The Strategic Imagination: Chess as a Political and Cultural Analytic

Films are popularly believed to be reflection of reality as well as a representation of the societies in which they were produced. They are excellent windows into their societies of origin and could thus serve as good anthropological or historical documents containing data about socio-political events that have happened in their societies of origin. One of the multiple data one can extract/gather from films is the socio-cultural and political dynamics prevailing in the society in which the films subsist. This paper attempts to illustrate this thesis through a review of relevant Bollywood and Nollywood films. Specifically, the study hinges on a review of relevant selected films to show how Bollywood and Nollywood are a reflection of cultural and political dynamics in India and Nigeria respectively. The paper starts with a brief background which examines the extent to which Nollywood and Bollywood films could be considered a reflection of contemporary Nigeria and India. It proceeds to defining the concept of cultural and political dynamics, with strict respect to the Indian and Nigerian experiences. The paper ends up with an examination of how these cultural and political dynamics are reflected in relevant Bollywood and Nollywood films. It concludes that both Nigerian and Bollywood films reflect social and political dynamics in their societies of origin in the same way.

Writing Self, Writing Empire: Chandar Bhan Brahman and the Cultural World of the Indo-Persian State Secretary

Clinical training in the vast majority of graduate programs in psychology fails to educate future therapists into perspectives that integrate personality theory with political and social theory. Instead, the emphases are on imparting highly specialized knowledge of personality dynamics and on techniques of psychological assessment and therapy. This narrowness of training means that, as a rule, clinicians rarely examine the historical, cultural, and political factors and dynamics that influence decisively people's identities and experiences of the social world around them. These factors and dynamics may create systemic illnesses that appear in the psyches of people; indeed, these same factors and dynamics may lead clinicians into holding unexamined assumptions about the nature and goals of therapy. In short, there are global, macroscopic events and processes that constitute the world in which therapeutic activity takes place; the significance of these should be perceived and fathomed by the psychologist, at least if he is to develop realistic and sound expectations about his role as a therapist, and if he wishes to have a broad and rich understanding of the connections that hold between social processes and the genesis of individual pathologies. The modern psychologist is usually an uneducated person, if by we mean an individual who has some knowledge of philosophy, sociology, political theory, and literature and cultural history. Indeed, a psychologist ought not to be called educated unless he manifests a drive to gain insight into the significant relationships that hold between social and political arrangements, cultural dynamics, and dilemmas that people experience in common. The psychologist of worth should, in addition, seek to appreciate the nature of the historical and intellectual traditions of his society, ones that may inform his guiding assumptions about the categories of health and illness. In short, a therapist is never value-free in his practice of healing psychic derangements, and he, as much as the next person, is shaped in his outlook by the course of social and political history. If this is so, then it follows that meaningful inquiry into the psyche should not be separated from studies of history and culture, and politics and philosophy. Evidently these areas have been separated artificially, with the result that each has developed its own distinctive language, priorities for research, presuppositions about the best methods of inquiry, and high levels of specialization. We have the unfortunate consequence that meaningful dialogue between fields is quite difficult. However, just as it is quite misleading to study a single leaf without having knowledge of the characteristics of the whole tree to which it belongs, so it is ultimately fruitless to examine the psyche apart from the historical, cultural, social, and political conditions in which it is nurtured. In short, a psychologist who truly deserves that title ought to be educated to hold broad and thoughtful interdisciplinary perspectives, and the trend toward value neutrality in the study of man is a misguided fashion that shirks the real task of creating a humanly meaningful form of scientific activity.

