The United States and China in the Era of Global Transformations

Over the last two decades, China has emerged as one of the most powerful state actors in the post-Cold War international system. This book provides a multifaceted and spatially oriented analysis of how China’s re-emergence as a global power impacts the dominance of the US as well as domestic state and non-state actors in various world-regions, including the Asia-Pacific, Africa, South America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, Europe, and the Arctic. Chapters reflect on how and under which conditions competition (and cooperation) between the US and China vary across these regions and what such variations mean for the prospects of war and peace, universal human dignity, and global cooperation.

Over the last five years, violent non-state actors have acquired armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and have been using them extensively. This paper presents the main non-state actors involved and the areas in which they have used this tool, as well as how UAVs are used and procured. To date, armed UAVs have mainly been used by non-state actors in the Middle East and Central Asia. They have also been used in the conflict zones of Ukraine, Myanmar, Mexico, and Ecuador. While this is worrisome, limited evidence suggests that violent non-state actors use armed UAVs intentionally in areas where mostly civilians are present. The paper details the state of UAV usage by non-state actors and develops a thesis of cyclic adaptation between state and non-state actors. Not only do non-state actors learn from state actors, so does state and state-backed actors learn from non-state actors in conflict zones. This process have been visible on the battlefield in Ukraine, where state-backed actors on both sides have incorporated smaller consumer style UAVs into their repertoire. As the use of armed UAVs developed substantially following Hezbollah’s early UAV operations in 2004 and spread to many regions of the world, the adaptation of non-state cleverness and ingenuity can be harnessed by state actors in times of poor or limited access to weaponry and support systems.

Following the Beslan2 school hostage crisis in September 2004, the President of Russia Vladimir Putin proposed the creation of a Public Chamber, which was intended to function as a public oversight committee with consultation powers. This body, which was established in 2005 with 126 members, analyses draft legis lation and monitors the activities of parliament, government and other governmental bodies of Russia and its Federal Subjects. At the same time new laws on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been adopted on the federal3 and regional level,4 in order to restructure the interaction between state and nonstate actors. According to the government, the new NGO legislation created the legal basis for NGOs as a new type of actor in the policy arena, enabling them to participate in politics.5 The Public Chamber, in addition, provides a negotiation platform that involves NGOs in problem solving and in bargaining compromises with state actors. Many observers, however, criticized the legislation as it seemed to tighten the control of the state over NGOs and to create obstacles for negotiations between the state and NGOs (Nusberger and Schmidt 2007). These controversial interpretations raise the question whether state actors really involve NGOs in problem solving and bargaining compromises and why state actors negotiate with NGOs. Analyses of authoritarian corporatism showed that economically and socially complex states cannot be governed only by technocratic-authoritarian means (Stepan 1978) and that under these conditions authoritarian regimes negotiate politics with societal actors. The literature on governance explains in detail that hierarchical steering causes information problems. This means that decision makers often do not have the required information about the object of theirdecision. Thus, the capacity of the state to effectively steer and coordinate society is seriously challenged. Negotiations between stakeholders can provide information and knowledge and can thus enhance the state capacity to solve problems (Scharpf 2000). Nowadays the combination of traditional hierarchical governance and network governance with non-state actors becomes ever more necessary in order to provide state functions, because in modern societies the need for sophisticated information and knowledge is growing constantly (Mayntz 1993). According to Linz, relations between state and non-state actors in authoritarian states differ, however, from those in democratic ones in that they are limited pluralistic (Linz 2000). Thus, the existence and the leeway of political and societal actors in authoritarian states depend on the authoritarian regime. The state dictates the institutions and procedures for negotiations with non-state actors. This forced institutionalized model of solving conflicts allows for the representation of societal interests while at the same time limiting conflicts. Although the theory of authoritarian corporatism seems to be of great use in understanding why and how state actors involve non-state actors in negotiations in Russian politics, we propose that it does not sufficiently correspond to and explain reality. We claim that NGOs in Russia are nowadays sufficiently powerful to influence whether and how state actors involve them in negotiations. In order to address the question why and how state actors in Russia involve non-state actors in negotiated governance, we analyse and compare interactions between state and non-state actors in five regions and three policy fields. The chosen cases differ in two ways. First, the interest of state actors to cooperate with NGOs differs depending on the policy field. Second, each policy field is analysed in two regions with different resource distributions among involved actors. The cases are ethnic policy in the Krasnodar and Stavropol regions, social policy in the Perm and Nižnij Novgorod regions and environmental policy in the Krasnodar and Irkutsk regions. The cases were chosen in a way that allows for testing whether the theory of authoritarian corporatism sufficiently explains why and how state actors negotiate with NGOs or whether the resources of NGOs to force the state to involve them in negotiations is a necessary additional contributing cause. The non-state actors we consider are private business actors and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The term ‘non-governmental organization’ describes organizations, linked to civil society. The crucial characteristic is that they are independent of the government, which means autonomous from the state and not oriented to profit-making. They can be differentiated from citizen initiatives and social movements, which often follow close or similar interests by their concrete organizational structure (Nohlen 2002: 324ff.). In our analyses we include NGOs that have an independent articulation of interests, possess differentiated financing, are not profit oriented and have concrete organizational structures. The following section of the chapter will first introduce the issues at stake in the various cases as well as the interests and resources of the main actors. In thesecond section the interactions between state and non-state actors will be analysed. The chapter concludes with a summary of the findings.

