To Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Conundrum of Taiwan’s Nuclear Power

Abstract

AFTER THE FUKUSHIMA NUCLEAR DISASTER IN 2011, THE WESTERN European Nuclear Regulators Association (WENRA) and the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group (ENSREG) jointly developed a Common Comprehensive and Transparent Risk and Safety Assessment, also known as the Stress Test, in May 2011. Taiwan's nuclear regulating agency, the Atomic Energy Council (AEC), requested to participate in the ENSREG peer-reviewed Stress Test in November 2011, which was formally agreed to in January 2013. Following the requirements of the EU Stress Test program, the AEC prepared the Taiwan Stress Test National Report for Nuclear Power Plants in May 2013 (AEC 2013). As part of the transparency requirements, members of nongovernmental organizations were also invited to evaluate the National Report.The general impression of the National Report was that it looked more like a licensee's report than a report from a regulator. The more critical issue was the geological information provided in the National Report. First, the fault lengths near nuclear power plants were much shorter than those the AEC already knew about, as its chair reported to Taiwan's Legislative Yuan on April 17, 2013 (Hsu 2013; Tsai 2013). Distances between nearby faults and the nuclear reactors were either overlooked or excluded from the report. Nevertheless, the AEC maintained that everything in the Taiwan Stress Test National Report was properly prepared according to the Stress Test procedures.It is quite intriguing that Taiwan invited overseas experts to conduct the assessment, but did not provide them with the most up-to-date information at the same time. Meaningful assessments cannot be achieved using incomplete and inaccurate information. One would like to believe that the AEC did understand the importance of nuclear safety and was capable of acting accordingly. It may be that those in charge of the AEC have been trying to manage conflicting roles simultaneously, and apparently achieving nuclear safety was not often high on its list of priorities. For those trained as nuclear engineers, promoting and expanding nuclear power still prevails over safety and waste management issues. Moreover, the culture of secrecy, deceit, and denial established from day one within the secret nuclear program still prevails to this day.I present several examples in this article to illustrate current disquieting conditions in Taiwan. I start by describing the early secret nuclear weapons program in order to help understand the power distribution and the psychology behind the scenes. Next, I describe the devolution to peaceful applications, the fourth nuclear power plant controversy, and its current status and challenges. Thereafter, I outline nuclear waste problems, the discovery of numerous radioactive apartments, the low-level waste storage facilities on Orchid Island, and recent spent fuel reprocessing issues. In the final section of the article I discuss why unfortunate incidents occurred and how Taiwan policymakers can prevent history from repeating itself.Taiwan's Early Nuclear Weapons ProgramThe Israeli Connection and US OppositionThe nuclear weapons program originated in the arms race between the ruling Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) and China. In March 1962, President Chiang Kai-shek learned from US intelligence images of a nuclear weapons program being undertaken in northwest China. Generalissimo Chiang, not wishing to fall behind the communists, decided to pursue a nuclear weapons program of his own. Taiwan sought help from Israel. Dr. Ernst Bergmann, chair of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, in response to an invitation by General Tang Chun-po, paid a secret visit to Taiwan in 1963 and spent three days at Sun Moon Lake Resort with President Chiang and General Tang (Wang 2010).Soon thereafter, a new research institute for nuclear energy, rocket propulsion, and electronics was proposed. In spring 1964, preparations for creating a military-controlled Chung Shan Science Institute (CSSI) were formally announced, with General Tang serving as chair of its preparatory bureau and Dr. …