The Soviet Authorities’ Position toward the “Women’s Question” in North Korea from 1945 to 1949

Ideological Ballast and New Directions in Soviet History David L. Hoffmann (bio) While reading the preceding commentaries, I became aware that the commentators misunderstood the basic purpose of my article. I would like to take this opportunity not to refute their statements or engage in polemics but rather to clarify the article's purpose and suggest a more productive approach to the study of Soviet history. My intention was not to argue whether or not the Soviet system was "socialist." Such an assessment would depend on one's definition of socialism; and as I pointed out, there have been other socialist projects that bore little resemblance to the Soviet system. (I certainly do not believe that, to quote Matthew Lenoe's attempt to paraphrase my argument, "if Stalin calls it socialism, it must be socialism" [725].) The purpose of my article was to re-examine one of the ways that Stalinism has been conceptualized and periodized—namely, that Stalinism (at least from 1934 on, according to Timasheff) marked a conscious ideological retreat by Soviet leaders. I rejected this view and argued that the striking changes in Stalinist culture of the mid-1930s resulted instead from Soviet leaders' proclamation at the 17th Party Congress that they had built socialism and reached a new stage in world history. Scholars may disagree as to whether or not Stalin and his fellow leaders actually believed their ideological proclamations, and it is on this point that the commentators and I differ. Evgeny Dobrenko states that "for the Bolsheviks, and above all for Stalin, ideology was only a tool" (675). Jeffrey Brooks asks skeptically, "did Stalin and his inner circle actually wish 'to transform human nature,' and if so, one may ask from what to what?" (718). Lenoe also doubts "the continued seriousness of the socialist project under Stalin" (726), in particular the Soviet authorities' commitment to the creation of the New Soviet Person. My research in former party archives has convinced me that Soviet leaders indeed took ideology seriously and that they endeavored, albeit unsuccessfully, to create the New Soviet Person—a person whose values and ways of thinking were to be qualitatively different from those who [End Page 731] lived under capitalism, a person free of egotism who was ready to sacrifice personal interests for the sake of the collective. To argue that ideology was more than a tool to Soviet leaders is not to pass judgment on whether the Soviet system was in any ideal sense "socialist." We may demonstrate that Soviet leaders' worldview was informed by Marxist-Leninist ideology; that their categories of class analysis derived from Marxism; and that their policies, from the collectivization of agriculture to the outlawing of free trade and the establishment of a state-run economy, were consciously anti-capitalist and yet still refrain from proclaiming the Soviet system "socialist." Depending on one's definition of socialism, one could just as easily see the Soviet system's inequality as evidence that it was not "socialist." In short, I believe that ideology is crucial to understanding Soviet leaders and their policies, but I do not feel a need to rehash Cold War debates over whether the Soviet system was in fact "socialist." A reconceptualization of Soviet history in the post-Cold War era requires that we move beyond debates that reified socialism. It also requires that we set aside models such as Timasheff's that portray Stalinism as a return to traditional Russian ways. The approach that I have proposed sees the Soviet system as one particular response to the ambitions and challenges of the modern era.1 In countries throughout modern Europe, political leaders and social reformers aspired to solve social problems and rationalize everyday life through the inculcation of new cultural norms. Soviet norms of efficiency, hygiene, sobriety, and literacy all reflected this more general ambition to establish a rationalized and aestheticized social order. Soviet norms regarding reproduction and the family similarly reflected the need of modern states to foster large, healthy populations for industrial labor and mass warfare. Stalinist culture also resembled the culture of other European states in the interwar period in that it incorporated elements of folklore and traditional symbols—not to revive...

