The Volunteer Dilemma

Abstract

We would like to thank Greg Oldham and Madan Pillutla for their constructive comments on an early version of this manuscript, Associate Editor Robert Sutton, Herbert Simon, and two anonymous reviewers for their particularly perceptive reactions and suggestions, and Linda Pike for her faultless editing. This paper uses evolutionary, social psychological, organizational, and game theoretic literatures as frames to explore the dilemma of the choice to volunteer. Although one's group may benefit from voluntary action, volunteers typically incur more costs than others, even when their actions are successful. The four experiments presented here addressed when and why people volunteer in fictitious financial scenarios that varied group size, the number of volunteers required, the payoffs to volunteers and nonvolunteers, and the need to work more or for smaller outcomes than others. The results suggest that, in general, undergraduates, M.B.A.s, and executives volunteered most often when personal benefits were high. Executives also focused on issues related to self-interest when they were questioned about voluntary action in the workplace. The discussion raises issues about voluntary action in situations in which people interact at a distance and speculates about implications for the dynamics and antecedents of altruistic action.'