“There cannot be two bulls in one kraal”: insights from the political conversions of Nelson Samkange on governance and opposition disruption in Zimbabwe, 1960s–2000s

The military remains active in Zimbabwean politics, yet military practices within and outside the barracks have received scant attention, especially regarding how the military sustains political parties in power. This article argues that the military is the power behind the survival of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) as a political party. Understanding the Zimbabwe military requires a detailed understanding of its relationship with ZANU-PF, but also of the ways in which the military’s economic interests inform its deep involvement in politics. The Zimbabwe military produces a political threat and then seeks to protect against the same threat it created within and beyond ZANU-PF. However, the relationship between ZANU-PF and the military is deeply rooted in history and determines the political path of the party. There has never been a period in which the military has been the apolitical and professional organisation which orthodox theories of its role would suggest.

Drawing on Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), and anchored on CDA theory, we argue that as the ruling party’s governance record increasingly came under scrutiny in two election cycles researched, the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), largely maintained its old strategies of power legitimation. However, it altered the message in order to reflect the changing intensity of political contestation, an increasingly bellicose political opposition and growing dissent within its own ranks, as well as the shifting economic fortunes of the country. Forced to campaign under these circumstances, ZANU-PF trusted, with notable variations, its old discourse strategies to produce election advertisements that legitimised its hold on power, hegemony and spread its ideology. The findings show that whereas in July, 2018, the message changed to reflect the leadership change, ZANU-PF’s legitimation strategies remained unchanged. Similarly, we note that whereas the ‘them’ that had to be de-legitimised in 2013 was unequivocally Tsvangirai and the Movement for Democratic Change Tsvangirai (MDC-T), in 2018 ‘them’ not only referred to Nelson Chamisa and MDC Alliance, but it also referred to Mugabe and curiously not ZANU-PF under Mugabe. Including ZANU-PF under Mugabe, we argue, would have also inadvertently de-legitimised both Mnangagwa and ZANU-PF.

Much of what we know about Zimbabwe's liberation war heroes and heroines is associated with the Zimbabwe African National Union- Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)'s recognition of individuals who defended its hold on power. However, of late, an upsurge in factionalism in the party has resulted in increasing reference to heroism as a means to exert factional dominance. An understanding of how this has been done can be used to explain ZANU-PF factional dynamics. Current studies call for the study of factionalism to focus on intra-party group dynamics instead of the traditional organisation forms of factions. It is in this context that this study argues that survival or fall of factions within (ZANU-PF) is framed around issues of heroism that is around one's perceived contribution or non-contribution to the liberation struggle. This article demonstrates this growing phenomenon in ZANU-PF veteran leaders whose status has been reshaped by new political moments as factionalism intensified. Inlight of rising factionalism, we argue that, war hero/heroine status in ZANU-PF is not permanent, but is highly shaped by obtaining factional political moments.

In his analysis of the 2013 elections in Zimbabwe, Donald Moore stopped short of saying that Zimbabwean democracy had breathed its last. Moore noted that a combination of Zimbabwe African National Union — Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)’s tricks, coercion, populism, regional peers’ collusion and the opposition’s lackadaisical campaign produced a ZANU-PF “victory” that even surprised the victors (Moore, 2014, p. 47). In this election, the incumbent, Robert Gabriel Mugabe, got a 61% share of the presidential vote against Morgan Tsvangirai’s 34%. Given the various intrusions on individual freedoms in the run-up to and during the election, many scholars, like Moore, wondered whether the democratization process could be saved from this massive onslaught. Scholars have identified issues how ZANU-PF invested into its power-retention motive through a number of measures including the military-dominated registry and electoral commission, the marshalling of the military and militia to its cause (which organs in turn tortured, killed and raped perceived opponents especially in the 2008 presidential run-off elections), manipulating the inclusive government and hiring a foreign gang of election mercenaries (Moore, 2014, p. 147). Languages of catastrophe that emerged from academics seemed to give democracy no chance, and also took away the initiative from the ordinary person. Counter-narratives that emerged during, and in the immediate aftermath, of these elections have masked the various ways through which pro-democratic forces within the country had, against seemingly insurmountable odds, made their voices heard and perhaps even narrowed the avenues that had previously been shamelessly manipulated by the incumbent political party. In the process, these forces have created a database for most electoral-related issues — which might be exploited by those seeking a more nuanced understanding of what actually transpired during the 2008 and 2013 elections.