Madrasah is an Islamic educational institution, facing significant challenges in the era of global competition. The political dynamics that accompany the development of madrassas require a comprehensive study to understand the complexity of this institutional transformation process. This research aims to analyze the challenges and opportunities faced by madrasas in a global context, as well as explore effective development strategies. This study uses a qualitative approach to examine political dynamics in madrasah development and explore the challenges and opportunities it faces in global competition. The results of the study show that madrasas face the main challenges in quality standardization, curriculum relevance, competence of educators, and strengthening infrastructure. However, the global era also opens up opportunities for madrasas to integrate science with Islamic values, develop soft skills, and carry out international collaboration. Political dynamics in the development of madrassas involve complex negotiations between the demands of modernization and the preservation of Islamic identity. In conclusion, the development of madrassas in the face of global competition requires a holistic approach that considers political, social, and cultural dynamics. The success of madrasah transformation depends on the ability of stakeholders to manage challenges and strategically capitalize on opportunities. Madrasah has the unique potential to become an educational model that combines Islamic values with global competence, but its realization requires a clear vision and close collaboration between various parties.

Although we no longer live in an era of strong ideologies, we currently observe a host of local ideologies: on all kinds of subjects people believe in false, fragile and sometimes socially and politically dangerous ideas. Should they, however, be considered as a normal ingredient of political life? How are they to be explained? False beliefs have always been an important topic in the human sciences. Three main types of classical theories can be identified on this subject. Herbert Simon is known for having created a ‘satisficing’ theory of decision, where he proposed to substitute ‘satisficing’ or, as we would rather say, satisfying, for optimizing. It is argued here that the local ideologies that permeate political life as well as the false and fragile beliefs that permeate ordinary life should be analyzed along the same lines. The theory explains the ‘biases’ discovered by cognitive psychologists, it solves the difficult problem of explaining magical beliefs; it explains the many strange collective beliefs that we currently observe in our societies; it explains ideological beliefs.

