Abstract

This article looks at the Lebanese Missile Crisis of 1981, drawing upon a broad range of primary and secondary sources including documents from the Reagan White House and the State Department. It argues that the United States intervened in the crisis because an all-out conflict between Syria and Israel bore unacceptable consequences since it could have damaged the Camp David peace process and the Reagan Administration’s security strategy for the Persian Gulf.

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