The Theory and Practice of War Termination: Assessing Patterns in China's Historical Behavior

Abstract

What factors determine when and how China terminates armed conflict? This article derives from the war termination literature three factors that impact the ability of disputants to resolve conflicts: approach to wartime diplomacy, views on escalation, and receptiveness to mediation. I then evaluate according to these three factors China's attempts to bring conflict to a close in the Korean War, Sino-Indian War, and Sino-Vietnamese War. I argue that China's tends to entertain talks only with weaker opponents, rely on heavy escalation to bring about peace, and to leverage outside parties less as empowered mediators and more as an additional source of pressure on its enemies. These three tendencies are likely to hinder conflict resolution in future conflagrations. A subsequent analysis of authoritative Chinese strategic writings reveal that these patterns have been imbued in contemporary thought, and therefore are likely to persist in future flashpoints. My findings add a new dimension to the war termination literature and have policy implications regional peace and stability.