The Theological Importance of Differentiating Identities. National and Christian Identity in New Testament Light

To test this hypothesis, the thesis analyses the discourse of two populist radical right parties in Western Europe: The National Front (now known as National Rally) of France, and the Party for Freedom of the Netherlands. This analysis has two parts: The first tests part of my hypothesis: that Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into ‘culture.’ The second consists of Critical Discourse This thesis seeks to understand the role of religion in the discourse of Western Europe’s populist radical right parties. Populist radical right parties have made extraordinary electoral gains in a number of Western European nations. Many of these parties call for a return to Christian and/or Judeo-Christian values, and for the Christian and/or Judeo-Christian identity of their respective nations to be respected and preserved. Muslims, in particular, are singled out by the populist radical right as a threat to Western Christian values and identity. Yet these populist radical right parties do not appear to be advocates of a religious doctrine or way of life; rather, they most often frame themselves as defenders of secularism. This is curious: if populist radical right parties in Western Europe are secular, when then has Christian or Judeo-Christian identity become such an important aspect of their discourse? Building on sociologist Rogers Brubaker’s observation that populist radical right parties in Western Europe are not genuinely religious, but rather Christian identitarian in orientation, this thesis contends that populist radical right parties use religion in their discourse in order to exclude Muslims from European society, and to protect their respective secular nationalisms. Therefore the primary question asked in this thesis is: why is religion used as a tool to differentiate ‘the people’ from ‘the other’ in the discourse of the populist radical right in Western Europe? The thesis proposes a hypothesis: Western Europeans’ encounter with Islam in Europe has (1) revealed the non-universal nature of Western European secularism to Europeans, and (2) demonstrated the secularisation of Christianity into Western European ‘culture.’ This recognition that Christianity has been secularised into ‘culture’ has allowed secular Europeans to identify themselves – and their nation and ultimately Western civilisation – as Christian or Judeo-Christian. These effects have precipitated the formation of Christianist secularism, a type of Christian identitarian politics which perceives contemporary European culture to be ‘Christianity secularised.’ A group of populist radical right parties in Western Europe, then, have embraced Christianist secularism, which they use to define their respective national identities in religio-civilisational terms, i.e. as (Judeo-)Christian. In doing so, they are able to exclude Muslims from their society, on the grounds that Islam is an alien religion which – unlike Christianity and possibly Judaism – has not and cannot be secularised into ‘culture'. Analysis of three selected texts produced by the respective leaders of the National Front and Party for Freedom, Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, produced during the 2012-2017 period. The Critical Discourse Analysis seeks answers in the selected to the following questions: (1) does the discourse display the key elements of Christianist secularism? (2) How is Islam constructed in the discourse? (3) How is Christian identity used to exclude Muslims from European society?

In Plato's usage, the word 'tauton' had two basic meanings, one being sameness, and the other being distinctiveness. Relevancy crisis refers to the idea that the church cannot reach contemporary people, while identity crisis implies that there is no common agreement on what the Christian church really is. The substitution theory became dominant in the church at the time when the New Testament church replaced the Old Testament people. The church itself identified who a Jew was and what Israel meant. There is a kind of identity that is not freely chosen, but it is given freely to an individual. Though national identity is not a creational order such as 'male and female' yet it should be taken into account when spoken about Christian identity. Nationalism is an aggressive self-realization, and should not be confused with patriotism, which is the responsibility one possesses for their nation.Keywords: Christian identity; Israel; Jew; national identity

International Review of MissionVolume 86, Issue 342 p. 307-323 Appendix III: SITUATION REPORT ON EASTERN EUROPE AND THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION John Brown, John Brown John Brown (see note on p. 207)Search for more papers by this author John Brown, John Brown John Brown (see note on p. 207)Search for more papers by this author First published: 25 March 2009 https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1758-6631.1997.tb00038.x AboutPDF ToolsRequest permissionExport citationAdd to favoritesTrack citation ShareShare Give accessShare full text accessShare full-text accessPlease review our Terms and Conditions of Use and check box below to share full-text version of article.I have read and accept the Wiley Online Library Terms and Conditions of UseShareable LinkUse the link below to share a full-text version of this article with your friends and colleagues. Learn more.Copy URL Share a linkShare onFacebookTwitterLinked InRedditWechat Volume86, Issue342July 1997Pages 307-323 RelatedInformation

