Theoretical Perspectives on the Concept of Competition Law

European Union (EU) competition law aimed at comple(men)ting the Internal Market rules. National competition rules of Member States undoubtedly generate similar effects at the national level. The same is true for third countries' competition rules. Yet, when turning to the impact EU competition law may/can have on the full effect of national competition rules, it is clear that both types of national rules are differently affected. In this chapter, the internal/national dimension of EU competition law specifically refers to the related yet distinct issue of the implications of EU competition law for national authorities and/or courts applying national competition rules to a concrete case. EU competition law applies to behaviour with an adverse effect on competition in the common/internal market or a substantial part thereof and on trade between Member States. Keywords: European Union (EU) competition law; Internal Market rules; Member States

The lively debate about the right of gig workers to bargain collectively stems from the idea that European Union (EU) competition law treats this group of workers worse than it treats employees. Namely, it is common to argue that employees, unlike gig workers, are permitted to conclude collective agreements because they are not undertakings and, therefore, not subject to EU competition law. In sharp contrast, by analysing the EU notion of undertaking, this article demonstrates—and this is the first of its theses—that in the labour market, which is the market that should matter in relation to the effects of collective agreements, employees are as much undertakings as any other worker, such as gig workers or other self-employed workers. The article further maintains that the reason employees are currently allowed to bargain collectively, while other workers are not, is to be found not within competition law, but outside it. At present, employees’ collective agreements are exempt from the application of EU competition law because employees enjoy the right to bargain collectively, among other social rights, and because the Court of Justice of the European Union has (rightly) recognized that the protection of these rights must trump the protection of competition. Consequently, this article argues, as its second thesis, that if Articles 151–161 TFEU were interpreted so as to grant social rights to workers other than employees, the collective agreements of gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers would be exempt from EU competition law, as are those of employees. At the same time, however, this paper recognizes that, in the absence of such an interpretative turn, antitrust legislators and policy makers could aid gig workers and other under-protected self-employed workers by excluding them and their collective agreements from the scope of application of competition law. This—and here is the third thesis of the article—would not force the interpretation of antitrust notions and rules and would thus not require antitrust authorities and courts to use competition law to pursue goals different from the protection of efficiency and innovation.

The chapter provides an overview over relevant aspects of the legal framework governing EU competition and trade defence law. This includes the central features of a trade defence investigation under the Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation and the Basic Anti-Subsidy Regulation as well as core concepts of EU competition law, such as market definition, or the concept of dominance in EU competition law.

That the penalties imposed under European Union (EU) competition law amount to criminal sanctions within the meaning of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) has been settled for some time. Yet whether the entry into force in December 2009 of the Charter on Fundamental Rights (as part of the Lisbon Treaty), and the EU's intended accession to the ECHR, should bring about changes in the operation of EU competition law is a question frequently debated now. Most of that debate has focused on the institutional make-up of competition law enforcement in the EU, notably on whether the European Commission ought to adapt its multiple roles of being simultaneously investigator, prosecutor, adjudicator, and policymaker, its practices relating to dawn raids, etc. This article takes a different tack and calls attention to the potential impact of fundamental rights on certain procedural or even substantive concepts in EU competition law. For many years now, the Commission has used presumptions to ease its administrative burden in bringing competition law cases. These presumptions have weighed heavily on defendant companies. This article submits that such administrative presumptions need to be curtailed in order to avoid conflicts with the fundamental presumption of innocence and the attendant rights of the defence. We will illustrate this thesis by reference to the presumptions inherent in the parental liability for anticompetitive conduct of subsidiaries and in the infringement attributed to the exchange of future price information between competitors.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides a brief overview of EU and UK competition law and the institutions involved in formulating, interpreting and applying competition law in those jurisdictions. It also explains the relationship between EU competition law and the domestic competition laws of the Member States, in particular in the light of Article 3 of Regulation 1/2003. The rules of the European Economic Area are briefly referred to, and the trend on the part of Member States to adopt domestic competition rules modelled on those in the EU is also noted. Three diagrams at the end of the chapter explain the institutional structure of EU and UK competition law.

This chapter provides an overview of the institutional actors, design and history of the competition law systems in the European Union and the UK. It begins with a discussion of the legal framework, focusing on the main competition law provisions in the EU and UK. The role of EU competition law provisions within the EU treaties is considered, along with provisions applying to all undertakings such as antitrust and merger control, application of Articles 101-102 TFEU to state conduct, the INNO doctrine, and UK laws such as Competition Act 1998. The chapter also looks at the main actors in the EU competition law process, including the European Commission and national competition authorities, and the main actors in the UK competition law process such as the Competition and Markets Authority. Finally, the history of competition law as well as the interaction between EU competition law and UK competition law are analysed.