The rise of non-state (international, private, and transnational) actors in global politics has far-reaching consequences for foreign policy theory and practice. In order to be able to explain foreign policy in the 21st century, foreign policy research needs to take into account the growing importance of nonstate actorss. A good way to do this would be to engage the literature on globalization and global governance. Both fields would benefit from such an exchange of ideas because their respective strengths could cancel out each other’s weaknesses. Foreign policy research, on the one hand, has a strong track record explaining foreign policy outcomes, using a broad range of theoretical concepts, but almost completely ignores non-state actors. This is highly problematic for at least two reasons: first, foreign policy is increasingly made in international organizations and intergovernmental and transnational governance networks instead of national institutions like foreign ministries. Second, the latter increasingly open up to, and involve, non-state actors in their policymaking procedures. Thus, if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized in the future, it needs to take into account this change. However, systemic approaches like neorealism or constructivism have difficulties adapting to the new reality of foreign policy. They stress the importance of states at the expense of non-state actors, which are only of marginal interest to them, as is global governance. Moreover, they also conceptualize states as unitary actors, which forecloses the possibility of examining the involvement of non-state actors in states’ decision-making processes. Agency-based approaches such as foreign policy analysis (FPA) fare much better, at least in principle. FPA scholars stress the importance of disaggregating the state and looking at the individuals and group dynamics that influence their decision-making. However, while this commitment to opening up the state allows for a great deal more flexibility vis-à-vis different types of actors, FPA research has so far remained state-centric and only very recently turned to non-state actors. On the other hand, non-state actors’ involvement in policymaking is the strong suit of the literature on globalization and global governance, which has spent a lot of time and effort analyzing various forms of “hybrid” governance. At the same time, however, this literature has been rather descriptive, so far mainly systematizing different governance arrangements and the conditions under which non-state actors are included in governance arrangements. This literature could profit from foreign policy research’s rich theoretical knowledge in explaining policy outcomes in hybrid governance networks and international organizations (IOs). Foreign policy researchers should take non-state actors seriously. In this regard, three avenues in particular are relevant for future research: (1) comparative empirical research to establish the extent of non-state actors’ participation in foreign policymaking across different countries and governance arrangements; (2) explanatory studies that analyze the conditions under which non-state actors are involved in states’ foreign policymaking processes; and (3) the normative implications of increased hybrid foreign policymaking for democratic legitimacy.

Let our actions today send this message loud and clear: There are no expendable American targets; there will be no sanctuary for terrorists; we will defend our people, our interests and our values; we will help people of all faiths in all parts of the world who want to live free of fear and violence; we will persist and we will prevail. President William J. Clinton1 Ironically, while the rest of the world is greatly concerned and annoyed about American military hegemony,2 some Americans believe U.S. military force is impotent in its fight against international terrorism.3 It seems as though America's benevolent role as the world's sole superpower should serve as a stabilizing force for international peace and security and a deterrent to terrorists. Instead, its formidable military dominance has antagonized other states and has made America the world's sole super-target of terrorists. In 1997, for example, Americans were the targets of over one-third of all international terrorist attacks.4 The United States defines as premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience, and international as terrorism involving citizens or the territory of more than one country. ,5 Defined as such, international is a criminal act committed by non-state actors-and the appropriate response of a victim state to defend against such is law enforcement. All non-state actors, however, operate within the sovereign territory of at least one state, and when a territorial state is unwilling or unable to cooperate in the suppression of international terrorism, or when it is covertly supporting international terrorism, then the law enforcement option fails. Furthermore, some states openly engage in, or support acts of violence that fall within the U.S. definition of international terrorism,6 and when a state attacks another state by resorting to or supporting international terrorism, an appropriate response of the victim state may be the use of armed force. Accordingly, international legal authority for a state to respond to acts of international is actor-dependent. If it is known that a non-state actor has committed an act of against the United States, then American law enforcement has the right to apprehend and prosecute the terrorist. However, when the location of a terrorist or a terrorist base camp is known and the territorial state refuses to cooperate with American law enforcement, the law enforcement response is completely ineffective in defending Americans and American interests abroad. In contrast, if it is known that a state actor has committed or supported an act of international terrorism, then American national security organizations have the lead in responding to the use of armed force by another state. Depending upon the severity of the terrorist attack and other circumstances, such a response may range from a diplomatic protest to seeking Security Council condemnation to the use of armed force in self-defense. In practice, however, the identity of the actor and a determination of state-sponsorship can be very difficult to establish. This Article briefly outlines the legal regimes which principally govern U.S. responses to international when it is established that the terrorist is either a non-state or state actor, and it explores international legal authorities' use of armed force against non-state actors when law enforcement options fail to protect Americans and American interests abroad. No state, including the United States, should take a heavy-handed approach toward the use of armed force under any circumstances. All states, however, must be able to exercise their inherent right under international law to defend themselves against all actors-non-state and state alike. Effective deterrence demands that terrorists do not have safe havens and that terrorists must fear that they ultimately will pay a price for their criminal mayhem. …