The Sung Home: Narrative, Morality, and the Kurdish Nation

As Barry Hallen observes, Kwasi Wiredu needs no introduction to many philosophers. A Ghanaian Akan, a graduate of Oxford, and the author of more than a hundred essays, Wiredu is one of the most prominent philosophers to consider cross-cultural issues relevant to Africa as well as to the West. Hallen himself needs little introduction. As long ago as 1991, he was described by Odera Oruka as, among other things, a leader in the school of African philosophy that uses anthropological research to advance philosophical points (see Oruka 1996, 183). For “many years,” Hallen has known Wiredu as both “colleague and friend” (p. 21).Hallen’s overview provides a comprehensive and synoptic picture of individual arguments within Wiredu’s general approach to philosophy, which Wiredu calls genetic and describes as inspired by the work of John Dewey. As Hallen notes: “According to Wiredu, a genetic approach aims to identify the origins of foundational components of human understanding” (p. 21). I focus on three topics: (a) Quine’s famous observation that to be is to be the value of a bound variable, (b) consensus, and (c) sympathetic impartiality.1Much of Wiredu’s work considered by Hallen concerns Quine’s use of symbolic logic to conclude that existence claims are always theory-dependent. The discussion is complex and nuanced.Quine is commonly understood as using logic to conclude that the statements of a theory expressed in a natural language treat certain indi-viduals and classes as existing in reality. For his part, Wiredu certainly insists on the strictly formal nature of logic, analyzing the relationships between the terms in a statement. He seems to think that, in some cases, logic should not be used to support existence claims about what is treated as real by the statements of a natural language. The reason is that statements expressed in English sometimes refer to the existence of things that cannot be referred to in Twi, the language of Akans.Wiredu develops this point most thoroughly with respect to the mind-body problem when minds are viewed as nonspatial substances in the manner of Cartesian dualism. He thinks that this type of problem is “tongue-dependent” (p. 31). It obviously arises in such Western languages as French and English. But it does not arise in Twi. On the one hand: “The concept of ‘mind’ implicit here [Twi] is of mind as a function [‘the function of thought’] rather than an entity’” (p. 31). Specifically, minds are not understood as entities in space.2 On the other hand: “There is no way of pretending in that medium [Twi] to be speaking of the existence of something which is not in space” (p. 56). That is, Twi speakers are monistic regarding space. In contrast with Descartes, according to Wiredu, Twi speakers think everything that exists does so in the space of material objects, including thought.Wiredu advances two more examples of a philosophical problem as being language dependent. First: “The metaphysical distinction between a thing and its properties cannot be expressed in Akan [Twi] without unconcealed absurdities” (p. 30). This holds when things but not properties are viewed as existing in space. Second: “The correspondence theory does not make sense . . . in Twi language usage” (p. 57). According to this theory, statements are true when they correspond to the appropriate facts about the world. This requires the existence of a “realm of facts as an ontological order distinct from the realm of statements and entities such as trees and houses” (p. 56). In Twi, however, “a statement and the fact that can make that statement true or false . . . are not expressed by different words” (p. 57). Consequently: “Trying to express the point of correspondence theory in Akan [Twi] is a tautology” (p. 58). “From [this] it follows that some philosophical problems are not universal” (p. 59).Hallen mentions that J. T. Bedu-Addo offers an analysis of Twi somewhat different from Wiredu’s (p. 66). We can observe this points to the fact that Wiredu’s language-based arguments would be strengthened if supported by research in linguistics journals. In the meantime, the arguments invite further discussion regarding what seems revealed when Twi-speaking philosophy students learn to discuss in English the three problems referenced above.Another cross-cultural matter that invites discussion is the expansive view Wiredu takes of what he calls consensual governance. He first uses this term substantively to criticize Kwame Ninsin’s view that, rather than being independent citizens, traditional Africans were subjects of a leader with a divine right to lead (Ninsin 2012, 1118).3 In contrast, Wiredu thinks that “decision-making in traditional African life and governance was, as a rule, by consensus” (p. 85). In other words, decision-making was conducted by independent citizens without benefit of sacral authority. The most reasonable way to resolve this debate is to agree that both Wiredu and Ninsin are correct in their own ways.Wiredu is right that, prior to a governing decision’s being declared in traditional African societies, all parties were invited to debate whatever alternatives were at issue: “Substantive dialogue between divergent individuals in a family or parties in a community enables everyone who is contending ‘to feel that adequate account has been taken of their points of view’ and serves to promote ‘a willing suspension of disagreement, making possible agreed actions without necessarily agreed notions’” (p. 86). Once consensus was reached traditionally, however, Ninsin is right that it was authorized by a leader as “representative of the gods as well as the ancestors” (Ninsin 2012, 1118) and, thereby, granted extraordinary force. Busia makes this point about the Ashanti of Ghana in particular, in which case a traditional chief was viewed as sacral by virtue of being “successor of the