This article focuses on the Palestinian Christian community in contemporary Jordan, tracing the evolution of the community's social, religious, and political identities since 1948 to the present day. Incorporating material from interviews conducted within the past two years, the article assesses the impact of local and global developments on the microidentities within the Palestinian-Jordanian community and the significance of religion in the context of sustaining the Pales tinian heritage for future generations residing in the diaspora. V-^hristian communities have long flourished in the area that is now the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, notably in and around the provincial towns of Karak, Madaba, and Salt as well as 'Amman. Jordan's history as a transit country has provided a rich and varied tapestry of cultures and faiths, the most notable being the majority mixed-faith Palestinian community that is estimated to comprise 60% of the Kingdom's population. The peaceful melange of faiths is illustriously exhibited in the capital by the numerous spires that stretch alongside minarets towards the skies of 'Amman. A closer look at the Palestinian and Jordanian communities of Jordan reveals a plethora of origins and influ ences, each rich in culture, heritage, and identity. Yet at the same time, the two groups differ in terms of their ethnic origins, as the Transjordanians descend from the nomadic tribes of Syria, the Hejaz, and the Nejd, in contrast to the Palestinians, who comprise a history shaped by the Canaanites, Hebrews, Syrians, Romans, Byzantines, and Greeks.1 In addition to the Jordanian and Palestinian-Jordanian communities, Jordan is home to a plethora of non-Arab minorities, with the Circassians and Chechens being the most numerous of these. The Christians of Jordan and Palestine deserve more than a passing nod, as they transcend the boundaries of ethnic, religious, and national identity within Jordanian soci ety. Accordingly, through the course of this article aspects of the contemporary Palestin ian Christian identity shall be explored in the context of the Palestinian community in Jordan, commencing with an overview of Christianity in the region and the post-1948 migration of the Palestinian Christian community to the Kingdom. While Jordan has long sustained a Christian community, the arrival of the Palestinians facilitated the rise of a new identity that continues to compliment the existing Jordanian Christian identity ? that of the Palestinian and Palestinian-Jordanian Christian identity. Multifarious and

Stimulated by the theme of the 2008 International Association for Mission Studies' general conference on “Human Identity and the Gospel of Reconciliation”, the article first screens the respective biblical terminology and texts and then ponders general theological considerations of the topic. In a third part, missiological implications that arise are shown and conclusions drawn for an appropriate contemporary missionary attitude. Reconciliation and identity are oftentimes mutually exclusive since the quest for national and cultural identity has the potential to turn into violent clashes. However, the new identity in Christ taken on in baptism and faith implies the realization by people of their reconciliation with God by God and, by this, with everyone else. The implications of this new identity challenge established perceptions of justice and call everyone to live accordingly. Since Christian faith will only be known when it is shared, mission today has to be lived advocacy for the spirit of God as embodied in Jesus Christ and carried out in a truly kenotic attitude that is also prepared to endure marginality and vulnerability as expressions of its eschatological nature.

