Abstract
We deal with three-level incentive differential games in which first and second leaders have access not only to state information but also to information on follower's strategies. We derive sufficient conditions for three-level incentive scherr.es using information on follower's strategies both in linear and non-linear differential games, and show that three-level incentive schemes using information on follower's strategies depend on an initial state value.
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