The Three Religious Revivals. Pentecostal, Islamic, and Orthodox Upswings in the Context of Long-Term Secularization

This chapter discusses Charles Grandison Finney, who published Lectures on Revivals of Religion in 1835 that argued for the efficacy of religious revivals and functioned as an instruction manual for planning such meetings. It features the first essay in that book, titled “What a Revival of Religion Is.” It also highlights how Finney succinctly defined a religious revival as the renewal of the first love of Christians, resulting in the awakening and conversion of sinners to God. The chapter considers the revival of religion in a community as the arousing, quickening, and reclaiming of the more or less backslidden church and the more or less general awakening of all classes, and insuring attention to the claims of God. It demonstrates Finney's definition of and advocacy for revival meetings.

This article contributes to the current scholarly discussion by inviting us to look at secularism not as a static model of religious governance, but as a formation that shifts with time and that is deeply related to our contemporary understanding of religion. As such, it investigates the recent transformations of French secularism. In 2004 France passed a law banning visible religious symbols in public schools. Since then French secularism has increasingly become a sacred – non-negotiable – element of collective life. Drawing on Kim Knott's concept of the ‘secular sacred’, the article investigates, through an analysis of policy reports, law proposals and laws, how this discursive usage of secularism has been used to set apart particular spaces from others: secular spaces that carry the ‘supreme’ values of secularism. In this process, the role of public servants and citizens has been changing, as they have been invested with the responsibility of policing the boundaries of these spaces. New tools, such as charters of secularism, laws and regulations, and state bodies are being imagined to consolidate these boundaries. The article also explores how ‘religious resurgence’ (and more specifically ‘Islamic resurgence’) has been essential to this ‘sacred-making’ activity: to give substance to values that are non-negotiable and need to be separated from those that are not. Overall, the piece posits, in line with other recent works, that sacred-making is not reserved to the ‘religious’, but can become a central component of how secularism gets articulated and deployed. In so doing, it underscores the importance of documenting how meanings given to secularism shift to grasp the politics that underpin discourses on religious resurgence.

The preceding analysis placed the current Islamic revival in historical perspective by means of a comparison with Judeo-Christian culture. While noting important differences in content and structure which have influenced the relative positions of women in each society, it was found that patriarchy constitutes an essential element of both religious traditions. Jewish, Christian, and Islamic doctrines manifest similar themes of female inferiority paradoxically mixed with fears of female sexual power and wile, leading to the imposition of norms which preserve male control, such as female exclusion from public participation and restriction to dependent familial roles. Religious revivals in both cultures are characterized by resurrection of these patriarchal themes, thus explaining the return to the veil by some Muslim women and the anti-feminist sentiments of Christian fundamentalists in the United States. An additional point made by this study is that women function as symbols of cultural and religious identity. Traditional female roles as caretakers of the family, despite their lower valuation in the status hierarchy, constitute the bedrock of human social organization, and an important referent for individual identity. Levi-Strauss, in his classic work, The Elementary Structures of Kinship,67 characterized the exchange of females by male-controlled kinship groups as the foundation of human social organization. Thus, while females have less authority than males, they paradoxically remain powerful objects of kinship exchanges, thus becoming targets of exaggerated male control during periods of social disorganization. Large-scale social upheaval triggers the demand for a reintegration of the self within a stable meaning system, and consequently thrusts the ideology of traditional womanhood to a prominent position in the revival movement. Moreover, challenges to traditional female roles can themselves instigate a resurgence of religious fervor, underscoring the centrality of female subservience and domesticity to religious and cultural identity. In the Muslim region, for example, we have noted the stimulation of religious revivals by policies liberating women from seclusion and male hegemony, intensified in all likelihood by the perception that such policies represented foreign-inspired assaults on the integrity of Islam. An equally plausible hypothesis is that American Christian revivals have been provoked in part by challenges to traditional female domesticity embodied in the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century and the feminist movement of the late 1960's. Thus, this study has tentatively identified some factors which may precipitate revivals of traditional religious and patriarchal sentiments. Additional cross-cultural analysis is needed to elaborate and specify the conditions under which these social movements occur and their consequent effects on women's roles. Finally, this research suggests some theoretical revisions for the more general process of societal development. Prevailing theories of modernization, particularly those influenced by the functionalist perspective, have tended to conceptualize tradition and modernity as contrasting ideal types, equating modernity with a host of structural and cognitive transformations including secularization and female equality.68 Evidence from the United States suggests that the developed nations are neither immune to significant religious revivals nor unilaterally dedicated to women's rights. In the developing world, Muslim leaders have found that Islamic revival is not an impediment to national development, but may in fact provide sacred legitimation for potentially disruptive social change.69 Industrial development, urbanization, and the diffusion of economic rationality may thus coexist with intense religious devotion and popular support for patriarchal traditions.