Editors' Introduction Arthur Versluis and Ann Larabee This issue of JSR introduces a new theme that informs not only these articles, but also many future articles: oppositional cultures. By "oppositional cultures," we refer to radical political and social movements that oppose aspects of mainstream society, to be sure, but that also begin to envision new forms of culture. The groups in this and in our next issue do not, at least on the surface, seem to have much in common, yet a closer look suggests underlying commonalities. Underlying many of these groups, across the political spectrum, is the expectation that if the right conditions were fulfilled, one might then see the more or less spontaneous awakening of a radically new form of culture. We begin this issue with Joanna Taylor's and Martha Lee's article on the Christian Exodus movement and its exponents' millenarian ideas regarding a proposed evangelical Christian transformation of South Carolina, Idaho, and eventually, the United States as a whole. The underlying engine of this envisioned radical transformation of state and federal government is Christian millenarianism and, in particular, the idea that it is possible to imagine an antisecular future for the United States in which particular evangelical social values—anti-abortion, anti–gay rights, and so forth—can be imposed on the rest of society. Various kinds of Christian millenarianism also underlie the subjects of our second article, Steven Woodbridge's study of the British National Party, and of our third article, Julius Bailey's study of media coverage of the Christian [End Page vii] Identity movement. Woodbridge discusses the complex relationships of the British National Party (BNP) with Christianity, since some members identify with a "purer" form of Christianity, while others have historically been quite critical of mainstream forms of Christianity in England. Part of the oppositional culture of the BNP turns on anti-Islamification themes and, therefore, also on questions of personal and national identity. Similar themes are inherent in the Christian Identity movement analyzed by Julius Bailey, but whereas Woodbridge generally accepts prevailing media narratives about the BNP, Bailey calls into question mainstream media narratives about Christian Identity and raises some interesting issues about what a label like "hate group" really means. All three of these articles—though they approach their topics from rather different angles—turn on questions of how white subgroups constitute themselves as oppositional movements, and on how they seek to enact an oppositional culture to replace what they see as a decadent mainstream social narrative. In these cases, the millenarian narrative underpins the hopes of social reconstruction, as adherents imagine a future in which their social vision is enacted so that it not only arrests but also transforms the existing society into one that imposes their perspective on the whole. Not surprisingly, of course, a somewhat similar engine underlies the emergence of the Weather Underground movement out of SDS and the New Left, and informs a particularly quixotic episode in American leftist radical history: the plot (or "plot") to kidnap Henry Kissinger proposed by a Pakistani scholar, Eqbal Ahmad, in 1970 over dinner at a Connecticut farmhouse. Th is episode resulted in the trial of the Harrisburg Eight, and in "Kissinger's Kidnapper," Justin Jackson not only outlines and analyzes the original episode, but also provides a larger sociopolitical and intellectual context for it. In effect, the plot or "plot" to kidnap Kissinger reflects revolutionary aspirations that one also sees in the Weather Underground movement. For Ahmad, with personal experience of Th ird World revolutionary movements, an important revolutionary strategy was to set up popular organizations and institutions that countered and delegitimized the state. The formation of these parallel social and political practices was much more important than any acts of political violence. Our final article in this issue, by Greg Seltzer, focuses on the Situationist International and the phenomenon of Situationism during the late 1960s [End Page viii] and early 1970s, a very different kind of oppositional culture. Whereas the Weather Underground and related revolutionary movements sought to bring down the existing social and political order, the Situationists sought to transform it artistically: for them, art and politics were combined. Effectively, Situationism proposed that, through radical art...

The article analyzes the strategy of the Russian Orthodox Church for the revival of national, state and church identity in Russia. The peculiarities of the church interpretation of the concept of identity and the risks of loss of national identity are revealed from the standpoint of the Church. The author concludes that in the socio-political discourse of the Orthodox Church the concept of identity is presented as a cultural and social marker and is comprehended in the paradigm of conformity with established standards and behavioral responses. Spiritual identity is seen in Orthodoxy through an appeal to the religious tradition and is correlated with the moral imperative formed in the past and with the social and legal code. The Church considers the Orthodox self-identification of citizens and its participation in sociocultural transformations of Russia to be important factors of state identity. In declarations on the topic of Christian identity, the leaders of the Church rely on the idea of Russian religious philosophy about the genetic connection of Orthodoxy with national consciousness. The tendency of Orthodox participation in the public examination of secular cultural events, in teaching schoolchildren (“General Professional Competences’ in the course of ‘The Basics of Religious Cultures and Secular Ethics”) and in the scientific activity of higher educational institutions (the inclusion of “theology” in the list of scientific disciplines of the Higher Certifying Commission) is developing. Public support for the interaction of the Church with state institutions of culture and education is regarded by the author as a factor of acquiring institutional features of identity by Orthodoxy. The active participation of the Church in the public discussion on the relationship between Russia and European countries is motivated by the desire to develop international cooperation, which is hampered by the value contradictions that the “secularized” West is offered to overcome by returning to a Christian identity. The scientific intelligentsia reacts inconsistently to the church formulation of the national identity as Russian identity. The implantation of Russian identity to the detriment of Russia causes ideological conflict.

Ethnic identities have been problematic for the construction of local churches since New Testament times. Transnationalism adds a layer of complexity to this circumstance, as migrants hold multiple identities and retain strong ties to places of origin. An examination of the history of anthropology’s study of ethnicity reveals ethnicity’s constructed nature, along with its tendency to demand loyalty as to a family. Given people’s very real need for a place of ultimate belonging, churches have sometimes too easily resolved the tension between Christian identity and ethnic identities by segregating themselves. New Testament churches were assemblies associated with place, not ethnicity, bringing together diverse peoples and requiring them to submit to Christ, as to the head of a household. There is evidence that contemporary attempts to form multi-cultural churches out of a liberal political agenda ironically become enmeshed in power struggles. But those that recognize the centrality of the gospel succeed due to the adoption of a central authority, Christ himself, who relativizes all ethnic and national identities in favor of a common purpose, the spread of the gospel to others who have not heard it.