Degradation, urbanization, and restoration: A review of the challenges and future of conservation on the Korean Peninsula

Editor's Note

IntroductionFluctuating political relations between North and South Korea made it difficult to sustain, at least in past, any meaningful and lasting economic cooperation between two Koreas. This paper reviews history and scope of economic cooperation between two Koreas, leading to conclusion that economic cooperation between North and South Korea should remain unaffected by political turmoil between two Koreas.Historical Background of Economic CooperationThe first official joint statement between two Koreas was released on July 4, 1972, nearly nineteen years after Korean War ended on July 27, 1953. The SouthNorth Joint Communique states that reunification will take place without reliance on or intervention by foreign nations; it will be achieved by a peaceful means; that the two sides shall take measures to stop propaganda broadcasting against other side, stop military aggression and prevent any military clashes; and that the two sides shall institute various exchanges in economic, social and cultural areas; cooperate in holding inter-Korean Red Cross talks; open a Seoul-Pyongyang hotline; and set up a South-North mediation committee.Regardless of cooperative spirit expressed in 1972 communique, economic cooperation between two Koreas did not take place for many more years because of two related reasons: lack of progress on political front and several provocative actions carried out by North Korea. On October 9, 1983, for instance, four South Korean cabinet members were killed by North Korean agents in Burma. On November 29, 1987, Korean Air 858 was exploded by two North Korean agents forty-five minutes away from Bangkok, killing all 115 passengers and crew members aboard. As Soviet Union was dissolved in 1989, ending Soviet Union's economic support to North Korea, focus of North Korean issues shifted to development of nuclear weapons in North Korea. In fact, current nuclear crisis began during 1989 when Yongbyon's nuclear facility was identified through U.S. satellite photos.On October 21, 1994, United States and North Korea concluded four months of negotiations by adopting Framework in Geneva, which called for North Korea to freeze and eventually eliminate its nuclear facilities, a process that would require dismantling three nuclear reactors, two of which were still under construction. In exchange, North Korea was promised two light-water nuclear reactors (LWRs) and annual shipments of heavy fuel oil during construction of reactors. The LWRs were arranged for construction through Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). On March 9, 1995, KEDO was formed in New York with United States, South Korea, and Japan as organization's original members. On June 1, 2006, KEDO Executive Board announced that it had formally terminated its project to build two LWRs in North Korea due to continued and extended failure of North Korea to comply with its relevant obligations under 1994 Agreed Framework. KEDO was more a political arrangement than an act of economic cooperation. We thus turn our attention to economic cooperation.Dawn of Economic CooperationAlthough trade between two Koreas began in late 1980s, first meaningful event in inter-Korean economic cooperation occurred on January 13, 1998, when Chung Ju-young, founder of Hyundai chaebol, traveled to North Korea through China and signed an agreement with North Korea on what would later be known as Mt. Kumgang tourism project. Chung's visit to North Korea was made possible by election of Kim Dae-jung as President of South Korea in December 1997.During his inaugural speech on February 25, 1998, President Kim Dae-jung announced his Sunshine Policy for dramatic improvement of inter-Korean relations, which led to President Kim winning Nobel Peace Prize in 2000. …

Purpose: This study seeks to present ways to realize tourism and unification for North and South Koreas based on the development of tourist destinations which can help link tourism to exchanges including mutual visits for the separated families of North and South Koreas, the North-South dialogue, politics, economy, culture and sports by developing tourist destinations from which politics of the two Koreas are fully excluded towards the realization of multi purposed tourism as well as the realization of mutual tourism for the two Koreans absent South Korean tourists for North Korea. Based on which, it would be possible to review, first, the development of tourist destina-tions of South Korea through which South Koreans can visit Mt. Geumgang of North Korea and North Koreans can visit tourist destinations of South Korea. Second, it would be possible to review a plan for carrying out ex-changes for the mutual visits of separated families by linking the exchanges of separated families of North and South Koreas at Mt. Geumgang of North Korea with tourist destinations of South Korea. Third, by developing tourist destinations for the purposes of tourism only which North Korea might demand, it would be possible to review alternatives for North Korea s South Korean tourist destinations in the future. Fourth, based on the afore-said, the purpose of tourism and unification may be realized and tourist exchanges may be reviewed under the premise of free travel. Methods: This study seeks to analyze changes in the tourism related conditions according to the expected changes in the North-South Korean relations and changes in tourism due to the expected changes of the North-South Korean relations via the previous data. Furthermore, through the current status of human exchanges of North Korea, the start of the North-South Korean tourism, and the performance achievements of Mt. Geumgang tourism, this study seeks to examine and understand the changes in the North-South Korean relations according to the North-South Korean summit and the tourism related feng shui storytelling intended for the North-South Korean tourism. Results: Achieving a form of tourism through the North-South Korean exchanges is the top priority. Hence, in order to achieve the purpose of feng shui tourism in the future, it would be necessary to develop the tourist destinations from which politics of North and South Koreas are completely excluded. Towards this end, it is necessary to develop a tourist program by utilizing the tomb of Kim Tae-Seo located at Mt. Moak in Jeonbuk in which the North Korean leadership expressed deep interest ever since the North-South Summit of 2000. To this end, it will be necessary to develop a program which utilizes the storytelling of tourist feng shui utilizing the simple Korean culture which goes beyond the politics, while developing tourism. Conclusion: Tourism has clear points of contact for the unification, and it will be necessary to utilize the points of contact for the North-South Korean tourism through the mutual linkage of the North-South Korean relations moving forward to achieve the purpose of tourism and expect the unification on the Korean Peninsula.