Reviewed by: Robert Mugabe by Sue Onslow and Martin Plaut Brooks Marmon BOOK REVIEW of Onslow, Sue, and Martin Plaut. 2018. Robert Mugabe. Athens: Ohio University Press. 208 pp. $14.95 (paper). In Robert Mugabe, Sue Onslow and Martin Plaut deliver a timely work, encapsulating the former Zimbabwean leader's thirty-seven years in power alongside his contributions to the country's liberation struggle. The authors occasionally downplay his eminence, but they are aware that his lengthy career was epochal. Their introduction observes that, because of his "extraordinary longevity in office, . . . [his] personal history is woven through that of his country" (18). Accordingly, this slim, nine-chapter publication, part of the Ohio Short Histories of Africa series, is more than a Mugabe biography, as it traces the unfolding of key political events in Zimbabwe. Beyond Mugabe, the primary actor in this account is the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF). Given Mugabe's durability and prominence, this accessible work will be appreciated by students and generalist scholars of Africa alike; however, those looking for a deeper dive into Zimbabwean politics may desire a companion "Long History." Onslow and Plaut are reluctant to typecast Mugabe, one of Africa's most divisive figures. Their views of Mugabe are overwhelmingly critical, but they praise his political cunning and acknowledge the "real achievements" of his early years in office (1). They further stress that "Zimbabwe's fortunes since independence cannot be distilled down to the attitude and actions of just one man" (13–14). The contemporary aspects of Robert Mugabe offer incisive insights, but the historical components are more uneven. A nonagenarian when he was deposed in 2017, Mugabe had played a prominent role in ZANU-PF since cofounding it in 1963. The emphasis (and strength) of the work centers around his leadership of Zimbabwe from the late 1990s, when his policies [End Page 114] became the subject of international controversy and, for many African intellectuals, a litmus test for the authenticity of radical pan-African thought. Compact explorations of Mugabe's evolving relationship with South Africa and China offer insights on the strategies and dynamics that enabled his long reign. Those who have highlighted positive aspects of land reform, the signature aspect of Mugabe's radical agenda, are largely portrayed as overreaching (106). The authors identify Mugabe's decision to intervene in the Second Congo War as a critical turning point, which facilitated corruption and massively strained the public purse. It is in the telling of the developments following this intervention, when Mugabe's generally positive relationship with the West soured, where the book gathers strength. The exploration of Mugabe's leadership in the period before the 1987 Unity Accord and during the de facto consolidation of a one-party state over the following decade is less developed. In the light of Zimbabwe's political polarization, the brief discussion of the Gukurahundi atrocities of the 1980s, which according to the authors resulted in at least 20,000 deaths (81), is, even for a short history, conspicuous. The treatment of the 1979 Lancaster House Conference, which guided the transformation to genuine majority rule, constitutes the richest pre-independence component of the book, undoubtedly a product of Onslow's detailed research on this critical diplomatic event. Close followers of Zimbabwean history will also appreciate the authors' decisive (albeit contested) claim that Rhodesian security forces killed ZANU leader Herbert Chitepo (53), while Mugabe is fingered as being "most likely" responsible for the death of ZANU military leader Josiah Tongogara (166). The authors succinctly highlight an array of domestic actors shaping Zimbabwean politics following the resurgence of the opposition from 1999. This is perhaps a reflection of their source material; the narrative relies heavily on published works. In the later chapters, Onslow and Plaut profitably draw on online media accounts and technical reports, which diversify the heavy dose of academic tomes and memoirs that inform earlier chapters. A byproduct of limited archival research is a muted consideration of the local forces at play during Mugabe's years of struggle. British diplomacy receives as much attention as the white Rhodesian interests that Mugabe was struggling against. Aside from Prime Minister Ian Smith, the archetypal Rhodesian...

Over the past 20 years, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and his political party, Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), have relied heavily on political rhetoric that demonizes lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) persons. In this paper, it is argued that the anti-LGBT political rhetoric in Zimbabwe is part of a larger program known as “patriotic history,” which emphasizes a particular kind of Zimbabwean identity to legitimize the continued rule of Mugabe and ZANU-PF. The value of combining patriotic history and political homophobia emerges out of the unique political and economic context which Mugabe’s regime found itself unable to adequately address. To illustrate how and why this has happened, the paper focuses on two key incidents: the 1995 Zimbabwe International Book Fair, and the public conversation over writing a new constitution between 2010 and 2013.