Polish national identity has long been caught up with questions of Christianity and Catholicism, with some scholars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries arguing that a turn to Christianity in the tenth century was a turn away from a more glorious non- Christian identity and that ties with Catholicism rather than Orthodoxy was a betrayal of a Slavic heritage. The question of whether Catholicism has helped or hindered Poland is much debated and Polish history is read through the lens of this controversy, which itself is a product of Polish history in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, that has tended to downplay the significance of religion in political and social life and sought to understand Polish relationships with Germans and Russians. Appreciating this means that the question about when Poland became Christian admits of no straightforward answer.

This chapter studies the growth and the change of the Eglise Anglicane du Congo (EAC) as a result of the migration of its members to urban areas in North-east Congo. It scrutinises the way in which the rural Anglican identity was both affirmed and contested in the urban milieu. The chapter analyses how the EAC enabled its members to take advantage of migrant opportunities whilst maintaining continuity with their tradition. It also examines in what ways the position they took began to be contested by their children. Second generation migrants criticised their parents? conservative religious ethos, desiring a Christian identity that reflected their national and urban identity. The chapter analyses the general patterns of rural-urban migration in the area demonstrating where Anglican aspirations intersected with urban ambitions. Finally, it argues that the urban EAC of the 1970s consciously attempted to replicate the escarpment church.Keywords: Christian identity; Eglise Anglicane du Congo (EAC); escarpment church; rural Anglican identity; rural-urban migration

The study is devoted to the analysis of the geopolitical doctrine of the ROC, related in particular to its participation in the political redistribution of the world. The ideological basis for interfering in the internal affairs of independent states is the concept of canonical territory. The object of the study is the ROC as a structural part and organic component of the Kremlin regime, and the subject — its political activities, aimed, in particular, at violating the national interests of Ukraine. The purpose of this study is the problem of the origin and essence of this neologism, filling it with semantic content and use as an ideological narrative in the hybrid war of Russia against Ukraine. The ecclesiastical-legal, historical, ideological and political explication of its content as an integral part of the doctrine of the «Russian world» has been carried out. The foreign policy of the ROC is based on the expansionist ideologies of the «Russian world», aimed at establishing its own hegemony on potential objects of influence, of which Ukraine has traditionally emerged as the main direction of its influence. In the historical dimension, the formation and growth of the network of ROC structures on its territory took place by illegal means, both from the ecclesiastical and political point of view. The liquidation of Ukrainian statehood was accompanied by the simultaneous capture and leveling of its Christian identity: canonical affiliation, church infrastructure, national and cultural identity. In the conditions of the development of independent Ukraine, it became natural for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to acquire the status of a local autocephalous church, which corresponds to the current ecclesiastical and international law, its national interests. As a political trend, the notion of canonical territory was introduced by the ROC in 1989 as a means of preserving its own imperial ambitions. There was a targeted transformation of the idiom «territory of the state for the canonical church» into the ideology «state as the canonical territory of the church», which serves as a basis for the ROC to interfere in the internal affairs of international law. In modern conditions, the ROC is a direct participant in Russia’s hybrid war against Ukraine. The dimensions of such participation are various: organizational (formation and support of terrorist organizations), repressive (prohibition of religious freedoms in the occupied territories), property (raider seizure and seizure of church property and territories), psychological (creating an atmosphere of fear and social tension), etc. The focus of the illegal policy of the ROC is its systematic attempts to discredit and oppose the activities of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine as an expression of the spiritual interests of the Ukrainian people. This allows the final conclusions about a number of threats to public harmony and national security of Ukraine, induced by the activities of ROC structures in our country.

The German churches had for centuries seen themselves as the moral guardians of the state and the defenders of Germany’s national and Christian identity. The already over-developed German habit of social control could readily enough be applied to any church member believed to be in any way lacking in loyalty to the regime or its policies. Both historically and theologically the German churches were conditioned to regard themselves as upholders of the established order. The German churches did not possess the kinds of theology adequate to sustain any critical attack on the actions of their political rulers. The church leaders’ triumphalist proclamation of God’s support for Germany’s imperialist aggression in 1914, their enthusiastic promises of imminent and divinely-blest victory, and their subsequent legitimation of the ruthless slaughter of the trenches were now proved to be words of hollow hypocrisy. The dominant school of German Protestant liberal theologians collapsed in the shock of war and unparalleled destruction.