A line of studies of contemporary religion in South East Europe links resurgent nationalism together with the revival of religion. These studies argue that nationalism are grounded on a re-use of religion and assumption of many former religious functions. This type of argument has become a key feature of social scientific studies of religion in the region, as already Daniela Kalkandjieva has pointed out in a 2011 study. In cases from Yugoslavia this argumentation and connection of religion and nationalism has blocked for a more nuanced description of the religious transformation of the religious communities in the period after the fall of communism. The local religious transformation of heritages, holy sites, communities and clergy are too often diminished and religion is instead interpreted to be “proxies”, “scenes” or “agents” for nationalism. The category of religion is emptied and nationalism seems to be all there is to say about religion. In this article it will be discussed what the danger are in such a simplification and, how it is possible to unblock the study of religion in the South East European context. This will be done through a critical revisiting of studies of religion in Montenegro and exemplified on some central cases from Montenegro. It is the intention of this article to craft a revised analytic strategy that on the one side keeps the attention on the connection between religion and nationalism, but at the same time acknowledge religion as a category in itself. Such an analytic frame can be used to nuance studies of religion in South East Europe.

The article focuses on the main trends in the revival of religion in the modern world, its active presence in global politics and international relations. It is substantiated that the religious revival at the turn of 1980-1990 in Ukraine, sharp Orthodox-Greek-Catholic and inter-Orthodox conflicts were the result of significant distortions of its institutional and confessional space caused by the party-Soviet religious policy. Special and specific signs of "return of religion" in Ukraine in the context of global religious changes, in particular, the dynamism, complexity and to this day the incompleteness of this process. The content and essential characteristics of the mutual influences of socio-cultural transformations and dynamics of changes in the religious complex of modern Ukraine, the influence of events related to the Revolution of Dignity and the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian war in the East of the country are analyzed. Peculiarities of life and social positioning of the main actors of the Ukrainian religious landscape, in particular, institutions of the Orthodox complex, UGCC, Protestant denominations, Islamic community, new religious movements are revealed. A number of difficult challenges facing the newly formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine are substantiated - ensuring internal unity, minimizing conflicts, creating their own landmark projects, finding a dialogical model of church reconciliation to overcome the religious frontier of the division of Ukrainian society. The dynamics of public ideas, clear ambivalence and controversy of public consciousness in the religious aspect - from the traditionally high level of trust in religion and the church, to a steady decline in assessments of their importance in the lives of citizens and socio-political processes. Conclusions and proposals on the intensification of the state policy of nationalcivil consolidation and active involvement of religion and religious organizations in this process have been formulated.

References to religion have increasingly permeated the worldviews and initiatives of international security actors. Religion has also emerged as an important factor in international security (IS) literature and policy initiatives, in which it is commonly addressed as an autonomous variable, explicative of contemporary conflicts and insecurities. Beyond the “religious revival” narrative, this chapter exposes the resilient influence of the assumption according to which Westphalian secularism is a necessary condition for international peace and security. It addresses the roots and consequences of the confessionalization of IS, arguing that this evolution symptomizes an implicit victory of the controversial “clash of civilizations” thesis. Having progressively permeated the worldviews and initiatives of international security actors, this approach has been performatively validated through multiple initiatives aimed at regulating the “revival of religion” and mitigating its anticipated security consequences. This evolution, it is argued, has led to an increasing securitization of religion and religious identities in contemporary world politics.