Reviewed by: Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945–1958 by Kiril Tomoff Michael Paulauskas (bio) Kiril Tomoff. Virtuosi Abroad: Soviet Music and Imperial Competition during the Early Cold War, 1945–1958. xi + 262 pp. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015. ISBN 9780801453120. In Virtuosi Abroad, Kiril Tomoff makes a significant contribution to the historiography of the cultural dimensions of the Cold War by examining the world of classical music. He argues that Soviet domination of international music competitions and successful tours of Soviet musicians in the West gave Soviet officials confidence in the inevitable victory of their system over American-style democracy and capitalism. By participating in this system, however, Soviet leaders integrated their country into the legal and economic framework of an increasingly globalized world that had been shaped primarily by the United States. This contributed to the eventual collapse of the USSR since, in the long run, the Soviet Union proved less adept than the US at navigating this system. Tomoff’s book is organized thematically into five chapters. He starts by discussing the Soviet government’s fight against William Wellman’s The Iron Curtain, perhaps the first American anti-Soviet feature film of the postwar era. Soviet legal opposition to the movie’s release crystallized around the soundtrack’s unauthorized appropriation of music by Soviet composers such as Shostakovich, Prokofiev, Khachaturian, and Miaskovsky. Surprisingly, the fight against the film was not led by Soviet officials, but rather by Western partners who were sympathetic to the Soviet Union. American leftist Helen Black, for example, led the initial fight to suppress the film in the United States and, when it failed, authored a memo that resulted in a reshaping of Soviet policy. Following Black’s advice, Soviet leaders decided to complete agreements with Western firms for the publication and distribution rights for Soviet music. This embrace of Western copyright law allowed Soviet officials to challenge The Iron Curtain in court and block its release in France, but it also meant integrating into the legal framework of American global capitalism. Tomoff then discusses Soviet participation in international music competitions after World War II. He outlines the ideological dimensions of competition with the West, the relationship between Soviet musicians and performers from satellite states, and Soviet authorities’ development of conservatory programs in Moscow to prepare musicians for competition. One of the key themes of this section is the fragmented nature of Soviet bureaucracy, with different ministries and committees colliding as they attempted to shape Soviet cultural policy, take credit for Soviet victories, and shift the blame for failures away from themselves. Tomoff also addresses the 1958 First International Tchaikovsky [End Page 257] Competition in Moscow, when American Van Cliburn took home the top prize in piano. He argues that while Americans traditionally have viewed this as a major Soviet defeat in the cultural Cold War, Soviet officials were pleased with the result, as they felt the festival was “a full-fledged demonstration that Moscow was a, perhaps the, center of a global musical culture” (112). In the eyes of Soviet leaders, people around the world would look to the USSR as the natural heir of Western musical traditions. The final chapters of the book focus on Soviet musicians’ tours of the West, particularly the United States. Tomoff centers his analysis on Soviet integration into global norms that had been set by the United States. He argues that Soviet-American musical exchanges had the effect of creating a standardized orchestral sound, with Soviet technical prowess assimilated into an American system that stressed expressiveness. Additionally, Tomoff notes that Soviet cultural authorities chose to arrange tours through Western impresarios such as Sol Hurok, rather than developing their own system, perhaps through the friendship societies that continued to operate in the West after World War II. Although this approach permitted Soviet authorities to exploit the financial resources of Western elites, it highlighted Soviet integration into the American-dominated capitalist economy of cultural production. Furthermore, it exposed Soviet artists to the “contrast between gracious American abundance and corrupt Soviet concentration of wealth” (139), as American impresarios wined and dined their Soviet guests. Soviet authorities were aware of the allure...

