The Vexed Man: Oliver Cromwell and the English Reformation and Civil War on Screen

THE work of Philip Massinger does not appear unduly complex O'r profound and it is thus rather surprising that his plays should have aroused such divergent critical comments. Although very different views are mO'st abundant in criticism of Massinger's language, other aspects O'fhis work show an absence of critical agreement. For example, T. A. Dunn believes that 'The divine right of kings ... is accepted by Massinger, but with his own implications',! whereas Emile Legouis states, Massinger 'had no respect for the divine right of kings'.2 In The Rom'an Actar, according to T. S. Eliot, 'the development of the parts is out O'f all proportion to' the central theme'3 (which he does not define) but Emil Koeppel O'bserveshow, in The Roman ActO'r, 'the process of blending the accO'untsof historians . . . results in well arranged scenes in which no trace O'fpatchwork is to be discovered'.~ As it is with the structure of this play that I wish to' deal, perhaps I might be permitted to' set side-by~side further critical assessments of The Roman ActO'r's cO'nstruction. In stating 'The fact is Massinger had adopted two conflicting themes which could not easily be co-ordinated',5 Dunn appears to' agree with Eliot. A little earlier he states: 'the play is more episodic than Massinger's usual skill would lead us to expect. The sequence is that of a series of striking situations and the comparative incoherence is inevitably worsened by the insetting of three playlets within the play, even if they have a certain dramatic or thematic relevance'.6 Some years before the appearance O'fDunn's boO'k,A. H. Cruikshank spoke of 'the dexterity with which three smaller plays are. introduced intO' the action' (with which Dunn agrees) 'without in the least confusing the action'7 (with which Dunn cannot agreeS).More recently Arthur Brown has written O'fthe importance of the playlets in The Roman Actor.9

James I Stuart’s theory of the divine right of kings
 The author presents King James I Stuart’s theory of the divine right of kings as the modification of Bodin’s concept of the sovereignty. According to King James, a monarch is subjected to no earthly authority, as he derives his right to rule directly from the will of God. The king is thus not a subject to the will of his people, the aristocracy, or any other estate of the realm, including the Church. This doctrine implies that any attempt to depose a king or to restrict his power is contrary to the will of God and may constitute treason. The author argues, that the theory of the divine right of kings is rooted in the medieval idea that God had bestowed earthly power to the king, just as He had given spiritual power and authority to the Church, centering on a pope and in this way in protestant kingdoms may justifies the king’s absolute authority in both political and spiritual matters. The author points out that it is contrary to Bodin’s theory of sovereignty and he argues that King James’ general statements of divine right should not be read as claims about specific royal powers in any particular kingdom. Unlike the theorists of absolutism, King James thus believed the king to be bound to exercise his authority through defined constitutional channels. Such a requirement went beyond that expected of the absolute monarch, who was to rule well if he were to avoid the charge of tyranny. Finally the author argues, that King James’ theory of power is the attempt of the restoration of Christian uniformity and of the re‑Christianization of Bodin’s concept of the sovereignty.

This chapter examines the philosophical foundations of leadership as the intellectual scenery gradually becomes more glorious. Thomas Hobbes' teachings gave rise to the concept of the divine right of kings within Western society. In defense of his king against the attacks of the papacy, Hobbes held that the authority of the king is the authority of God; it cannot be questioned; there can be no appeal to a higher power. Few nations in the Western world continue to base the authority of their leaders on the divine right of kings. Hobbes notes that the king is God's only representative on earth. Such a proposal would hardly seem appropriate to a rationalist, to one who had been accused of atheistic totalitarianism. Indeed, his critics suggest that such a doctrine was most convenient for Hobbes at a time of religious turbulence when the populace was in a state of uprising against its king.

Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Liberia, Somalia, Azerbaijan, El Salvador, Northern Ireland, Lebanon, Cambodia -- all provide bloody evidence that civil wars continue to have a powerful impact on the international scene. Because they tear at the very fabric of a society and pit countryman against countryman, civil wars are often the most brutal and difficult to extinguish -- witness the American Revolution. And yet, civil wars do inevitably end. England is no longer criss-crossed by warring armies representing York and Lancaster or King and Parliament. The French no longer kill one another over the divine right of kings. Argentines seem reconciled to living in a single state, rather than several. The ideologies of the Spanish Civil War now seem largely irrelevant. And the possibility of Southern secession is an issue long-buried in the American past. The question then begs itself: how do people who have been killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success come together to form a common government? How can individuals and factions work together, politically and economically, with others who have killed their friends, parents, children and lovers? How are armed societies disarmed? What effect does a total military victory have on a lasting peace? In sum, how are civil societies constructed from civil violence and chaos? This is the central concern of Stopping the Killing. In this highly original and much needed volume, a distinguished group of experts on civil wars discuss both specific conflicts and broader theoretical issues. Individual chapters examine civil wars in Colombia, the Sudan, Yemen, America, Greece, and Nigeria, and analyze the causes of peace, the relationship between the battlefield and the negotiating table, and issues of settlement. An introduction and conclusion by the editor unify the volume. Contributors include: Jonathan Hartlyn (Univ. of North Carolina), Caroline Hartzell (Univ. of California, Davis), Jane E. Holl (U.S. Military Academy), John Iatrides (Southern Connecticut State University), James O'Connell (University of Bradford), Donald Rothchild (Univ. of California, Davis), Stephen John Stedman (Johns Hopkins Univ.), Robert Harrison Wagner (Univ. of Texas, Austin), Harvey Waterman (Rutgers Univ.), Manfred Wenner (Northern Illinois Univ.), and I. William Zartman (Johns Hopkins Univ.).

The divine right of kings was a widespread and influential early modern doctrine of political authority, legitimacy, obligation, and sovereignty. It achieved its most sophisticated elaboration and exposition during the seventeenth century, and was especially important in the French and English political traditions. Scholars often draw connections between divine right theory and theories of royal absolutism, since the argument that kings were granted authority by, and accountable to, God alone implied that they ruled their realms absolutely, answerable to no other earthly authorities (Sommerville 1986; but cf. Burgess 1992). Likewise, scholars also relate divine right theory to theories of nonresistance: since kings draw their authority from God and not from the people, the people are never justified in actively rebelling against a harsh king. More broadly, divine right theories are predicated on a hierarchical view of the social and political world: indeed, David Wootton views the idea of the Great Chain of Being – that God arranged the cosmos in a series of ordered hierarchies, with God Himself settled comfortably at the top – as central to divine right theory (1986: 29–30).

Social contract theory, as representative of a strand of natural law theory during the Enlightenment, displayed some common features, to which a conservative political movement would react. These theorists began their inquiries into the nature of legitimate political authority with myths of a beginning, evoking "states of nature" and postulating the laws therein as a function of reason. Reason revealed its critical force against the inherited traditions and dogmas of the Church, against the static hierarchies of the feudal system, and against the economic structures of the guild system, agrarian economies, and mercantilist policies. Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, the authoritarian and the libertarian respectively, were both exemplars of the strength of reason to erect systems meant to stabilize both the disorder of the English Civil War and to redress the transgressions of unlimited monarchical power, backed by the theory the divine right of kings. Reason, on this model of social contract thinking, gives us access to the laws of nature, which prescribe the way legitimate government operates. Reason also secularizes political discourse by attacking the divine right of kings and presenting criteria for legitimate government beyond the rule of inheritance.

Conjuring Up a King

This article considers James VI and I's treatise on the divine right of kings, The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598), in relation to his earlier treatise on witchcraft Daemonologie (1597). James's articulation of divine right kingship not only served to refute the arguments of his former tutor, George Buchanan (1506–1582), and the Jesuit, Robert Persons (1546–1610), but also served as a bulwark against the perceived threat of the supernatural to his rule. James incorporated the ideal of a stoic subject previously put forward in his Daemonologie into the Trew Law, offering a doctrine of non-resistance that both Catholic and presbyterian subjects were expected to follow. The ideal stoic subject would remain firmly in command of their passions, enduring the ‘curses’ of tyranny or of witchcraft without actively seeking relief for their circumstances.

How much political progress have we made since the days of the divine right of kings? The Enlightenment philosophers considered divine right to be repugnant, but they could not foresee the potential for universal destruction that would characterize the twentieth century and were thus unaware of the security in which they lived. Gale Edward Christianson is a member of the department of history at Carnegie-Mellon University at Pittsburgh.

The study intends to present the main features of the political doctrine commonly called by contemporaries the ‘divine right of kings’ in seventeenth-century England, and its transformation brought on by the ‘glorious revolution’ of 1688. The new version of the doctrine was named ‘divine right of providence” (G. Straka) and it was refl ected not only in written sources, the Bill of Rights included, but also in the change of the iconography of coronation coins. However, by 1714, the growth of the power of parliament led to a new perception of the right to the throne: popular sovereignty replaced divine will, which caused a major change in the imagery of coronation coins. Henceforward, for the rest of the century, in coronation coins power was conferred on the ruler not by the act of the Almighty but by the hand of the female allegorical figure of Britannia.

