The voting behavior of bureaucrats: Some empirical evidence

Abstract

This paper has examined the voting behavior of bureaucrats and the consequences for elections. The economic theory of the rational voter predicts that bureaucrats would have more to gain by voting than the general public. The cost of voting is lower for public employees than for those who work in the private sector. As a consequence, theory predicts that bureaucrats would participate in elections at a greater rate than other individuals. As a test of the validity of the economic theory of voting, an empirical analysis of national elections from 1964 to 1978 was presented. The evidence is drawn from household survey data published by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. The data permit a direct observation of voting participation rates of public and private employees. The empirical results indicate that bureaucrats consistently participate in elections at significantly greater rates than non-bureaucrats. As the public sector expands and voter participation rates remain low, bureaucrats will exert disproportionate influence on election outcomes.