This paper adopts a comparative approach by focusing on a selection of early DPRK and People’s Republic of China war films made during the years that followed the Korean War. It looks into the narrative, and the aesthetics of the films in the general framework of socialist construction but also in terms of the DPRK’s shattered dream of reunification. The Korean War broke out during the beginnings of socialist construction, a time of awakening and departure into a new world. It marked the beginning of the Cold War that drew battle lines that would remain in place over the next four decades. The war also served as the theme of a number of films in both countries that reflected their war experience. For the DPRK and PRC, film provided an occasion to address the socialist construction and supremacy over the United States. While the earliest Chinese movies, The Battle of Shangganling Ridge (上甘岭 1956) and Flying in the Sky (长空比翼, 1958), focused on the heroic battles of the Chinese troops, later films such as Friendship (友谊, 1959), Raid (奇袭, 1960) and At the 38th Parallel (三八线上, 1960) recounted incidents of Chinese and Korean soldiers fighting in cooperation against the US enemy under the background of a “Resist the US and Help Korea” campaign. The eight DPRK films discussed include Again to the Front (또 다시 전선으로, 1951), Scouts (정찰병, 1953), and The Combat Unit of a Fighter Plane (비행기 사냥군조, 1953). These productions had to confront the fact that Kim Il Sung’s attempt for (forced) unification had ended in a complete failure that permeated divisions and cut family ties. The Korean War broke out during the early stages of socialist construction in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and in the People’s Republic of China (PRC), a time of awakening and departure into a new ideological world.1 It marked the beginning of the Cold War, drawing battle lines that would remain in place for the next four decades. When Chinese Volunteer troops entered the Korean War on the DPRK side, they were motivated, rather than by friendship, by a mutual enemy, the US, which the PRC feared might further invade Manchuria.2 The war became the theme of a number of films in the DPRK, and the PRC, reflecting their war experience. For the DPRK and the PRC, film was a means to address the process of socialist construction and its supremacy as a model over that of the United States. The DPRK’s films had to deal with the fact that Kim Il Sung’s attempt at (forced) unification had ended in complete failure, which permeated divisions on the Korean peninsula and cut family ties. In addition, the films were produced at a time when Kim Il Sung and the Korean Workers’ Party (KWP) sought to build North Korean society anew, in order to present the socialist system as superior to what had been before. A few years before, Mao Zedong had started to introduce socialist values among his followers during the first rectification campaign in Yan’an in 1942. However, the socialist construction period only started after the establishment of the PRC in 1949. This paper focuses on the war films made in the DPRK and the PRC during the Korean War and the years that followed it, when the Chollima movement in the DPRK (launched in 1955, in full swing by 1957), the Anti-Rightist Campaign (1957) and the Great Leap Forward (1958–1962) in the PRC, served as ideological turning points until the beginning of the 1960s.

통일 후 남북한 산업구조 재편 및 북한 성장산업 육성방안 (Ways to Reform Industrial Structure of North and South Korea and Nurture Growth Industries in North Korea after Unification)