Review: <i>Performing Power in Zimbabwe: Politics, Law, and the Courts since 2000</i>, by Susanne Verheul

ABSTRACTLanguage is a political tool used to legitimise, delegitimise, produce and (re)produce dominance. In Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF advertisements for the July 2013 elections were an attempt to deploy language to (re)produce dominance. The advertisements were produced in the context of a power-sharing government comprising ZANU-PF and the MDCs. Adopting sign theory, the article uses legitimation analysis to explore the ways in which ZANU-PF used language to retain dominance. Research revealed that ZANU-PF legitimated its dominance on the basis of performance, for example, implementing the multiple currencies system after the Zimbabwe dollar’s collapse and delivering a constitution that guarantees the values espoused by the liberation struggle. Mugabe’s incomparable “wisdom and deftness” in handling matters of state, ZANU-PF’s care for ordinary urban ratepayers and economic indigenisation were used to justify the party’s dominance. It also legitimised its rule by portraying the MDC-T as an uncaring, dishonest and sell-out party, thus delegitimising it while skilfully concealing its own blame in the collapse of the economy post-2000.

Fake news has long been used in propaganda, but the proliferation of digital media reinvigorated it. In Zimbabwe, fake news peaks during elections and on the eve of international summits the country’s leadership will be attending. The ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) and the main opposition Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A), which re-branded to Citizens Coalition for Change (CCC), deploy fake news against each other. These two are the main contestants for power, and they dominate Parliament and Senate. ZANU-PF has the majority in the legislature whilst the opposition CCC dominates Urban Councils. They are permanently engaged in a battle for hegemony. Informed by the three dimensions of fake news as a genre, a label and dramaturgia, the paper interrogates how, when, where and why ZANU-PF and MDC-A deployed fake news in the post-Mugabe era. Data were gathered through archival research and virtual ethnography, and the findings show that both parties used the three dimensions of fake news in intra-party and inter-party struggles, and the battle to influence regional and global public opinion. Fake news was used to confuse the public and discredit the opponent.

1. Introduction In the March 2008 'harmonized' elections in Zimbabwe, (1) the Movement for Democratic Change (Tsvangirai) (MDC-T) scored the narrowest of victories over the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in the race for the House of Assembly, by 100 seats to 99, with the splinter Movement for Democratic Change (Mutumbara) (MDC-M) winning another 10 constituencies, with one more taken by an independent. (2) In the Presidential race, MDC-T leader Morgan Tsvangirai outpaced incumbent Robert Mugabe, by officially taking 47.9 per cent of the poll compared to the latter's 43.2 per cent. However, the long delay of five weeks between the close of polls and the official announcement of the result implied strongly that the margin of difference between the two front-runners had actually been larger. Nonetheless, official denial that the challenger had won more than 50 per cent of the poll (plus one vote) meant that the two leading candidates were forced into a presidential run-off, and as is well known, the level of violence subsequently orchestrated by the ruling party was so great that Tsvangirai ultimately pulled out of the contest to save his supporters' skins. But now the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) decreed that his withdrawal had happened too late, and that the election would continue, and with MDC supporters cowed, Mugabe officially went on to record a 90.2 per cent victory. ZANU-PF had bludgeoned its way to a win in the election that really mattered (the executive long having subordinated the legislature to its will in Mugabe's Zimbabwe), and the scene was set for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to negotiate a Global Political Agreement (GPA), signed in September 2008, which installed a coalition government, with Tsvangirai serving as Prime Minister but Mugabe retaining the presidency. How different things were in 2013! The elections, held on 31 July, saw Mugabe trouncing Tsvangirai by 61.1 per cent to 33.9 per cent in the first round presidential poll. This was matched in the Assembly elections, ZANU-PF securing a landslide in the Assembly elections, winning 160 constituencies to the MDC-T's 49 (with a further seat won by an independent). In addition, ZANU-PF won 37 out of 60 extra seats which, with the promulgation of a new constitution in January 2013, were reserved for women, each of the country's ten provinces electing six candidates according to the proportion of the total votes won by parties' constituency candidates. Overall, therefore, in a National Assembly comprising 270 seats, ZANU-PF secured a total of 197, compared to 70 for the MDC-T, 2 for the MDC-M, and the one independent. Likewise, in the elections to the Senate, elected proportionately in the same way as proportional representation seats for women in the Assembly, ZANU-PF trounced the MDC by 37 to 21. In sum, this meant that ZANU-PF had won more than the two-thirds majority required for amending the recently agreed constitution. (3) ZANU-PF thereupon claimed that voters' had 'come home' to the party of liberation, and that Zimbabwe was back on course after the confusions and compromises of the GPA coalition period. Both wings of the MDC cried foul. Local monitoring groups, such as the Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN), (as well as a report by the SADC lawyers' association) (4) supported them, their principal complaint being that ZANU-PF had grossly manipulated the voters' roll and had used its longstanding control of government to subvert the entire electoral machinery in order to secure its victory. Western commentators, including the United States (US) and the British government, together with the European Union (EU), largely agreed with them, although they had been officially barred from sending official monitoring and observer groups. However, despite stating that they had their reservations about the conduct of the poll, the observer groups sent by the African Union (AU) and SADC, declared the elections as credible and fair. …