In 2018, the Syrian Civil War will enter into its ninth year of conflict. From an international relations perspective there are few, if any, studies on state actors in regional sub-state systems. What can an intrastate conflict teach us about future dynamics of the regional interstate hierarchy? It is worthwhile to examine The Syrian Civil War for three reasons. First, Syria lies in the heart of the Middle East lending proximity to regional actors. Second, the breakdown of order in Syria represents a microcosm of the global anarchic environment. Third, Syrian Civil War is an intrastate war that encapsulates both state and non-state actors. This paper intends to provide a clear regional hierarchical analysis with future possibilities and perspectives. For the last century realism then neorealism dominated the field of international relations, yet they are unfit theories for analyzing the Middle East's hierarchy. To address anomalies realists and neorealists incorporated preference and satisfaction, which undermined the core tenets of their theories. Power Transition Theory (PTT) incorporates satisfaction while maintaining structural organization. The addition of power and satisfaction give PTT the necessary tools to assess regional hierarchies and estimate the likelihood of conflict. This PTT theoretical framework will be used to assess the global hierarchy, the status quo set by the United States, and Syria's relation to the status quo. A synopsis of the Syrian Civil War will be provided to contextualize the actors and dyadic comparisons between actors before and after the Iranian-Russian-Syrian victory in Aleppo. The dyadic comparison indicates power and satisfaction among interested parties and if they change during the course of the conflict. Conclusions indicate that the actors and the environment in the Syrian theater are suitable for Power Transition Theory and the data acquired by researching the Syrian Civil War affirms Yeşilada and Tanrikulu's assessment that Russia tops the Middle East's hierarchy with Turkey and Iran following at near parity. The findings reveal the veracity of Lemke's claim that PTT can be utilized for intrastate conflict. The findings substantiate my claim that intrastate conflict can inform us of a region's hierarchy.

The study investigated the role of Non-State Peace Actors in promoting international peace and stability within the context of the Peace Actors Forum in Nairobi. Specifically, the study objectives sought to: Assess the effectiveness of the non-state peace actors’ Forum initiatives; examine how the Peace Actors Forum's work in Nairobi contributes to broader international peace and stabilization; and lastly analyze the challenges and opportunities faced by non-state peace actors in advancing international peace and stability. The significance of this study includes providing practical implications for peace and diplomacy practitioners, as well as stakeholders. It also contributes to scholarly research. The study was framed by Liberalism, Constructivism, and Track II Diplomacy. Descriptive research design was employed, with a case study on Nairobi PAF platform population. The study administered interviews, survey and Focus Group Discussion., targeting 120 members of the platform. Questionnaires were administered to 93 members, 7 key informant interview informants and two FGDs targeting 15 participants, a response rate of 91.83% was secured. The results were analyzed using both quantitative and qualitative techniques; quantitative data is presented through frequency distribution tables, pie charts, and bar graphs, while qualitative data is presented in verbatim quotes to provide a nuanced understanding of the findings From the findings, a significant majority of respondents reported positive outcomes of the initiatives by Nairobi non-state peace actors’ forum, particularly in interventions like the Sondu conflict. Non-state peace actors had more international collaborations than state actors, facilitating access to resources and knowledge sharing. Nonetheless, non-state peace actors commanded higher legitimacy and trust from the local communities. Among the key points of departure between Non-State Peace Actors and State Peace Actors was that the state actors had government authority unlike the non-state peace actors who lacked powers to enforce peace policies or any agreement. The major challenge experienced by non-state peace actors was reducing donor funding; divisive politics and ethnic mobilization that instigated conflicts; and security risks among the non-state peace actors. The State Peace Actors relied on public funds from the government, which is always available through national budgets and donors, to fund their operation unlike non-state peace actors who relied on donations to fund their operations and given the diminishing availability of donors. The study concludes by confirming that non-state actors provide distinct advantages that are crucial to establishing sustainable peace, despite having fewer resources and institutional power. Finally, the study recommended that stakeholders in peace and conflict resolution should strengthen coordination among non-state actors and State Actors; Strengthen local capacity building; engage in research; and advocate for supportive legal and policy framework.

The global humanitarian crisis is worsening due to human-caused conflicts, leading to a significant increase in internal displacement worldwide. However, inclusive education plays a significant role in resolving humanitarian crises and in any society transformation. The purpose of this study is to examine the roles of state and non-state actors in promoting inclusive primary education in Mangala IDPs Camp in Central Equatoria State of South Sudan. The qualitative research design fitted the study to describe the state of affairs on the people's opinions about the roles of state and non-state actors and challenges facing them in promoting the inclusive primary education in Mangala IDPs Camp. The study was based on using open-ended structured questionnaires and key informant interviews to collect data from 40 respondents as the sample size. Data was analysed using content analysis and presented in tables, graphs and charts. The study findings reveal that State Actors’ roles include provision of educational services and protection of IDPs and Staff from social harassment and humiliation and to reverence human rights in Mangala IDPs Camp. Furthermore, Non-State Actors' roles were to help carry out a back to learning campaign, provide collaboration with government security personnel, provision of capacity building and training of teachers and provide stationery. Based on the research questions, the study concluded that both State and Non-State Actors are actively involved in the promotion of inclusive primary education. The study also found that primary education in the Mangala IDPs Camp enjoyed the educational support from the non-state actors, as illustrated by the present NGOs in the Camp. The study recommends that the government strengthen and enforce free and compulsory education in IDP camps and intelligence education implementers from funds to other programs.

