Abstract
This chapter defends a particular strategy and set of constraints on an adequate theistic explanation of morality. It claims that God's status in orthodox theism as ultimate explainer of the states of affairs that obtain is not satisfied by anything less than immediacy: that for any state of affairs that obtains, some theistic facts (facts about God's existence, nature, or activity) must enter immediately into that explanation. It also argues, drawing on a previous chapter's account of moral law and responding to recent work by Schroeder, that for every moral fact, that fact is explained by some moral law and is unexplained unless explained by a moral law. Thus, the way, and the only way, to provide an adequate account of God's explanatory role with respect to morality is for God to enter immediately into the explanation of all moral laws.
Published Version
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