ancestors” (Busia 1951, 36): “The most important aspect of Ashanti chieftaincy was undoubtedly the religious one. An Ashanti chief filled a sacral role. . . . His highest role was when he officiated in public religious rites which gave expression to the community values. . . . This sacral aspect of the chief’s role was a powerful sanction of his authority” (Busia 1967, 20).4This said, the more important point for Wiredu is that there are three reasons why governance within liberal democracy inhibits the consensual approach to compromise just described. First, liberal democracy involves organizations—political parties—that often “become identified with specific ethnic groups” (p. 88) in multiethnic African nations where competition at the national level is often based on ethnicity. Second, citizens in a liberal democracy participate politically in “elections, which happen very occasionally”: “But those are the only occasions when citizens can exercise what is referred to as their vote” (p. 87). Third, liberal democracies use “majority rule” to decide “‘winner take all’ . . . [contests among parties] for overall control of government. . . . [This] attitude implicitly tends to disenfranchise minorities from playing a significant role in the governing process” (pp. 88–89).Instead, Wiredu prefers governance within what he calls consensual democracy: “In a consensual democracy, there will be no political parties. This means candidates will not run for office on the basis of their party affiliations. As individuals, they will run for office on the basis of their qualifications for office. . . . [W]ithout the constraints of membership in parties relentlessly dedicated to wresting power or retaining it, representatives will be more likely to be actuated by the objective merits of given proposals” (p. 86). As in liberal democracies, governance in consensual democracies will involve a hierarchy of representative officeholders. In consensual democracies only, however, “the voluntary acquiescence of the minority with respect to a given issue would normally be necessary for the adoption of a decision” (p. 91).Basing political decisions on a proposal’s objective merits is obviously desirable. Political contests that avoid winner-take-all results might well be desirable. But Hallen is right to question whether consensual democracy would diminish the negative effects of group-based chauvinism more than liberal democracy does: “Even in the absence of political parties, why should it be presumed that consensual governance would not face the same chauvinism problem that has troubled African liberal democracies?” (p. 91).Wiredu’s discussion of consensual governance is most cross-culturally relevant regarding the requirement within consensual democracy that political decisions must involve the voluntary acquiescence of a minority. This requirement provides any minority with a veto power that is able to produce gridlock when it comes to group decisions at the national level. This sort of thing actually occurred at the founding of the United States when the question arose of each state’s responsibility for national revenue under the Articles of Confederation. Because of the emergency created by the Revolution, each colony did contribute its share to national revenue even though this was voluntary under the articles. After the war was won and the emergency eliminated, however, many of the new states failed to continue doing so. Rectifying the matter was a major reason for the founders adopting a new constitution replacing the old articles.Granted, America’s constitutional founders explicitly hoped their own replacement would not lead to political parties. But it did—because parties are politically stronger than even brilliant and idealistic individuals when they lobby as individuals; and because political decisions are typically based on strength. Wiredu needs to explain why he thinks modern Africans would be willing to use something other than strength when making political decisions. Strength, of course, can be based on the persuasive power of rational as well as groupism factors.Wiredu is most cross-culturally relevant when it comes to what he calls sympathetic impartiality. Much of that work focuses first on Akan ethics and morality: “Akan ethics . . . defines morality purely in terms of human interests. . . . Morality, strictly conceived . . . concerns the harmonization of the interests of the individual with that of society on the principle of sympathetic impartiality” (Wiredu 1996, 235, 237). As a part of his genetic approach to philosophy, however, Wiredu thinks sympathetic impartiality is also “a universal principle that all human beings must live by if any community or society is to survive”: “Such values as truthfulness, honesty, justice, and chastity are simply aspects of sympathetic impartiality” (pp. 75–76).5Concerning interactions among just a few individuals, Wiredu emphasizes that the element of sympathy includes “goodwill . . . that goes beyond mere duty” (p. 73). He compares this to the Golden Rule: “Let your conduct at all times manifest a due concern for the interests of others. . . . A person may be said to manifest due concern for the interests of others if in contemplating the impact of her actions on their interests, she puts herself imaginatively in their position, and having done so, is able to welcome that impact” (p. 76). Thus, for example, one might sympathetically forgive a loan that, through no fault of her own, a debtor simply cannot repay. Presumably, one’s sympathy in such a situation would extend to friends and family more than to strangers. In any case, sympathy here could be understood as just and as compatible with impartiality because the lender has endorsed this exception to the impartiality of a loan’s obligation, something that the lender has a right to do.Concerning justice, however, sympathy applies to all members of a society and needs