Contents: Part I Introduction and Sources: Non-state actors in the international system of states, Bob Reinalda The Yearbook of International Organizations and quantitative non-state actor research, Elizabeth Bloodgood Researching transnational history: the example of peace activism, Thomas Richard Davies The United Nations Intellectual History Project and the role of ideas, Francis Baert. Part II Actors Other than Governments:Transnational religious actors, John T.S. Madeley and Jeffrey Haynes Transnational corporations and the regulation of business at the global level, Karsten Ronit Unravelling the political role of experts and expertise in the professional services industry, Angela Wigger Parliaments and parliamentarians as international actors, AndrA(c)s Malamud and Stelios Stavridis Autonomous agencies of the European Union as non-state actors, Martijn Groenleer. Part III Perceptions and Understanding: Liberal political philosophy: the role of non-state actors and considerations of global justice, Geoff Gordon and Roland Pierik Non-governmental organizations and non-state actors in international law, Anna-Karin Lindblom Intergovernmental organizations in international relations theory and as actors in world politics, Joel E. Oestreich Inter-organizational relations: an emerging research programme, Rafael Biermann Civil society and NGO: far from unproblematic concepts, Norbert GA tz Non-state and state actors in global governance, Martin Koch Limitations of intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, Dennis Dijkzeul and William E. DeMars. Part IV Nature and Impact: Non-state actors and the transformation of diplomacy, Brian Hocking Dynamism and resilience of intergovernmental organizations in a world of persisting state power and rising non-state actors, Yves Schemeil International bureaucracies: organizing world politics, Steffen Bauer and Silke Weinlich Interest representation and advocacy within the European Union: the making of democracy?, Sabine Saurugger From agenda setting to decision making: opening the black box of non-governmental organizations, Liesbet Heyse Non-governmental organizations and decision making in the United Nations, Jutta Joachim The ongoing organizational reform of the United Nations, Yves Beigbeder Reporting and peer review in the implementation of international rules: what role for non-state actors?, Thomas Conzelmann Accountability of public and private international organizations, Steve Charnovitz Non-state actors and the proliferation and individualization of international dispute settlement, Eric De Brabandere. Part V Separate Worlds: Politics and the world of humanitarian aid, Wolf-Dieter Eberwein Non-governmental organizations in the human rights world, Anja Mihr Non-state actors in the global security world, Carolyn M. Stephenson Non-state actors in the development aid world as seen from the South, Moushumi Basu Cities for citizens in the global South: approaches of non-governmental organizations working in urban development, Diana Mitlin Non-state actors in the global health world, Peter Hough Non-state actors in multilateral trade governance, Dirk De BiAvre and Marcel Hanegraaff Non-state actors and environmental governance: comparing multinational, supranational and transnational rule making, Lars H. Gulbrandsen, Steinar Andresen and Jon Birger SkjA|rseth Bibliography Index.

The United States and state and non-state actors in the Middle East have impacted and influenced one another mightily since the conclusion of the Cold War. In terms of economic exchange, political deliberation, and military engagement, the Middle East has left an indelible mark on American commerce, diplomacy, and security—and vice versa. America’s post–Cold War experience in the Middle East began during the first Bush administration following two events in 1991: The US-led liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. These heralded a unipolar world order where American values and interests promulgated via diplomacy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, deterrence of Iraq and Iran, and defense arrangements with Arab monarchies and select republics. Following the Clinton administration’s tenure in the 1990s, US hopes for orderly oversight of the Middle East crumbled on 11 September 2001. In the subsequent two years, the United States assembled coalitions of various strength and legitimacy to intervene in Afghanistan and Iraq. Despite insistence from Arab partners (aside from Kuwait) that an invasion of Iraq would destabilize the Gulf and augment Iranian influence, the Bush administration launched a war that contributed, in part, to the rise of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS). The Obama administration’s engagements in the Middle East were multifaceted, ranging from diplomacy and intervention during the Arab Spring regional uprisings and revolutions, coercion against ISIS through a global coalition, and the passage of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) Iran nuclear deal. The Trump administration premised its Middle East policy on confrontation with Iran, embodied in Maximum Pressure, and Arab-Israeli normalization through the Abraham Accords. These twin policies interlinked the United States with Yemen, the monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Morocco, and—to some extent—Sudan. The Biden administration’s ambitions for a recalibration toward the Indo-Pacific region, showcased through its hasty withdrawal from Afghanistan, confronted the lingering realities of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The Hamas attack into Israel on 7 October 2023, and the Israeli response in the Gaza Strip, tested US diplomacy and deterrence. The United States navigates a strained alliance with Turkey and a Middle East becoming more multipolar as competition for energy resources and logistical routes ensues. A renewed Trump administration enters a Middle East wherein the United States is undeniably entrenched, but where numerous policy shortfalls have fundamentally eroded the power and prestige it enjoyed in the early 1990s.

