The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and the Gulf: Will India Prefer a Further Westward Expansion of the SCO or its Consolidation?

Abstract

The admission of India and Pakistan as full members in the SCO in June 2017 is a landmark event in the evolution of Eurasian identity and its institutionalization and an event set to change the geopolitical and geo-economic patterns of the world. India, given the nature of its interests and ambitions in Asia, would have serious misgivings about any Eurasian project that would bring the Gulf and Central Asia into a single institutional framework. India is aware that at the global level, it is the weakest of the four global players, namely, the US, Russia, China, and India. In this context, India appears to be pursuing diplomacy along two parallel axes simultaneously: to balance China in the Indo-Pacific region with American support and assistance and to balance China in Eurasia with Russian support and assistance. This article also focuses on the nature of India’s bilateral relations with China, Pakistan, Russia, the US, and the EU to gauge India’s attitude toward the SCO’s further expansion westwards. While India may welcome Iran into the fold of the SCO for geo-economic reasons, it may not be too keen on Saudi Arabia and the GCC membership in the SCO. In economic terms, India may prefer a dense network of economic collaboration and cooperation activities with other states and regional entities, as the SCO looks further west, rather than absorbing them into the SCO’s fold. In security terms, India will probably try to direct the SCO efforts towards dealing with non-conventional threats like terrorism, energy security, and environmental protection rather than developing conventional military capabilities and doctrines, which could be perceived as anti-NATO.