The united nations operation in Cyprus: A new look at the peacekeeping‐peacemaking relationship

Abstract

This article explores the relationship between peacekeeping and peacemaking with reference to the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). It defines a new way to measure peacekeeping success and evaluates UNFICYP's performance during the 1964—75 period. UNFICYP had some success in its humanitarian and other non‐military functions, but it failed to establish freedom of movement, de‐fortify the Turkish Cypriot enclaves, preserve the military and (by extension) political status quo or implement the 1975 Vienna agreement. These failures were largely attributable to the peacekeepers’ ultra‐conservative interpretation of their mandate, their failure to use all instruments available to them, their preference for weak rather than strong strategies, and their neutrality toward a changing military and political status quo. UNFICYP's peacekeeping failures aggravated the parties’ already negative attitudes toward peacemaking. Thus, UNFICYP's negative influence on peacemaking in Cyprus was due to peacekeeping failure, not success, as is widely argued in the literature.