THE U.S., KUOMINTANG AND TIBETAN RESISTANCE 1950–1960: COVERT OPERATIONS, CONSEQUENCES AND TIBETAN PARATROOPS IN TAIWAN

Abstract

This paper reflects on the complex political dynamics between the United States, the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang) and Tibetan leaders from 1950 to 1960. In contrast to the existing literature, this study assesses these trilateral relationships by focusing on attempted covert operations and consequences. While volumes of studies have been published about the United States Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) involvement in the Tibetan resistance movement, what remains understudied is the secret but unsuccessful attempts at cooperation between the Kuomintang and Tibetans and the role that the U.S. played in these activities. Findings demonstrate that the U.S. and Kuomintang's interest was driven by the desire to exploit the Tibetan resistance to advance their interests in combating Communist China. However, Tibetan resentment towards the Chinese and the lack of Kuomintang influences in Tibet compelled the U.S. to push back the Kuomintang in these trilateral relationships. This created a major barrier in U.S.-Taiwan relations and between Tibetans and the Kuomintang. In the race to exploit the Tibetan resistance, the U.S. became the winner. The Kuomintang, however, continued to explore the opportunity. Intricacies of nationalism, opportunism and pragmatism transiting through this period reveal realities of realpolitik.