further explication with respect to the laws that organize those members. How might sympathy affect these laws? Wiredu does not address this question directly. However, sympathy in a just society’s laws can be easily and reasonably explicated by Rawls’s difference principle (see Rawls 1971, 65ff.). That is, inequalities should serve the interests of the members of a society who are the least advantaged. Likewise, the impartiality of a just society’s laws might be well explicated by the veil of ignorance in Rawls’s original position. That is, laws should be adopted by people without knowledge of those individuals who will benefit most or least from the available options. These two possibilities suggest further discussion comparing and contrasting Akan and Western views of ethics and morality.Wiredu has done this himself in a number of publications (see Wiredu 1980, 1995, 1996). A recurring theme is one of contrast regarding what he calls supernaturalism. This denotes the view of colonizing missionaries that the Supreme Being has revealed certain norms to be universally binding on all people, marriage as monogamous in particular. According to Wiredu, for traditional Akans, the only norms that actually receive governing support from any “extra-human being or force” are certain local customs that bind only themselves (Wiredu 1995, 404).6 By virtue of this universal/local difference in scope, Wiredu thinks traditional Akans tended to resist the supernaturalistic justification employed by colonizing missionaries to condemn the traditional practice of polygamous marriage.Wiredu also thinks the view of various norms as universal by virtue of being supernaturally supported leads to a sense of personal infallibility. He thinks this sense sometimes extends to a person’s own normative beliefs, even those not viewed as revealed by the Supreme Being. This is true, for example, of beliefs regarding Western-style political bureaucracies:7 “In that case it becomes quite possible for policies which lead manifestly to human suffering to be advocated or pursued with a sense of piety and rectitude” (Wiredu 1980, 5).It is easy to consider Wiredu’s examples of truthfulness, honesty, and justice as being norms that are both impartial and necessary for a society’s existence. However, none are as obviously sympathetic as they are obviously impartial. The reason is that they serve not just the interests of a society’s least-advantaged members but also those of its most advantaged. The social norms that can, indeed, be obviously sympathetic are those Wiredu calls customs, which are rules of convenience and contingent preferences that have been adopted by and for “human groups in particular places” (Wiredu 1996, 237–38). An example is progressive taxation in the United States whereby, in 2017, half the country’s income earners paid 96.89 percent of federal income taxes.8What is more interesting is that it is much easier to understand sympathy as combined with impartiality while adopting social norms as laws than while judging violations of them when this involves more than just a few friends. Sympathy while judging a case of official lying, for example, could create an exception to the law requiring truthfulness in official matters. That would be incompatible with the law’s being impartial and would therefore seem unjust. This was true, for example, of President George H. W. Bush’s pardoning the Iran-Contra conspirators for their perjury.9 Even if we do want to allow some exceptions to truthfulness as required in official matters, impartiality requires another law that legitimizes these exceptions. Ideally, such a backup law would exclude egregious cases such as Bush’s that, according to Judge Lawrence Walsh, protected Bush’s own “disturbing pattern of deception and obstruction,” something Bush really did not have a right to do: “It demonstrates that powerful people with powerful allies can commit serious crimes in high office—deliberately abusing the public trust—without consequence” (Walsh 1992).In any case, the combination of sympathy with impartiality is more easily understood while adopting a social law—via the difference principle and the veil of ignorance, for example—than while judging violations of it.Whenever social norms are considered, it is important to appreciate that different people actually do and will almost certainly continue to value the balance between impartiality and sympathy differently. George Lakoff is one of the more prominent researchers to observe that “in the right’s hierarchy . . . the top value is preserving and defending the moral system itself”: “On the left, the highest value is helping individuals who need help” (2004, 28).10 Exceptions exist, of course, as when the right-winger Bush valued sympathy toward Weinberger and the other Iran-Contra criminals more than the legal system he had promised to defend and they had violated. Despite this lack of universality regarding the balance between impartially defending one’s legal system and sympathy for individuals who need help under it, most members of liberal democracies in the West have flourished relatively well.In short, Wiredu’s idea that sympathetic impartiality is universally necessary for social existence invites further discussion.Wiredu thinks one important contribution he makes to academic philosophy overall is the elaboration and application of a genetic methodology. Hallen therefore stresses that Wiredu regards his approach to philosophical issues as more than just an analysis of concepts. Nonetheless, Wiredu’s contributions to the analysis of concepts are formidable. His cross-cultural background allows him to undertake analyses of philosophical concepts that are strikingly original. They provide some of the best available ideas for consideration by philosophers interested in Africa as well as the West. Hallen’s overview provides a clear and most helpful way of grasping these ideas.