Consten and Grundig and Vertical Agreements

The last five years have witnessed a decrease in the parallelism between EU competition and consumer law policies. Recent policy and legislative developments in these politically distinct areas of EU law highlight that effective consumer protection and redress – where it does not currently exist at the level of Member States – will increasingly rely upon effective regulation and enforcement of anti-competitive business practices via EU competition law. Indeed recital 7 of Regulation EC 1/2003 requires Member States to ensure that private individuals can pursue private redress mechanisms via national courts. Consequently, the increasing prevalence of private enforcement – namely private claims for damages – as a means of regulating market activity and enhancing consumer protection between the Member States necessitates reference to Community rules on private international law. In 2002 Withers commented that the ‘cause of action [for a claim in tort for breach of competition law] is very much at an incipient stage of development'. The same could be said for analogous rules of EU private international law. Indeed, at the time Withers's valuable analysis of jurisdiction and applicable law rules alluded to the need for many other significant ‘additional procedural and evidential issues’ to be addressed to ensure the effectiveness of private enforcement as a remedy for victims of anti-competitive behaviour. Nevertheless, in accordance with Treaty obligations, the EU has continued to implement measures designed to facilitate private enforcement of competition laws. Furthermore it has also continued to implement measures pursuant to judicial cooperation in civil and commercial matters. The most recent development connecting both measures is Regulation EC 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual Obligations (hereafter the Rome II Regulation), which provides rules to determine the applicable law of a non-contractual obligation. A key development offered by this new, communitarised private international law instrument is contained in Article 6. Article 6 of the Rome II Regulation determines the applicable law that will apply when private, final consumers or their representatives claim damages against businesses for anti-competitive practices or acts which have restricted competition, thereby impeding consumer choice.

Chapter 1 - Introduction to Competition Law 1.1 The economic background to competition law 1.2 The function of competition law 1.3 The market 1.4 Competition law and the economic theory of regulation 1.5 Various systems of competition law Literature Chapter 2 - The basic structure of competition law 2.1 Some key concepts in the application of competition law 2.2 The combined system of UK and European competition law 2.3 The scope of application of competition law Chapter 3 - The prohibition of anti-competitive agreements 3.1 Introduction 3.2 The prohibition of cartels 3.3 Voidness 3.4 Block exemptions 3.5 Other exceptions from the prohibition of cartels 3.6 Some important types of anti-competitive agreements Chapter 4 - The prohibition of the abuse of positions of economic power 4.1 Introduction 4.2 The prohibition of the abuse of a position of economic power 4.3 Postscript: the Commission's Discussion Paper on Exclusionary Abuses under Article 82 EC Chapter 5 - Control of concentrations 5.1 Introduction 5.2 The key elements of the EC Merger Regulation 5.3 Merger control in the UK system: the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission Chapter 6 - The Application and Enforcement of Competition Law 6.1 Introduction 6.2 The application of competition law by the courts 6.3 Competition procedure and enforcement under UK law 6.4 Enforcement of EC competition law 6.5 Leniency policy 6.6 Judicial protection in EC competition law 6.7 Division of competence and co-operation between the Commission and the UK authorities (OFT and CC) Chapter 7 - Competition Law and the State 7.1 Introduction 7.2 The rules for public undertakings and undertakings with exclusive or special rights 7.3 The norm of Articles 3(1)(g), 10, 81 and 82 EC 7.4 How to assess conduct in mixed situations? 7.5 EC state aids law: a general introduction Chapter 8 - The international dimensions of competition law 8.1 Introduction 8.2 The geographic scope of application of EC and UK competition law 8.3 International agreements 8.4 Relevant concepts Chapter 9 - Epilogue 9.1. Introduction 9.2. Themes in competition law 9.3. Objectives of EC Competition law and policy 9.4. Does competition law do the job? 9.5. Antitrust procedure 9.6. Fundamental rights 9.7. Block exemptions 9.8. Fostering general Community policies? 9.9. Remedies 9.10. Liberalisation of the closed 9.11. Public service obligations 9.12. Extraterritorial application of EC competition law and international co-operation in the competition law field 9.13. Merger Control 9.14. Article 82 EC 9.15. Articles 3(1)(g) and 10 EC 9.16. Article 86 EC 9.17. Role of national courts 9.18. Harmonisation 9.19. Centralisation & Decentralisation of EC competition law 9.20. Regulation 1/2003/EC 9.21. Competition between Legal Orders 9.22. Targeted sectors and/or issues 9.23. Accession 9.24. Conclusion

