The voluntary adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards and loan contracting around the world

Abstract

Using a sample of non-U.S. borrowers from 40 countries during 1997–2005, this paper investigates the effect of the voluntary adoption of International FinancialReporting Standards (IFRS) on price and non-price terms of loan contracts and loan ownership structure in the international loan market. Our results reveal the following. First, banks charge lower loan rates to IFRS adopters than to non-adopters. The difference in loan rates in excess of a benchmark rate between the two groups is about 20 basis points for all loans and nearly 31 basis points for London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR)-based loans. Second, banks impose more favorable non-price terms on IFRS adopters, particularly less restrictive covenants. We also provide evidence suggesting that banks are more willing to extend credit to IFRS adopters through larger loans and longer maturities. Finally, IFRS adopters attract significantly more foreign lenders participating in loan syndicates than non-adopters.