The involvement of kiyai in political life can be seen from various sides, both in religion and politics itself. From the religious side, the involvement of religion leaders in political dynamics could be seen to strengthen religious life because of political support. Meanwhile, from the political side it could also be seen to provide a positive point for political life because of the content of religiosity and morality. However, the involvement of the kyai in political dynamics is seen to have reduced his central position as a reference for religious behavior and sources of knowledge for all groups without barriers, while political traditions often divide. The relationship between politics and religion often makes religious instruments become a part that frames or become a political packaging, both the person, the institution and the activities including the activities of dakwah. Through observation and in-depth interviews, it was found that the use of religious spaces and dakwah patterns were still regarded significant in socializing and building awareness including political choices. Even though there is political narratives in the activities of dakwah, it does not undermine the marwah and glory of the dakwah itself. Political content and narratives in the religious space is only as distractions in affirming their choices, it is not found any elements of manipulation or politicization which distort the religious itself. This happened along with social control through communication technology. In addition, people are more intelligent and critical, as well as there are variety of references that made people have many choices in determining their attitudes including political choices.

Where is the theory? Evaluating the theoretical frameworks described in decision support technologies

Reviewed by: Kentucky's Joseph C. S. Blackburn: Soldier, Statesman, and a Friend of All by Elizabeth Rouse Fielder Stefano Tijerina (bio) Kentucky's Joseph C. S. Blackburn: Soldier, Statesman, and a Friend of All. By Elizabeth Rouse Fielder. (Morley: Acclaim Press, 2018. Pp. vii, 384. $29.95 cloth) Having researched the Joseph Clay Stiles Blackburn papers at the Kentucky Historical Society in search of primary sources that would shed light on his work as Civil Governor of the Panama Canal Zone, it is evident that Elizabeth Rouse Fielder's depiction of the life of Blackburn is idyllic. This does not demerit the fact that in Kentucky's Joseph C. S. Blackburn: Soldier, Statesman and a Friend of All, Fielder is able to effectively describe the dynamics of local politics and culture, and its impact on nation-building, as the United States moved past the Civil War and toward the unification of the national market. Fielder's objective was to describe the trajectory of the political career of Joseph Blackburn, while drawing parallels to the economic development of Kentucky and the consolidation of the nation-state, contributing to the historiography of the Reconstruction era from a southern lens. Blackburn's political life, as described by Fielder, reveals that the vision of nation-building and the realization of "Manifest Destiny" was not only the intellectual product of the North but also of the South. Her book is broken down into six parts. The first part describes the emergence of the Blackburn family in Kentucky, emphasizing their generational trajectory in the economic, political, and cultural spheres. This is followed by a section that gives agency to Blackburn's role in the American Civil War and that served as a means to connect him to the Reconstruction era and its impact on Kentucky's post–Civil War economic development. The third part contains the core of the development of Blackburn's political career, his vision as a Democrat, and his numerous battles, on the debate floor, in defense of a balance between state and federal powers, always placing country first (pp. 258–94). Part four of Fielder's work focuses on his years as Governor of the Panama Canal Zone (1907–1909), connecting Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine with nation-building [End Page 323] overseas, as the power of the United States expanded beyond its borders, threatening the interests of other superpowers of the time. This is followed by parts five and six which depict the concluding years of Blackburn's career, emphasizing the life of the Southern Democrat whose political trajectory was driven by the conviction that the United States was destined to a growing and influential role on the international stage (p. 315). Although lacking clarity, the concluding remarks let the reader know that without the conviction and dedication of Southern Democrats like Blackburn, the nation-state project would have been impossible to achieve. Perhaps Fielder's work will inspire scholars to move past the classical historical analysis, unveiling new local historical narratives that may shed light on the political, economic, cultural, social, and business history that shaped the nation during the first era of globalization. Ultimately, as shown by Fielder, Blackburn was face-to-face with the challenges of nation-building, juggling local interests and national interests, as the United States transformed into a regional power. Fielder's work is lacking in-depth historical analysis and only touches the surface in many instances. Nevertheless, it illustrates why it is important to move beyond the status quo of history, encouraging scholars to return to the archives, dust away old collections, and revise the narrative through new stakeholders that impacted the local, federal, and international trajectories of our nation-building process. Many questions remained unanswered: what were the worldviews of pro-federalists like Blackburn? What were his views on American expansionism? What were his views on Manifest Destiny and the Monroe Doctrine? What role did he see the state of Kentucky play as the first era of globalization unfolded? Perhaps some of these answers would explain why his political rivals back home would repudiate his "inconsistency" when it came to casting a vote in Washington, according to an op-ed piece...