This study analyses media narratives of Joice Mujuru’s fall from Zimbabwe’s political hierarchy and Grace Mugabe’s speeches during the “Meet the People” rallies that were held in Zimbabwe’s ten political provinces between 2015 and 2017. Media texts about Joice Mujuru’s political demise are analysed as reproductions of gender stereotypes used to justify women’s marginalisation in politics, while Grace Mugabe’s speeches are read as political performances of her power(lessness) as the wife of the then president (the late Robert Mugabe) and leader of the Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)’s Women’s League. Drawing on ideas of female political representation, this paper discusses representations of the political experiences of Joice Mujuru and Grace Mugabe between 2014 and 2018 to highlight the gendered aspects of politics, and explores whether women’s presence in political leadership in Zimbabwe translates into substantive representation of women.

The history of violence, political intolerance, and polarisation in Zimbabwe is rooted in the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)’s view of opposition parties as an existential threat, not only to itself, but also to the state itself. ZANU-PF views opposition parties as counter-revolutionaries that work with the “enemy” to “reverse the gains of independence”. Since 1980, ZANU-PF sought to establish itself as the only political party with the “right” to exist and rule Zimbabwe. This claim is based on its participation in the liberation struggle. This chapter focuses on ZANU-PF’s response to the August 1st protests that followed the July 2018 contested Presidential elections and what that means for the “new dispensation”.

In the post-2000 years, Zimbabwe’s ruling Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party became locked in strong internal factional struggles, which intensified as the economy declined and president Robert Mugabe advanced in age. This chapter maintains that political violence was an important feature of these internal struggles. The violent June 2008 run-off presidential election, which is the chapter’s main focus, was emblematic of ZANU-PF’s internal uses of violence. The chapter analyses political violence in Zimbabwe in three sequential parts: the patterns and explanations for the 2008 poll violence, the subsequent low-level violence since 2008, and the violence emanating from internal ZANU-PF factional struggles. What emerges from this analysis is that violence is an important way in which internal competition in ZANU-PF is performed and there are continuities in this violence over the past decade. In addition, violence is most intense during election periods. Despite the repeated risks of violence during elections, Zimbabwe remains a relatively stable country.

The article shows how the 2006 discovery of significant deposits of diamonds in eastern Zimbabwe transformed the minerals sector and its nascent regional business networks, with significant political implications. It argues that diamond revenues have been used to prop up the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) party and maintain its hold on the state and dominance in the Government of National Unity. Internal battles over control of and access to diamonds posed a direct challenge to the viability of the new, ‘power-sharing’ unity government and prospects for a democratic transition in Zimbabwe. Because profits from mining are benefiting security forces and factions of the ZANU-PF elite, Zimbabwe's diamonds have cemented political corruption, further marginalised the two opposition parties, and may have guaranteed election victory for ZANU-PF in the country's next election.

This article focuses on the impact of the policies of the ruling Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) government on Zimbabwe's black middle class. It does so by exploring three propositions emerging from the academic literature. The first is that during the early years of independence, the middle class transformed into a party-aligned bourgeoisie. The second is that, to the extent that the middle class has not left the country as a result of the economic plunge from the 1990s, it played a formative role in opposition to ZANU-PF and the political elite. The third is that, in the face of ZANU-PF's authoritarianism and economic hardship, the middle class has largely withdrawn from the political arena.