BOOK REVIEWS133 Korean, Japanese, and Western scholarship in the subject, P'yöngyang remains a Churchillian enigma wrapped in a riddle encased in mystery. The outside world's understanding of North Korea continues to be clouded by a fog of propaganda and counterpropaganda. So, while a political scientist such as Scalapino seeks to discern, albeit cautiously, certain trends in North Korea, I, as a historian, can only cross my fingers, wait for the next event to happen, and then try to grasp its significance retrospectively. The Korean peninsula is likely to remain an exciting, if still unpredictable, political terrain for some time to come. Scalapino's lucid book does offer an urbane perspective on Korea's recent history, but it is by no means a definitive synthesis of the subject. Vipan Chandra Wheaton College The Korean Peninsula: ProspectsforArms Reduction under GlobalDetente, edited by William J. Taylor, Cha Young-koo, and John Q. Blodgett. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990. Price not given. Recent changes in global politics have provided an unprecedented opportunity for talks on arms reduction and the reunification of North and South Korea. The collapse of socialism in Eastern Europe and the consolidation of reform politics in the Soviet Union, along with the U.S. initiative for the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons, offer a valuable opportunity to resolve the dangerous and ultimately unnecessary confrontation of the two Koreas. But the relationship between North and South Korea has not kept pace with these global changes. Indeed, the Korean peninsula remains one of the most volatile potential sites of local conflict—the kind of international conflict that will characterize the new age of detente. The Cold War, unfortunately, still lingers in the peninsula. Why is this so? And how can this situation be corrected, and the chances for peace and unification enhanced? These are the questions that should be posed when we discuss "prospects for arms reduction under global detente" in the Korean context. What this book's eighteen writers, Korean and American, attempt to do is just that—well, almost. The book deals with such comprehensive issues as the new global detente and the Korean peninsula (Part 1) and the context for arms reduction (Part 2), and the more specific question of issues and prospects for arms control in Korea (Part 3). The book's main themes are as follows. First, the changing global environment is conducive to peace and arms reduction on the peninsula (see especially John Q. Blodgett's article "Conclusions and Policy Implications"). Second , in spite of this favorable climate, the North Korean leadership shows no signs of flexibility, especially in military matters (see Oh Chang Il's "Military Talks in Korea: An Overview"). Third, the governments of the United States and 134BOOK REVIEWS the Republic of Korea should therefore take the initiative in negotiations for arms reduction and peace (William J. Taylor, Jr., and Michael J. Mazarr, "The Future of ROK-U.S. Security Ties"). At the same time, ROK-U.S. relations should be changed along the lines of the new global detente (Cha Young-koo, "The Future of ROK-U.S. Military Relations"). Finally, the alliance should be alert to the possibility of military provocation by North Korea (see especially Oh Kwan-chi, "The Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula"). This reviewer's general impression is that the authors are still more or less obsessed with the Cold War confrontation between East and West: They are pessimistic about the prospects for democratic reform in the Soviet Union, and they believe that the Russians and the North Koreans are still building a military capability in Northeast Asia; that the North Korean peace and arms-reduction proposals have all been mere propaganda; that the North Korean leadership has not abandoned its prime objective of unification by force; that North Korea's military capability is superior to that of South Korea. Given the backgrounds of the authors, it is not surprising that they hold such obstinately conservative views: Among the eighteen authors, six were military officers on active duty at some point in their lifetime, and most of the others have careers in government or related institutions. On the issue of arms reduction, they undoubtedly represent...

2017년 북한의 제6차 핵실험을 끝으로 대결국면이 종결되었고 북한의 평창올림픽 참가와 특사외교는 남북화해와 대화로 전환되는 계기가 되었다. 4.27 판문점 선언과 6.12 북미회담을 통해 북핵위기는 해결국면으로 전환되고 있고 한반도는 북한의 비핵화발표와 북미실무회담, 종전선언 그리고 한반도 평화체재 구축으로 이행하고 있는 것으로 보인다. 북한은 비핵화를 통해 개혁개방을 표명하였고 베트남식 개방정책에 깊은 관심을 가지고 있는 것으로 사료된다. 문재인 대통령이 주창한 한반도 신경제지도와 신북방정책은 점차 그 실현가능성이 높아지고 있고 남․북․러, 남․북․중 간의 협력 사업에 대한 기대감도 높아지고 있다. 문재인 정부의 신북방정책은 향후 대북관계의 진전과 더불어 동북아 평화체재구축과 단일시장 건설에 기여할 것임에 틀림없어 보인다.The confrontation between North and South Korea ended with North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017 as a last move. North Korea’s participation in the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics and diplomacy involving special envoys became the opportunity to switch North- South relations to the mode of reconciliation and conversations. This year, North Korea’s nuclear arms crisis is tipping the balance toward a resolution through the Panmunjeom Declaration on April 27 and the North Korea-U.S. talks on June 12, and the Korean Peninsula appears to be fulfilling its agreements through North Korea’s announcement of denuclearization, working-level talks with the US, declaration of the end of war, and cooperation to establish a peace regime in the peninsula. North Korea professed its willingness to reform and open the country through denuclearization and appears to be deeply interested in the Vietnamese open-door policy. The feasibility of the New Economic Map of the Korean Peninsula and the New Nordpolitik, which President Moon Jae-In has advocated, is gradually increasing. Moreover, much anticipation is building for cooperative projects between South Korea, North Korea, and Russia as well as South Korea, North Korea, and China. Accordingly, the Moon Jae-In government’s New Nordpolitik will certainly contribute to the establishment of a peace regime and the creation of a single market in North Korea along with the future improvement of North-South relations.