As an organization that has been around for a long time, it cannot be denied that Al-Irsyad continues to experience changes in line with the social, economic and political dynamics that occur in Indonesia. The division peaked in 2007, then splitting the organization into the Al-Irsyad Association and Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah. This phenomenon is interesting, so the aim of this research is to look further at changes in the orientation of Al-Irsyad's Islamic education. This study uses qualitative ethnographic methods. Most of the data was obtained from observations and interviews in the field, which were then supported by secondary data from various sources. Data analysis using the Spradley model includes domain analysis, taxonomic analysis, componential analysis, and model analysis. The results of the study show that the Al-Irsyad Association and Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah institutions in identifying themselves, each institution carries out different strategies as a manifestation of educational orientation based on the interpretation of Mabadi Al-Irsyad. Islamic educational institutions under the auspices of Al-Irsyad Al-Islamiyyah gave rise to schools with a modern-exclusive style, and educational institutions under the aegis of the Al-Irsyad Association had a more puritanical-inclusive kind. The differences in values that are the guidelines or ideologies of each institution are formed over time and social, political, economic and cultural dynamics.

Rather than exploring once again what the concept of power can mean for constructivists, this article analyses what constructivism implies for doing a conceptual analysis; here, of power. It will try to show that besides an analytical assessment (`what does power mean'), a constructivist conceptual analysis includes a study of the performative aspects of concepts (`what does `power' do'?), which, in turn is embedded into a conceptual history or genealogy (how has `power' become to mean and able to do what it does?'). The analysis will show that a neutral or descriptive meaning of power cannot be found, since the meaning of power is always embedded in a theoretical context; hence conceptual and theoretical analysis interact with each other. It will further argue that attributing `power' has the effect of `politicising' issues, moving actions into the scrutiny of a public realm where justifications are needed. Finally, it sketches one hypothetical lineage for understanding the origins of these particular performative effects, which relates developments in German political theory to political realism in International Relations. At the same time, the article is meant to convey a more general point for the relationship between constructivist conceptual analysis and power: by stressing the reflexive relationship between knowledge and social reality, such a conceptual analysis is itself part (but only part!) of a more general constructivist power analysis.

Ibn Khaldun's thoughts, especially those presented in his work Muqaddimah, have made important contributions to understanding the dynamics of society, economy, and politics. This article comprehensively examines Ibn Khaldun's development theory with a historical approach, conceptual analysis, and reflection on the relevance of his thoughts in the modern era. Using literature study and content analysis methods, this study explores central concepts such as asabiyyah, dynasty cycle, economic productivity, and the role of the state in development. The findings show that although issued in the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun's development theory has essential similarities with contemporary development paradigms such as the importance of social capital, fiscal balance, and leadership regeneration. The theoretical implications of this study are expected to enrich the discourse on development based on ethical values ​​and social justice.