To determine and compare the level of implementation of policies for healthy food environments in Thailand with reference to international best practice by state and non-state actors. Data on the current level of implementation of food environment policies were assessed independently using the adapted Healthy Food Environment Policy Index (Food-EPI) by two groups of actors. Concrete actions were proposed for Thai Government. A joint meeting between both groups was subsequently held to reach consensus on priority actions. Thailand. Thirty state actors and twenty-seven non-state actors. Level of policy implementation varied across different domains and actor groups. State actors rated implementation levels higher than non-state actors. Both state and non-state actors rated level of implementation of monitoring of BMI highest. Level of implementation of policies promoting in-store availability of healthy foods and policies increasing tax on unhealthy foods were rated lowest by state and non-state actors, respectively. Both groups reached consensus on eleven priority actions for implementation, focusing on food provision in public-sector settings, food composition, food promotion, leadership, monitoring and intelligence, and food trade. Although the implementation gaps identified and priority actions proposed varied between state and non-state actors, both groups achieved consensus on a comprehensive food policy package to be implemented by the Thai Government to improve the healthiness of food environments. This consensus is a platform for continued policy dialogue towards cross-sectoral policy coherence and effective actions to address the growing burden of non-communicable diseases and obesity in Thailand.

The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) emphasise the importance of partnerships in achieving targets like Universal Health Coverage. But how can partnerships between non-state and state actors be established, and what development and political ramifications might they have, within protracted conflict situations? In Myanmar’s Kayah State and Kayin State, decades-long conflict resulted in parallel health systems operating under Ethnic Armed Organisations. In recent years, non-state and state health workers in both areas have forged partnerships to implement an Expanded Programme on Immunisation (EPI). These endeavours demonstrate that partnerships are permeated with power relations and development programmes can become the site of political struggles in contested states. Linking national development plans with the SDGs can enhance non-state actors’ positions in contexts where state and international actors have limited implementation capacity. Comparing Kayah State and Kayin State EPI activities demonstrates the importance of recognising political dynamics of partnerships in conflict situations. In Kayah State, when non-state actors were not recognised as leaders of development in their areas, EPI activities had negative impacts, fuelling local grievances. Conversely, in Kayin State, when state and international actors acknowledged political sensitivities and empowered non-state actors, EPI activities built a ‘working encounter’ with positive development and peacebuilding outcomes.

Armed conflict actors frequently target civilian populations. Thus, an improved understanding of such behaviour could pave the way to reducing it. We use the Civilian Targeting Index (CTI) and a broad array of geo-referenced data to investigate the spatio-temporal and economic dynamics of civilian targeting by conflict actors in Africa. Two main insights are generated. First, the civilian targeting behaviour of African non-state conflict actors is strongly influenced by the behaviour of other proximate actors. In particular, non-state actors tend to increase their civilian targeting after nearby non-state actors have done so. Possible mechanisms to explain such spatial spillovers include emulation and retaliation. Second, a negative relationship between economic activity and civilian targeting exists and applies to both state and non-state actors. In addition, CTIs of non-state actors tend to increase with population density, the geographical spread of their conflict activity and conflict duration. State actors have higher average CTIs than non-state actors do, but the gap between the two actor types tends to close during long-duration conflicts.

