The Unconditioned and the Absolute in Kant and Early German Romanticism

Abstract

Abstract This paper argues not only that Schelling, Novalis, and Friedrich Schlegel are reacting directly to Kant (rather than simply to each other and to other post-Kantian figures), but also that they are responding in complex ways to one particularly prominent and distinctive line of thought in Kant, namely his account of reason, conditions, and the unconditioned. Though Kant argues that we cannot have cognition of unconditioned objects, he none the less thinks that reason demands that we accept the existence of such objects. The paper argues that the German Romantics take over this general line of thought, though they do so in different contexts and to different ends. Specifically, focusing on this dimension of Kant’s thought allows us to see both how the logic of conditioning relations can be seen to be driving their arguments for the Absolute, and how Kant’s particular conception of conditioning relations gives rise to important differences from the views of the German Romantics. For whereas he distinguishes different kinds of real conditioning relations, they operate with a generic conception of conditioning that leads to their distinctive Romantic views.