Abstract
The doctrine I have in mind is the theory of intensional meanings, the theory according to which unitary descriptive expressions (and some complex ones) have not only extensions, but intensions as well. According to this theory, found in fullest flower in Carnap's Meaning and Necessity, individual expressions, one-place predicates and sentences, have corresponding to them individual concepts, properties and propositions respectively, these latter being the intensions, or, meanings, or, logical contents, of the expressions in question. In the first part of this paper I shall attempt to show that the whole theory of intensional entities represents not just an ontological extravagance, but a fairly clear absurdity. In the second I shall sketch briefly an alternative semantical method and in the third shall attempt to exploit this method for the clarification of a couple of puzzles.
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