Previous articleNext article FreePresidential AddressRecognizing Complexity in Our Changing Contexts: Centering What Matters in Comparative and International EducationKaren MonkmanKaren Monkman Search for more articles by this author PDFPDF PLUSFull Text Add to favoritesDownload CitationTrack CitationsPermissionsReprints Share onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditEmailQR Code SectionsMoreIntroductionAs I write this address, we are in the third year of a global pandemic; an unprovoked assault on Ukraine is continuing unabated; climate change is impacting our lives and the ecosystems on which we depend; racial and gender violence continues; and a diminishing tolerance for difference is evident, whether related to sexuality and gender identities, religion and ethnicity, political orientation, among many others. The layering of these challenges has created a new reality for all of us, although some are impacted more than others. These conditions have affected our teaching, research, projects, how we engage with colleagues and mentor students—basically, all aspects of how we live and work. Even more so, communities with whom we work are impacted.Just as in the world, our field of comparative and international education (CIE) has also undergone changes, not only due to current global conditions, but due to the evolving ways of understanding how education is shaped by forces such as neoliberalism, poverty, social values, politics and environmental changes. Discursive framings of CIE embed particular agendas and ways of seeing the world, and they in turn shape how we think, understand, and act. More concretely, our field has seen an increase in the types and numbers of actors involved, including nonstate actors such as celebrities, billionaires, corporations, and others, each of whom has their own priorities and ways of engaging in education globally.Now more than ever, we need to understand with much more nuance these realities across diverse communities and within our changing field. We need to act in ways that are informed by a profound responsibility for the consequences, with, as I will suggest, a renewed focus on considering what really matters in and for the field.After reminding us of several ideas from previous presidential addresses, I will examine some key issues from CIES 2021—specifically, changing contexts and social responsibility—as an invitation to reexamine where we are, how we engage in our work and with each other. I invite you to consider a variety of questions to ponder, including:• What really matters? … to whom? … how? … why?• Whose interests are (and are not) being served?• To whom are we individually and collectively responsible? … for what? … how?• How are we implicated in creating or maintaining the social, political, and economic structures that impede education, or enable it, in ways that matter to people and communities we seek to serve?• How does our own work, the configuration of our professional relationships, and our discursive framing re-shape, reify, resist, or challenge structures of inequity and exclusion?• How does our work in education affect people’s lives, directly and indirectly, immediately and long-term?Our Shared HeritageTwenty years ago, Heidi Ross (2002) began her presidential address by situating her focus within the challenges she observed in how students and others grappled with making sense of education and society in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States. In noting the need for critical dialogue, she called for a renewed relational orientation in our work—for reconsidering the “space between us” (416). In using “metaphors and imagery of relational theories to think with,” she argues, we can then (a) center a critical analysis of “conceptualizations of democracy, globalization, connection, and difference,” (b) “take seriously the issues of ‘identity work,’” and (c) “move toward social justice” (411).We have known for a long time that education serves some populations well and underserves others. In 2004, Kassie Freeman observed that “looking but not seeing has led to the underutilization of human potential” (443), particularly in Black communities. Freeman (2004) explaines the costs to those whose potential is underutilized: “Having their talents underutilized over the centuries has had a negative impact on the psychological being (self-esteem and confidence) because the costs of underutilizing their potential has gone to the heart and soul of black populations” (451–52). Not being seen is a form of violence that has profound negative implications. We might apply that point to our field more broadly, by saying: “looking but not seeing” (443) as we form or interpret policy, measure progress, teach others, or engage in collaborations can easily result in a diminished, and sometimes counterproductive outcomes that further challenge rather than help people and communities. Using “seeing as a metaphor [is useful for] capturing difference, the depth of understanding of that difference, and the plight of the human condition” (444).Ross and Freeman built on the work of Vandra Maseman (1990), who, 14 years earlier, had challenged us to use paradigms in our thinking and our work that are “holistic, context dependent, and integrative” (471), because these paradigms can promote a more integrated understanding of our place in the world, by conceptualizing knowledge not as fragmented, or some forms as less important than others, but as integrated wholes. She argues: “our conception of ways of knowing have limited and restricted the very definition of comparative education that we have taught students and used in our own research and, indeed, have promulgated to practitioners” (465). This has led “to willful ignoring or bypassing of large areas of teaching and learning that are not considered in the domain of valid knowledge” (465)—this, in turn constricts our awareness of possibility.N’Dri Assié-Lumumba (2016) also resonated with those ideas and challenged us to be more inclusive and holistic in choosing how we frame our own ways of seeing and knowing. Ubuntu, she argues, is an alternative way to frame not only our work but also how we see ourselves in the world. It is about a sense of shared humanity, a rich sense of community and collectivity, a recognition that we are all connected to each other and to the broader ecosystems within which we live. In this Ubuntu framing, we would think differently about knowledge, how we know, and power relations across time and location.Finally, beyond human-to-human experience, Iveta Silova (2021) called for more attention to environmental concerns and climate change, recognizing that we, as humans, are integral to a much larger environment and often act in ways that are destructive to our own life spaces.Across these addresses, past CIES presidents have called upon us not only to look, but also see, and to consider the space between us. We are also called upon to reconsider how we situate ourselves among others, and also in relationship to particular ways of knowing and the production of knowledge itself. These orientations are important for positioning humanity and meaningful social relationships at the center of our work—especially in today’s world with increasingly challenging conditions.CIES 2021: Social Responsibility within Changing ContextsThe theme of the CIES 2021 annual meeting, “Social Responsibility within Changing Contexts,” was an invitation to consider a variety of complexities related to changing contexts and our own individual and collective social responsibility.1 Like the presidential addresses noted above, these issues invite us to consider who we are, how we engage, what influences our understandings that inform how we engage, and how that engagement has consequences for others.Changing ContextsThere are many dimensions of context that are changing. After broadly contextualizing our changing world, I will focus on three dimensions: increasing precarity in today’s world, changing education/development discourses, and the expanded variety of actors in the field (i.e., the changing social/collaborative terrain).The world in which we find