The article analyzes the criminal character of the Russian Orthodox Church as an apologist for Russian imperial aggression. The concept of canonical territory is the ideological basis for the intervention of the Russian Orthodox Church in the internal affairs of independent states. Historically, the creation and growth of the network of the Russian Orthodox Church structures on its territory took place by illegal means, and the concept of canonical territory as a political trend was introduced in 1989 as a means of maintaining its own dominance in the post-Soviet states. The concept of “canonical territory” in the interpretation of the Russian Orthodox Church is a political-ideological construct of neo-colonial, imperial, and revanchist content, intended to identify the part of the world planned to be taken under target control by specific means of influence. There was a targeted transformation of the classical idiom “the territory of the state for the canonical church” into the imperial ideology of “the state as the canonical territory of the church,” which serves as a basis for the Russian Orthodox Church interfering in the internal affairs of subjects of international law. The foreign policy activity of the Russian Orthodox Church is based on the expansionist ideology of the “Russian world,” aimed at establishing its own hegemony over potential objects of influence, of which Ukraine traditionally appears as the main direction for imperial expansion. The liquidation of Ukrainian statehood was accompanied at the same time by the capture and leveling of its Christian identity: canonical affiliation, church infrastructure, and national and cultural identity. As an independent Ukraine developed, it was natural that the Ukrainian Orthodox Church acquired the status of a local autocephalous church, corresponding to the current church, international law, and its national interests. Under present conditions, the Russian Orthodox Church is a direct participant in the Russian-Ukrainian full-scale war, and the levels of such participation are diverse: organizational (the blessing of criminal activity and support of the Russian occupation forces and various terrorist organizations), repressive (banning religious freedoms in the occupied territories), material (raiding, seizing, and appropriating church property and territories), and psychological (creating an atmosphere of fear and social tension).

Christianity used to be an alien affair in China, both culturally and politically. Since the Boxer Movement in 1900, Chinese Christians began to reflect on their own national identity. The Anti-Christian Movement in the 1920s accelerated this process, with the indigenisation movement as a key programme. It was due to the Three-Self Patriotic Movement in the 1950s that Chinese Christians finally became part of the Chinese People. This achievement was consolidated with the accommodation and reform in the 1980s: the greatest change in Christianity in twentieth-century China. In the global context, Chinese Christians not only need consider how to adapt to Chinese culture and society, but also how they will contribute to the world Christian movement.

This paper is about the reconstruction of three historical buildings in Novi Sad at the beginning of the twentieth century. The town was founded by the Orthodox people, mostly Serbs, who fled from the Ottoman-ruled Balkans to the Habsburg territories in 1690 and throughout the eighteenth century. After gaining national and religious autonomy, the Serbian people raised a cathedral church dedicated to Saint George in the center of Novi Sad. A Bishop’s Palace was built next to the church, as well as the first elementary school, which later became The First Orthodox Gymnasium. These three buildings represented a core of the Orthodox part of the city, and since the Church dignitaries were the main representatives of the Orthodox people before the Emperor and other state authorities, Novi Sad soon became the religious, political, cultural, and educational nucleus of the Serbian people in this Catholic country. It was called Serbian Athens. After the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, the new Hungarian government began a process of Hungarization—a forced assimilation of non-Hungarian people—in order to preserve the unity of the Hungarian nation and territory. The authorities ordered the demolition of the Serbian Gymnasium in Novi Sad because the building was old, which Serbian people viewed as an attack on their religion, national identity, culture, and education. As the Cathedral church building was also old, the Serbs decided to rebuild these two important buildings, and to build a new, magnificent Bishop’s Palace. Since these three buildings were among the most important buildings for Serbian people in Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, their representative rebuilding was a matter of freedom, reputation, and honor. The great importance that reflected in these buildings led to their representative architectural appearance influenced by official political ideology. This paper explains why the Church administration intentionally invited two famous architects, Vladimir Nikolić and Herman Bolle, already proven in designing in Neoclassical and Neo-Byzantine styles. The façade of a building designed in Neo-Byzantine style had to have the recognizable elements of medieval Serbian churches, since it was believed the Middle Ages were the Golden age of the Serbian nation. National and religious identity was also expressed in icons, wall paintings, and stained-glass windows inside the temple. The national significance of the architectural and the artistic ensemble is recognized by the Ministry of Culture and Information of the Republic of Serbia, which is now financing the research and the digitization of its treasures, through the project The artistic and archive treasure of Cathedral of Saint George in Novi Sad (kultura.rs).KeywordsNovi SadSaint George’s CathedralBishop’s PalaceGymnasiumOrthodox churchSerbian identityHistorical architectureSerbian saintsHistory paintingsNeo-Byzantine architectureNeoclassical architecture