After a year of trading colorful barbs with the American president and significant achievements in North Korea’s decades-long nuclear and missile development programs, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un declared mission accomplished in November 2017. Though Kim's pronouncement appears premature, North Korea is on the verge of being able to strike the United States with nuclear weapons. South Korea has long been in the North Korean crosshairs but worries whether the United States would defend it if North Korea holds the American homeland at risk. The largely ceremonial summit between US president Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un, and the unpredictability of both parties, has not quelled these concerns and leaves more questions than answers for the two sides' negotiators to work out. The Korean Peninsula’s security situation is an intractable conflict, raising the question, “How did we get here?” In this book, former North Korea lead foreign service officer at the US embassy in Seoul Patrick McEachern unpacks the contentious and tangled relationship between the Koreas in an approachable question-and-answer format. While North Korea is famous for its militarism and nuclear program, South Korea is best known for its economic miracle, familiar to consumers as the producer of Samsung smartphones, Hyundai cars, and even K-pop music and K-beauty. Why have the two Koreas developed politically and economically in such radically different ways? What are the origins of a divided Korean Peninsula? Who rules the two Koreas? How have three generations of the authoritarian Kim dictatorship shaped North Korea? What is the history of North-South relations? Why does the North Korean government develop nuclear weapons? How do powers such as Japan, China, and Russia fit into the mix? What is it like to live in North and South Korea? This book tackles these broad topics and many more to explain what everyone needs to know about South and North Korea.

Introduction

North Korea is actively utilizing the SDGs as a means to emphasize the unfairness and contradictions of the U.S. and other U.N. sanctions, saying that they are hindering peace-making and global partnerships, including the promotion of the SDGs and development cooperation, and to inform the international community that they are threatening North Korea's survival in non-political areas such as energy, food, water and sanitation, and the climate crisis. Furthermore, by actively embracing the UN SDGs, the DPRK is emphasizing its image as a ‘normal country’ and a ‘moderate country’ by accepting universal norms and values of the international community, including the United Nations, and cooperating with the international community, and recognizing the SDGs as a key means to attract development cooperation from the international community. In other words, the DPRK is establishing an implementation system by linking the UN SDGs to the Kim Jong-un regime's mid- and long-term national development plans, including the National Development Strategy and National Plan. Analyzing the specifics of the linkages and understanding the implications of the North Korean regime's policies can have important implications for advancing inter-Korean relations in the future. North Korea's legislative and policy responses to the implementation of the SDGs, particularly in the area of climate and environment, have so far fallen far short of the 30-year target. Nevertheless, North Korea's diplomatic diversification strategy to actively deal with the prolonged sanctions and diplomatic isolation is centered on the United Nations. North Korea's internal development strategy is also seeking a new direction, and the five-year plan for national economic development established at the 8th Party Congress in January 2021 and the new third UNSF (2022-2026) are also clarifying its intention to implement the SDGs with the international community. Among them, the renewable energy and circular economy sectors are being promoted by North Korea with a very active and urgent will to fulfill the SDGs, which is seen as a way to overcome the internal and external economic difficulties faced by North Korea. In addition, the disaster response field due to the climate crisis is being promoted by the North Korean regime with all its might. Given the need for the United Nations to include integrated SDGs on the Korean Peninsula in the new third UNSF (2022-2026), it is time for North and South Korea to work together with the United Nations to implement the SDGs, and we believe that cooperative projects in the field of climate and environment will be a key driver.