Political culture is an established and seemingly inescapable concept, but it has a deeply problematic standing in political science. While it is obvious that the cultural background has an influence on political life—whether it be in a country, a region, or for that matter an institution or a firm—what exactly this background consists of and how it has its influence is inadequately understood, is contested, or is set aside as unimportant. Remedying the poor standing of political culture research requires the construction of theory: theory that explains what political culture is and how it works. Against the view that adequate theoretical foundations already exist, the view that the concept itself resists theory by definition, and the arguments of opponents of political culture research who assume the superiority of their own theoretical frameworks, it is essential to demonstrate both the necessity and the possibility of a more adequate theory of political culture. This is done in the first four chapters of the book. The second half of the book constructs the new theory, reaching into philosophy for some foundational arguments about the nature of culture and into psychology for some parallel findings about human motivation. Culture is analysed into two dimensions, the practical and the discursive. The dualistic ontology of culture is then deployed in the last two chapters in the analysis of the causal dynamics of political culture, theoretically accounting for the inertial and fluid properties which have hitherto simply been juxtaposed.

The goal of this paper is to critically evaluate Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) as a paradigm by utilizing the method for theory framework developed by Pickett et al. (1994). While AEE can contribute in some ways to our understanding of human behavior through methods and techniques derived from neo-Darwinian theory (as well as current approaches in animal behavior and decision theory), AEE as a paradigm remains theoretically ill-equipped for the study of human ecology. This critique will focus on Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology, however, references will be made to Biological Evolutionary Ecology (BEE) since AEE relies heavily on theoretical components derived from BEE. Introduction A critique of Anthropological Evolutionary Ecology (AEE) as a theoretical paradigm should begin with a definition of paradigm. Following Kuhn (1970), the definition reads: a paradigm is the world view, belief systems, series of assumptions, methods, techniques and exemplars for problem solution held in common by a scientific community. The critique here is meant to apply to AEE as a theoretical paradigm in general, often referred to as evolutionary behavioral ecology and to its submodels and subtheories, in particular optimal foraging theory and life history theory. The critique is divided into seven sections, closely paralleling the structure of Figure 1. This scheme depicts the general components of theory and their degrees of development. Basically, as theory develops, it changes in two major ways: 1) through the addition of theoretical components (see rows in Figure 1); and 2) through the refinement of components (see columns in Figure 1). This scheme shows both increase in the number and refinement of components as theory matures. The column headings from left to right represent increasing development of theory, whereas the rows from top to bottom indicate increasing completeness of theory. Box 1 describes the major components of theory that are referred to in the rows of Figure 1. Box 2 describes the stages of maturation depicted in the columns of Figure 1. During the early stages of theory development, the emphasis is on the addition of components. By the consolidating stage of theory development all of the components are in place. Subsequently, refinement of components is emphasized. Thus, as theory develops, it becomes more and more complete, by the addition and refinement of theoretical notions, constructs, derived constructs, and structure. Increasing richness of components is a hallmark of maturing theory. For AEE, notions, assumptions, facts, and hypotheses developed early, with assumptions being the first to be fully developed. But notions are not yet fully explicit, and confirmed generalizations, models, translation modes, domain and the framework are still in the process of being refined. The stages of maturation depicted in the columns of Fig. 1 can be thought of as an idealized developmental sequence. Theory change is actually often chaotic, reflecting a combination of different empirical pursuits and different subtheories, and in the case of AEE, more complex or highly derived components have not yet accompanied simpler ones. Draw-ing on other theories for components has also resulted in transfer problems, where those components have acquired different meanings and interpretations problematic in their new context. Nonetheless, the key idea is that the jobs a theory is able to do depend upon its stage of maturity (Box 2); that is, the richness of its roster of theoretical components and their refinement. As a theory begins to take shape and to be used it often becomes clear that existing components must be replaced or refined. Theory may emerge from pre-theoretic notions by adding components, without showing much refinement. At the consolidating stage basic conceptual components are refined, empirical content is refined and expanded, derived conceptual components are added and refined, and the theoretical framework and structure begin to take shape. …