another notable element was observed in various economic lives. The transition to capitalism in the Ottoman Empire directed by external forces on the other hand, Russia gave direction to this transformation of its own volition. The purpose of study is to show the similarities and differences in the Ottoman and Russian modernization with using the comparative historical sociological method.Keywords: ottoman empire, russian empire, modernization, westernization, political life