Muslim societies have been reshaped in recent decades by an Islamic revival. We document a contemporaneous decline in social mobility among educated youth in Egypt, the epicentre of the movement in the Arab world. We then develop a model to show how an unexpected decline in social mobility combined with inequality can produce a religious revival led by the educated middle class. The principal idea is that religion helps individuals to cope with unfulfilled aspirations by adjusting their expectations-based reference point. By raising aspirations, economic development may make societies more prone to religious revivals. This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.

One of the main characteristics of the post-Soviet transformation was the religious resurgence. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the post-Soviet Islamic revival in the 1990s. The awakening of Islam and seeking the place for Muslims in the society significantly influenced the formation of today’s Russian Federation. The authors examine the factors that influenced the role of Islam in newly created post-Soviet Russia and the federal government’s response to its dynamics. The paper is divided into two parts. The first part deals with the Islamic revival after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The second chapter is focused on the Kremlin’s reaction to new radical movements that emerged during the Islamic awakening and the separatist sentiments in Russia’s Muslim regions. Using the qualitative research method, the authors drew a conclusion that Islamic radicalisation in post-Soviet Russia was caused by several external and internal factors. The political developments in the Russian Federation between the second half of the 1990s and the early 21st century were characterised by restrictions on religious freedom and consolidation of federalism.

This article examines and compares the Islamic resurgence movements in Iran between the 1950s to the revolution of 1979 and in Turkey from the 1950s to the present. It focuses on wide-ranging socioeconomic, political, ideological, psychological, historical, and cultural factors, in addition to the religious and spiritual motivations, behind the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism and intends to find the similarities and/or differences between the Islamization movements in both countries. We are witnessing the ongoing and increasing revival of Islam in the contemporary Muslim world. This has been the motivation for my article, which focuses on the Islamic resurgence movements in Iran from the 1950s to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and in Turkey from the 1950s up to the present day. In choosing these two non-Arab Muslim countries, which were never formally colonized, I argue that in spite of certain parallels in the revival of Islamic movements in the Muslim world, they have diverse, deep-rooted historical foundations and unique features and therefore should be analyzed distinctively in consideration of the internal dynamics and specificities of each country. In my study, I ended the analysis of Islamic revivalism in Iran with the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution in 1979 and the establishment of the Islamic Republic that marked the opening of a new era in which the secularist regime was replaced with a theocratic one. I considered this as the ultimate stage that Islamic activism can reach. In other words, the Islamic resurgence movement in Iran has resulted in the establishment of an Islamic order. However, in contrast to Iran, given the country-specific conditions, religious revivalism in Turkey is still an evolving and dynamic process, which continues to develop by taking different forms and appearances in its struggle with the established secular forces. Therefore, the analysis of Islamic revivalism in Turkey is carried up to the present. The present study aims to determine the essential factors which account for the Islamist mobilization in each of these countries. Which factors mobilize the masses along Islamist lines? Who are the actors and supporters? What are the similarities and differences in the nature of Islamic revival movements in both countries? Is there a common pattern? are the implications and consequences of the Islamic movements in Iran and Turkey? Why have the outcomes been different? These are the questions that I will answer in this article in consideration of the unexpected occurrence of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the electoral success in Turkey of the Islamist Welfare Party and its successor, the Justice and Development Pary (AKP). There exists a huge body of literature about the Islamic revival process in both Turkey and Iran that posits different explanations or generalizations about its occurrence, nature, and consequences. This study intends to deal with each of these factors separately and find the similarities and/or differences - if there are any - between the Islamization movements in both countries by employing an all-encompassing and comparative approach. Thus it will focus on wide-ranging socioeconomic, political, ideological, psychological, historical, and cultural factors besides the religious and spiritual motivations behind the phenomenon of Islamic revivalism in Turkey and Iran. Before focusing on each factor separately, it is useful to begin with an overview of the general characteristics of the Islamic revival process in each country. GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS Islam is a very important element in both Iranian and Turkish social, cultural, and political life. Moreover, in Iran and Turkey alike Islamic movements are instigated mainly by - although by no means only by - the alienated and disinherited groups of society. As Shireen Hunter points out, Islam was used as a means of opposition and resistance by various elements of society from different economic and social milieus to express their discontent and resentment towards the state's policies. …