John Locke's philosophy, as argued by Graham A. J. Rogers (Oct 24, 2024), represents a pivotal shift in Enlightenment thought, emphasizing individual rights, empiricism, and the social contract (Britannica). His revolutionary ideas challenge the divine right of kings and advocate for government as a protector of life, liberty, and property. Locke's Two Treatises of Government is a foundational text in political philosophy that articulates a revolutionary framework for understanding government and individual rights. In the first treatise, Locke critiques the divine right of kings, arguing against the notion that monarchs possess inherent divine authority over their subjects. In the second treatise, Locke outlines his vision of a civil society formed through a social contract, where individuals consent to surrender some freedoms in exchange for the protection of their fundamental rights by a government. He argues that if a government fails to uphold these rights or acts against the interests of its citizens, the people have the right to revolt and establish a new government. This philosophical revolution has had a profound and lasting impact on the development of modern political thought, particularly in the context of revolutions, constitutions, human rights, and the establishment of liberal democracies.

The ‘divine right of kings’ which ended with the decapitation of crowned heads of Europe several centuries ago, has — need I state the obvious? — been replaced by the ‘divine right of the gun’ on this continent. We must now invite all our dictatorships, under no matter what camouflage, and however comparatively civilianised and domesticated they are — to set a definitive date within this century for the abandonment of this denigration of our popular will

The two parts of Henry IV dramatise Prince Hal's coming of age amidst the political unrest following his father's usurpation of the throne of Richard II. The consequences of that usurpation weigh heavily upon King Henry: civil broils prolonged by those lords who helped him to the crown and now feel abandoned by him; fear of a rival claimant, Edmund Mortimer, whom Richard designated his heir; and an acute awareness that by killing Richard, he has violated - and made impossible to assume for himself - the divine right of kings. Such obstacles help to explain why his son Hal chooses to idle away his time in a tavern rather than at court. But Hal must learn to surmount them if he is to succeed his father, and in the royal narrative of Henry IV , which chronicles his progress from the taverns of Eastcheap to his coronation at Westminster, he does so: he defeats the rebels, transforms himself from wastrel to responsible heir, and strives to prove that linear succession can serve as a legitimate alternative to divine right. In dramatising his success, the two Henry IV plays offer a comic view of fifteenth-century history. Yet they also address political and social issues pertinent to Elizabethan England, and their popularity for Shakespeare's audiences no doubt resulted in part from their use of the past to comment on the present.

El artículo presenta el pensamiento político del De opere sex dierum de Suárez, una obra de la que todavía no se dispone de traducción española. El artículo se divide en dos partes. La primera expone y analiza el pensamiento político de esta obra, llegando a la conclusión de que su idea central es la distinción entre poder económico y político, realizada para salvaguardar, frente a la teoría del derecho divino de los reyes, la libertad e igualdad de todos los hombres y el carácter contractual del Estado. La segunda investiga los nexos de esta obra con El Patriarca de Filmer, así como la inspiración suareciana de las ideas de libertad e igualdad contenidas en el segundo Tratado del Gobierno de Locke.

Much has been written on the political behavior of the Stuart Church of England. And much too has been written on its monotonous reiteration of the divine right of kings' doctrine—with its ancillary ideas of passive obedience and non-resistance to the commands of authority. Indeed, for this perspective on the institution there exists abundant evidence: seventeenth century sermons and treatises were filled with “church politics.” Morever, Figgis' study remains indispensable: before, and perhaps even more clearly and vehemently after the Puritan Revolution, insistence on absolute obedience to existing authority—especially to the king—reverberated in the parish churches of England. Thus, at this point in time little doubt exists as to the political attitudes of clerics; and indeed a consensus exists also on the probable motives for those clerical attitudes: they followed unavoidably upon the second great conquest in English history, the conquest of the church by Henry VIII. But the church was not unwillingly conquered: it both bound itself and was bound to the destiny of the monarchy in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—its newly-granted constitutional legality protected it while it nourished the hope that the Crown would act as sponsor of reform in Christian society. In a word, the institution of the church, keenly aware of both its relative impotence and its relative strength with regard to the monarchy, made the best of circumstances by offering virtually unqualified support to Stuart kingship, with certain unintended consequences for the church. Given this perspective, it is easy to understand why, apart from special problems and issues, the thought of Anglican clerics commands little attention today. But perhaps another view of clerical thought will yield as much or more understanding than the traditional perspective has so far yielded: it is the purpose of this essay to offer another view.