Abstract
Data about the activities of occupational health and safety officials in British Columbia is utilized to explore competing explanations for the overwhelming prevalence of persuasion over punishment in regulatory enforcement. By plotting the compliance histories of individual firms, this study demonstrates that many offenders repeatedly commit the same infraction. Few of these repeat offenders are punished. These findings suggest that the very limited use of penalties is not a result of the vast majority of firms being good apples induced to comply by mechanisms of social control other than punishment. Rather, there appears to be institutionalized tolerance of widespread violations. The enforcement deficit may be partly explained by such aspects of regulatory structure as the ongoing relationship between regulated firms and field officers who are the gatekeepers of the penalty process.
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