Theoretical Models, Biological Complexity and the Semantic View of Theories

Abstract

In this paper I discuss how, given the complexity of biological systems, reliance on theoretical models in the development and testing of biological theories leads to anti-realism. This is the result of the uniqueness and hence diversity of biological phenomena, in contrast with the uniformity of items in the domain of physics. I have argued elsewhere (Horan, 1986, 1989a, 1989b) that the use of theoretical models creates an unresolvable tension between the explanatory strength and predictive power of hypotheses, and I review this argument here. My discussion is in part motivated by the claims of Nancy Cartwright (1983), who has argued that the use of ceteris paribus laws in physics creates an antagonism between truth and explanation that requires theoretical models to figure centrally in scientific explanation, thereby precluding realism. I argue instead that in biology it is the use of theoretical models that creates this conflict, and conclude that adequate biological explanation cannot rely on the modelling approach alone.