This article applies the lessons from the prior theory of responsive regulation in criminology to EU competition law and extends these lessons to argue in favour of an enhanced form of responsive competition law. First, it finds that EU competition law enforcement is already responsive in the traditional sense as it takes the reactions of undertakings into account when deciding which instrument to apply, in accordance with the enforcement pyramid developed by Braithwaite. An enforcement pyramid for EU competition law is presented. The objectives of competition law are found to be broad, and its key norms are open, facilitating responsiveness. This also allows competition law to develop to meet new societal demands, such as the need to control market power in the digital realm and to combat climate change. Next, the article examines the role of responsive and accountable behaviour by undertakings in competition law. First, it is found that in line with new forms of regulation concerning non-financial reporting, greenwashing, data protection, digital markets and services, and artificial intelligence, the special responsibility of dominant undertakings in competition law increasingly demands a pro-active approach to compliance. This also involves considering the interests of third parties and framing private governance in accordance with fundamental rights and legal principles. An enhanced degree of responsiveness of dominant undertakings results. Second, additional space is being created within competition law to accommodate undertakings that behave in a socially responsible manner, notably regarding sustainability. This is examined in relation to the issue of a fair share for consumers, and private enforcement by means of compliance agreements. After discussing potential objections to responsiveness in terms of democratic legitimacy, legal certainty, and redistribution of wealth, the article concludes that the developments sketched above indeed point towards the reinforcement of the responsive nature of competition law.

Integrating Public and Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Europe -- Legal and Jurisdictional Issues

The term ‘competition’ is a core notion for social and economic thinking and the organisation of markets. Nevertheless, this paper shows that there is no single acceptable economic imaginary ascribed to the notion in Europe. The search for the meaning of competition is an ongoing journey, from the EU’s very inception 60 years ago to the present day, which is inherently tied to the objectives, scope, and boundaries of EU (competition) law and to socio-economic transformations.The paper first reviews the history of the notion in both common-usage language and in legal-economic thinking. It exposes the emergence of three parallel, partly conflicting, imaginaries influencing the notion in EU competition law: Keynesian, ordoliberal, and neoliberal. After demonstrating that no single imaginary was adopted by EU primary, secondary, or soft laws, it applies Critical Discourse Analysis to the Commission’s annual reports on competition (1971–2020) in search for the meaning of competition. The paper reveals that the notion of competition had acquired one meaning in ‘hard’ contexts of the enforcement (scope of the prohibition of competition; exceptions or justifications for allowing otherwise anti-competitive behaviour), and another meaning in ‘softer’ contexts (mandates of the competition rules, and to a lesser extent – selection of enforcement priorities). While the ‘hard’ contexts have experienced a transformation from Keynesian and ordoliberal imaginary of competition to a neoliberal notion; the ‘soft’ contexts still invoke a broader notion reflecting influences from all three theories.Finally, the paper argues that although the lack of a clear definition for competition undoubtedly raises challenges relating to the rule of law, legal certainty, and uniformity, its ambiguity also serves as a powerful tool in safeguarding the durability and legitimacy of competition as an economic imaginary. It allows tailoring the notion of competition to changing legal, economic, and social conditions without a Treaty amendment.

While company law makes great efforts to maintain the separation of different legal entities, other areas of law increasingly emphasise the common responsibility of corporate groups. One of the fields shaping this emerging principle is competition law, where focusing on the whole group rather than its individual members is increasingly becoming the norm. But this approach is still far from being uniformly accepted. While EU competition law is pushing ahead, US antitrust law is said to take a rather critical stance. Against this background, this chapter examines the functions performed by a unitary perspective on corporate groups. The main goal is to show that at least three important functions must be distinguished in EU competition law, each of which has its own implications. Only when these are properly understood can it be determined where the group perspective is appropriate and where it is not. This is shown by the example of current discussions, for example, on the liability of sister companies and on possible applications in the area of liability for damages. Finally, the analysis in this chapter also aims to contribute to a better understanding of the different approaches in EU and US competition law.