ourselves now is not the world that shaped the development of our work several decades ago, or even our work a few years ago. We are now experiencing rapid changes in basic life conditions which affect education, and, in turn, changes in education which affects life conditions. Most obvious in these current times is the global COVID-19 pandemic, which has not only forced changes in how CIES creates space for coming together in our annual meetings and how our professional relationships develop but has also radically altered how schooling is experienced globally, how nonformal and informal modes of learning occur (or not), how policy is created and understood, how research is conducted, and how we decide what is worth learning or knowing. Teachers worldwide were either forced to pivot to teach online, usually with little support or knowledge about how to do so—or for those where adequate or appropriate technology was not available, teachers were left without work as schools closed completely (UNICEF 2021; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, n.d.). Disparities in school closures and in access to technology have intensified already existing inequities (World Bank 2021). Beyond teaching, many researchers have moved to conducting interviews on virtual platforms, for example, which impacts the building of rapport and the development of nuanced understandings (both of which are critical for the collection of meaningful qualitative data). This shift also limits who is available as research participants (due in part to in/accessibility to technology). Others have stopped their research or shifted to other topics that are doable with pandemic restrictions, thereby changing the contours of knowledge production. In addition, many people struggle with social isolation due to lockdowns and social distancing.Beyond the COVID-19 pandemic are critical concerns about climate change, racial injustice and xenophobia, gender violence, increasing poverty, forced displacement, and the increased politicizing of migration along with a wide range of other social concerns. Globally, of the 26 million refugees—the highest number ever recorded—half are children, and 85 percent are being hosted in developing countries (Amnesty International, n.d.). Over 100 million people are forcibly displaced globally (Siegfried 2022), including 12.8 million people in Ukraine (Treisman 2022; UN-OHCHR 2022). International students of color have had a hard time crossing borders to escape the war in Ukraine, since neighboring countries do not welcome them as readily as White Ukrainians (Benavot 2022; Okeowo 2022). Conditions such as these are layered and intertwined, multiplying today’s challenges. Gender violence remains an endemic part of social strife, increasing in times of war and in conditions of domestic isolation as in a pandemic (Moaveni and Nagarajan 2022). In addition, world hunger is increasing, reflected in a doubling of severe food insecurity in the last 2 years (United Nations 2022).Fake news, belief in unsubstantiated conspiracy theories, and hate rhetoric add to the complexities we struggle with today. Global warming is still denied or downplayed by some (Dunlap and Jacques 2013). And, the global pandemic also has its deniers (Krugman 2021; Spring 2021), despite solid science about the virus and over 6 million lives lost worldwide (WHO 2022).Along with these recent contextual changes, we see other conditions continue to evolve, adding to individual and collective challenges. Neoliberal policies, for example, continue to constrain the work of teachers; narrow the curriculum; prioritize assessments over meaningful learning; and disadvantage some schools over others, growing the gaps in achievement (Lubienski and Brewer 2019).Woven throughout all of these dynamics and more, supporting some elements and undermining others, is the global circulation of cultural values and ideas, including through social media (Anderson 2016). Our globalized world connects us all and enables real time communication, as long as one has access to particular technologies. Even so, the ideas that flow around the world are often controlled by those in positions of power (Brøgger et al. 2016; Menashy 2019) and accessed only by those with the required technology—we are not all engaged in the same conversations, so we do not all have access to the same knowledge and ideas.All of these conditions, and more, affect our work and our lives, and, more importantly, the lives of the people we are striving to support through our work. The experiences of these conditions and dynamics are not the same for everyone. For increasing numbers of people these layered and rapidly changing conditions make their lives precarious.2Precarious ConditionsThis layering of challenging conditions we now experience is increasingly referred to as precariousness or precarity.3 Although these terms have long been used to describe unstable conditions of employment, the terms are now also used to now describe conditions of life much more broadly. Judith Butler (2009) argues that precarity is a politically induced condition, in which, “certain populations suffer from failing social and economic networks of support and become differentially exposed to injury, violence, and death. Such populations are at a heightened risk of disease, poverty, starvation, displacement, and of exposure to violence without protection” (25–26).Conditions of precarity include unpredictability, vulnerability, insecurity, instability, and the like.4 For many, “precarious situations and events are like rugged terrains: every step must be carefully preconceived and decisively taken and, even then, one can never be certain that s/he has firm ground under his or her feet” (della Porta et al. 2015, 2). Precarization has been described as “[penetrating] entire life-worlds of individuals and groups of people” (della Porta et al. 2015, 2, citing others).Those on the social margins are impacted most (Butler 2009; Perry et al. 2021). When intersections of multiple forces of instability, insecurity, vulnerability, and unpredictability are present, it is easy to see that precariousness is exacerbated. This demands that we not only “look” but also “see” the realities of life of those we presume to help through our work, so that our actions have a better chance to reduce precariousness and alter the structures that create these realities.These changing conditions—especially those that increase precarity—raise important questions about who has a right to learn and has access to learning, how to make learning available to those less able to adapt to today’s realities, what is worth learning, what is worth teaching, and even what education is for (Dovemark and Beach 2016). Grappling with these increasingly complex global challenges also raises questions such as: what kinds of policy would best support more equitably distributed education across disparate populations as we grapple with these increasingly complex global challenges. And finally, who is, can, and should be involved, and how, in these processes?The CIE professional terrain is also changed in these precarious times. Funding, jobs, mobility restrictions, organizational priorities, and other challenges have resulted in many losing jobs or having hours, salaries, or benefits cut. Limitations in travel due to the pandemic or lack of funding reduces opportunities to do fieldwork (whether related to projects or research) and to join colleagues at conferences.These precarious times demand that we reimagine how we come together in CIES, as has been evident in the most recent annual meetings. Even in virtual interactions, we notice different communication networks which likely fragment our communications within CIE. Who is talking with whom on what platforms? Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, WeChat, Zoom, e-mail, text, or phone—not everyone is engaged in or has access to all of these, so conversations, the sharing of ideas, and ways of thinking and framing of issues discursively are likely occurring among particular groups and not others.Discourses: Ways of ThinkingWords and images matter, especially in policy. They change how we make sense of what we do and how we do it. They condition how we see the world, and what we decide is important. As Ross did 5 years before him, Victor Kobayashi (2007) highlighted the role of metaphors in his presidential address, and Ruth Hayhoe (2000) discussed metanarratives in hers. Similarly, discourses—the ideological underpinnings embedded in the ways we use words and images—shape how we and others think and understand (Ninnes 2004; Ball 2006; Allan 2012). The reason I raise this here is to call attention not just to the concrete language that we use but also to the need to unpack it, to more fully examine the discursive underpinnings of how we make sense of our worlds and how we live and work within them. Discursive shifts are another layer of changing contexts.In work on girls’ education, for example, policy discourses, such as in the sustainable development goals (SDGs), continue to prioritize counting bodies in seats (access, enrollments, gender parity, etc.) rather than messier (and more difficult to measure) research related to quality, content, empowerment, and other critical issues (Monkman and Hoffman 2013). To see our work differently, we must be willing to reexamine our underlying assumptions (discourses). Gayatri Spivak (2021), our Kneller lecturer at CIES argues that a and … how we come to is She this point by saying: real are the and is to are other our to see how others think and how they are to life conditions is to understanding other more issues differently can new with shape how we understand our own field. We are a diverse from many with ideological but we also to with those who do work and with whom we the numbers and variety of actors in the field this does not us How well do we understand particularly those of our new nonstate in our field who the between and nonstate actors in their work be in a to help interpret these especially to be often from where and how we are from our and our own ways of and the ideological can to inform of and in the variety of actors in our field is How they are in development work changes the among that is, relationships and assumptions that inform priorities and et al. 2016; Menashy actors and policy of nonstate celebrities, billionaires, and so to help the world. The long of of a of by the and see has expanded to many more and use for education work, and their as They about their to but research that benefits to and only sometimes to the communities they are to research, for example, how and in and of color as of that this benefits the positioning them new of to new in the Global but without changing the structures of that would or in communities (or other called for and for in their relationships with and as in their and as well as of their and these relationships, to whom and for what are these are, in of a larger often as part of their social responsibility What like in this environment but it is to with their new actors we see a wide variety of to funding from some whose goals are to the to others that are in their own to Like most have their own priorities, and many lack a knowledge of the field. In one I was with, a funding the their to the as they the communities to create priorities to their that their the communities and the experienced had the knowledge and and they the of In in another the that the did not to understand a to social to make the was on the of whether the participants to around one as by the even the was to enable communities to decide for what issues they The measure of did not from the or usually the form of For example, their and or as a way to awareness of particular development international have 2022), and are a few in the development world. many by are for education (or to be to their For example, and the known and his with They the the jobs were not their lives as a was was known for in Others have through their work in for example, known through his about schools in and and the of his education work on and development have now created whose is to with more research is on the benefits to the communities that are to be the benefits to the or to the argues that complexities of development that for can be or failing to the real underlying these and have and some do work. have goals that or do not often have the to the of education globally or in or to understand complex social issues as they with To the it that these are the world, but they had been better more have been and the challenges they have been and also about a that they had work on girls’ education globally and before that many of us have been in this for of these new actors are very well to frame the education issues in the ways in which large understand our not and 2021). This also impacts the ways that relationships are and engaged in the actors in our field have more in and the language of and have of to some they are not without including the in power among the More have actors and other nonstate actors as those discussed sometimes as the of funding and sometimes as key et al. and 2021). questions about whose agendas are more in and what the are of the particular power relations within recent international has changed in recent with numbers of increasingly diverse actors involved, as well as more through which is She conceptualizing these changes in the of new actors and relationships as not because the of where multiple actors come to the as and work toward a is in today’s world. does not the relationships, or in the of these relationships can result in disparate influences in policy a at the the power of nonstate actors is evident and 2021; 2021). Menashy and their related as increasingly education and having a much larger in policy In Global are and are now of several As part of a they become able to shape although not about nonstate actors in and research has that some but also many in the Global the policy (Brøgger et al. 2016). research the networks through which policy are by the Global and development at recent CIES have also power inequities in and have the power relations of those at the policy or on the of these policy networks not having a in policy. the of and the discursive underpinnings are integral to understanding what social responsibility to different actors and what is focus in the 2021 CIES theme us to unpack how we understand social at CIES 2021 we a variety of of social world the social although this narrow was not the of the CIES 2021 that should have a responsibility beyond their it is also as a social and environmental with its and et al. 2015, that be to can prioritize or the world at large and have elements related to or In the of social responsibility us to consider what a broader understanding of social responsibility might in the work by the increasing variety of actors in education globally, including To many of us in CIES, it would a much more at the and our priorities, and so to

Humanitarian diplomacy emerged as a concept in the 2000s to describe the vital work effected by non-State humanitarian organizations to negotiate access, protect civilians and uphold humanitarian principles. This paper charts the rise of State-led humanitarian diplomacy in the Middle East, arguing for the need to expand the conventional lens that is focused on non-State actors. It does so through a detailed examination of Qatar, a case study that has emerged over the last two decades as a significant State actor engaging in a range of forms of humanitarian diplomacy. Following a brief theoretical examination of the concept of humanitarian diplomacy, the paper describes Qatar's role in humanitarian diplomacy in relation to the changing context of armed conflict and humanitarian response in the Middle East. It then presents a categorization of Qatar's humanitarian diplomacy, employing a framework structured around multiple levels including practice, policy and normative/ideational, carried out by both non-State and State actors. Finally, the paper reflects on the significance of Qatar's experience and the implications it may have on the conduct of humanitarian diplomacy in the region, and in particular what a niche small State can do to contribute to the protection of the humanitarian sphere.