The Stackelberg game model of cross-border river flood control

Abstract

In face of more and more prominent problems of cross-border river flood disasters, the upstream and downstream need to strengthen cross-border flood disaster management cooperation. The authors set up a Stackelberg game model in the three scenarios of separate management/compensation management/joint governance between upstream and downstream flooding than get the Nash equilibrium under various conditions. An empirical analysis is carried out by taking the cooperative governance among countries in the Lancang–Mekong River Basin (LMRB) as an example. The conclusion shows that when flood control in the upstream region has a greater impact on the downstream region, with the increase of flood control compensation, flood control in the upstream region gradually decreases, while flood control in the downstream region gradually increases. And when the compensation amount is greater than the adverse impact of failure 2.22 times, the flood control of the downstream area will exceed that of the upstream area. When the compensation amount is greater than the adverse impact of failure 0.74 times, the social welfare of the downstream areas under cooperative flood control is greater than the social welfare under the flood control alone.