Kazakh society underwent a process of russification and baptism during the Russian Empire, a policy of secularization under the Soviet government, and religious and social changes after independence, such as a religious revival. With the revival of Islam in society, missionary activity by Christian denominations also began to gain strength. These religious and social changes in society naturally allowed people to convert. That is, there were more and more people in Kazakh society who changed their religion. In this article, a sociological study is conducted on people who adopted religion, and they are analyzed from the perspective of the sociology of religion. Twenty-five respondents with Kazakh citizenship participated in the study. Methods of sociological research such as observation, interviewing and analysis were used.

Religious Revival and Deprivatization in Post-Soviet Georgia: Reculturation of Orthodox Christianity and Deculturation of Islam

Islam has been fundamental to the life of Central Asia for more than a millennium. The Central Asian region has, in its turn, played an invaluable role in Islamic history. Many Muslim scholars, spiritual leaders, and dynasties originated from this region and contributed much to the development of Islamic sciences, culture, and civilization. The last three decades have been marked by the resurgence of Islam in post-Soviet Central Asia after the long seventy-year destruction and suppression of religious institutions, educational venues, and Islamic consciousness by the Soviet regime. Inasmuch as this religious resurgence is having a considerable impact on the personal and social lives of Central Asian Muslims, the issue of political Islam has become one of the most debated and controversial in political and academic circles, as well as in the expert community and in the media. Although it seems implausible to deny the threat of radical political Islam in Central Asia, we cannot ignore the fact that this threat can be employed and exacerbated by some power-holding groups to their own advantage. So, it is necessary to analyze political Islam and the Islamic resurgence in Central Asia in general in a more nuanced fashion. It seems often that “insurgent Islamism” or “creeping radicalism” have become catch-all expressions for conventional threats and fears in Central Asia. Security-obsessed assessments turn out to be not only stereotyped, but also misleading, since they prevent us from understanding the region’s real problems.

The resurgence of Islam in private and public life, in Indonesia and elsewhere, is one of the most important phenomena of our time. Its implications for politics and society are also widely misunderstood. Piety among Indonesian Muslims is essentially unrelated to most of the basic problems of political and economic life that analysts of religion and public life have addressed. Instead, the social and economic transformations that are co-occurring alongside the resurgence of Islam in Indonesia are the best predictors of how Muslims think and behave. These findings reorient our understanding of Islam and democracy in contemporary Indonesia. They should also inform policymakers interested in Islam, religious revitalization, democracy, and relations between the West and the Muslim world.

Discourse on religious revival is neither a [heretical] innovation nor a novelty;2 nor is it an exclusive aspect of the Islamic outreach mission [da’vah]. The idea of religious reformation has a long history. Still, there is an obvious difference between the reformers of yesterday and those of today.

The two predominant forces of social change in the Third World in the late twentieth century are religious revivalism and democratization. The emergence of this new apparently contradictory phenomenon is itself a byproduct of globalization and the two divergent forces of economic integration and cultural particularism that it puts in motion. The magnitude and vibrance of these two phenomena in the Middle East and North Africa have been quite divergent. While Islamic revivalism has been the predominant social force in the region in the last two decades, the forces of democratization and their achievements have been relatively meagre and negligible. Another peculiarity of democratization in the region is its convergence with Islamic. Due to global and regional religious revival, and the political weaknesses of secular forces, Islamists have been in the best position in many parts of the Muslim World to take advantage of political openings and mobilize themselves for contestation of political power. This reality has put the issue of compatibility of Islam and democracy to the forefront of political debate among Muslim theologians, intellectuals and western academicians. Reconciling a sacred faith with democracy, whose historical roots are attributed to western cultural and institutional traditions, has posed a host of challenges for theoreticians as well as political practitioners.