THE COMMUNIST VICTORY in Indochina has now turned American and Japanese attention to another of the divided statesKorea. The border between North and South Korea remains one of the most heavily armed borders in the world; the North-South talks which began in 1971 have bogged down in mutual recriminations and there are signs of mounting tension. The North accuses the South and the U.S. of deliberately seeking to foment tension in order to divert attention from the mounting political crisis in the South; the South, on the other hand, accuses North Korea of increased efforts at subversion and watches warily for any signs that North Korea will attempt to exploit the American defeat in Indochina. There have been three coastal incidents involving the sinking of several North Korean ships since December 1974. In this article, we want to focus on some of the factors which have determined North Korean policy in recent years and to try to make some assessment of the future options open to the North. We focus on North Korean policy not because it is the sole determinant of what will happen in the Korean peninsula during the next five to ten years-obviously the policy of South Korea and of the great powers will also affect the outcome-but simply because North Korea remains something of an enigma. While there is general agreement that North Korea pursues an independent course of action, there is much less agreement on the factors that shape its policy and even on the content of that policy itself. While some observers consider that North Korea is poised like a cat to pounce on South Korea at the earliest opportunity, others argue that South Korea is as much to blame for the lack of progress in the talks. Some observers consider North Korea to be led by inflexible, fanatical ideologues impervious to recent changes in the international environ-

IntroductionThe Korean Peninsula remains a hot spot in international security. A puzzling North Korea has turned its back on the world by its incessant pursuit of nuclear weapons, and despite recent reconciliatory developments, tension remains between the two Koreas that may erupt into military conflict at any time. One area with the greatest potential for conflict is in the West Sea near the Northern Limit Line (NLL).2 South Korea is blaming North Korea for sinking one of its navy ships in the waters near the NLL in March 2010. More recently, South and North Korea exchanged artillery fire soon after North Korea fired on Yeonpyeongdo Island, near the NLL, in November 2010. The causes of these military remain a riddle. Though the NLL is considered a major factor, it alone is not sufficient to explain what brought the two Koreas into conflict.One interpretation posits that North Korea's provocative posture is attributable to South Korea's punitive policy against North Korea. The current Lee Myung-bak government has taken a hard-line policy toward North Korea, making its North Korea policy distinguishable from the unilateral engagement policy of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun governments. The current government has emphasized reciprocity and thus has showed little tolerance against North Korea's provocations. With this shift in policy toward North Korea, fears of a new conflict with North Korea are growing. As a consequence, some critics now speak about the need to ease military tension in the Korean Peninsula by reintroducing a peace and reconciliation policy with North Korea.3 Then, it is relevant to ask whether the unilateral engagement policies of the Kim Dae-j ung and the Roh Moo-hyun governments have reduced North Korea's provocations in the West Sea.4With these concerns in mind, this paper challenges the widespread belief that conflicts of interest are reduced by interdependence, and that cooperation alone holds the answer to world problems.5 The main argument here is that North Korea's NLL violations do not rise and fall based on South Korea's engagement or containment policy toward North Korea, but rather on North Korea's need to catch more marine products. In order to support the argument of this paper, the second section evaluates the inter-Korean reconciliation process and its impact on North Korea's NLL violations. The third section analyzes why North Korea's economic crisis in the 1990s was conducive to a rise in North Korea's NLL violations. A summary and some policy implications are given in the final section.The Inter-Korean Reconciliation Process and North Korea's NLL ProvocationsThe 1953 Armistice Agreement to end the Korean War included only the landbased military demarcation line (MDL), leaving a maritime border as an unsettled question among the concerned parties, including the U.S.-led United Nations, North Korea, and China. The United Nations military forces, with superior naval and air power, felt urged to control their operations in the West and East Sea, and thus the NLL was set up in 1953 by a unilateral measure of the U.S.-led United Nations military forces. From then on, the NLL became the de facto maritime border between the two Koreas, but the cease-fire did not end military on the Korean Peninsula and in its surrounding waters.6 Arguing for the need to redraw the maritime border, North Korea has instigated numerous provocations around the waters near the NLL by kidnapping or sinking South Korean fishing boats and navy vessels.As the Cold War drew to a close in the 1980s, a turning point was reached in the relations between the two Koreas. In 1991, South and North Korea signed the InterKorean Basic Agreement-the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and North-opening a new era of inter-Korean economic cooperation. As for the NLL, the agreement provides that the decision on the maritime demarcation line is final, the nonaggression areas of the sea shall be those that have been followed by each side until the present time. …