The Secretariat-General: a Case Study in Innovation

This round of Euro-Barometer surveys focused on the current status of the European Community (EC), assessing respondents' awareness of and attitudes toward (1) the EC's activities and institutions, (2) various aspects of the Maastricht Treaty and the European Union, (3) EC policies, and (4) the European Parliament's work. A special set of questions focused on issues facing European societies, including family values and attitudes toward immigrants and people in other countries. Respondents were asked to rank their level of interest in European politics, and to indicate their level of support for the unification of Western Europe, including: (a) the degree to which they found European unification personally important, (b) whether they thought membership in the EC was a good thing, (c) whether membership would benefit their country, and (d) how they would feel if the EC were eliminated. They also rated how well they thought democracy worked in the EC and in their own country. Awareness of European institutions was measured by questions on how much respondents knew about the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Court, the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, and others. Several questions concerned the presidency of the EC's Council of Ministers, then held by Denmark. In addition, participants were asked about their knowledge of and attitudes toward the Maastricht Treaty on European Union and the proposed European Monetary Union. This section of the questionnaire explored the Maastricht Treaty's implications for national and EC control of drug traffic, crime, defense, immigration, and a number of other areas of public policy. With regard to defense policy, respondents were asked specifically whether the EC should intervene militarily in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. Opinions were obtained on the formation of a European Union with a European government responsible to the European Parliament. The Single European Market, in operation since January 1, 1993, was the topic of several questions, including whether respondents regarded the Single Market with hope or fear, and whether they had yet had any direct experience with the Single Market. In anticipation of the first general election of a European Parliament by the European Community's citizens in June 1994, the survey assessed respondents' awareness of the European Parliament, their overall impressions of its work, and opinions about its role in policymaking. Participants' intentions to vote and reasons for not voting in the upcoming election were also solicited. A special focus of this Euro-Barometer was the family, its composition and personal importance to respondents, and family values. The respective roles of mother and father in various parenting tasks were explored. The trend for grown children to stay at home longer was evaluated by respondents as good or bad for the children and the parents. Respondents assessed the priority for government policy on a number of family issues, such as infant care leave, availability of child care, availability of housing, and flexible working hours. Citizens' opinions of other European peoples and countries were sought through questions asking how much trust respondents placed in the people of various EC countries (as well as the United States, Japan, and Russia), which countries they favored becoming part of the European Community, and which citizens of other countries ought to be able to work and reside in the European Community. A number of questions concerned immigration and its effects on the European Community. Opinions were also solicited about Summer Time, a move to prolong daylight by putting clocks forward one hour from the last Sunday in March to the last Sunday in September. As in previous Euro-Barometers, questions on political party preference asked respondents which party they felt closest to, how they voted in their country's last general election, and how they would vote if a general election were held the next day. Additional information was gathered on life satisfaction, family income, number of people residing in the home, size of locality, home ownership, trade union membership, region of residence, occupation of the head of household, and the respondent's age, sex, education, religion, religiosity, subjective social class standing, socio-professional status, languages spoken, access to and use of media, left-right political self-placement, and opinion leadership.

Identifying and explaining bureaucratic centre formation within government institutions – such as the European Commission (Commission) – is essential for understanding political order and the potential and limitations for public sector governance. Benefiting from a new body of interview data this article adds two key observations: First, bureaucratic centre formation in the Commission does not profoundly penetrate the Commission as a whole. Comparing officials from the Secretariat General and DG Trade, this study suggests that bureaucratic centre formation is primarily happening within the Secretariat General and only marginally penetrating DG Trade. Two behavioural logics tend to coexist within the Commission administration, albeit embedded and layered within different organizational sub-units. Variation in bureaucratic centre formation is associated with two key variables: (i) the accumulation of relevant organizational capacities at the bureaucratic centre, and (ii) the vertical and horizontal specialization of the Commission administration. Third, these findings hold when ‘controlling for’ recent managerial reforms inside the Commission. The article illustrates that despite recent Commission reforms, some core behavioural logics among Commission officials are not profoundly transformed. Points for practitioners The administration of the European Commission is seen as increasingly steered from the executive centre – that is from the President and the Secretariat General. This study, however, makes two main observations: First, it shows that the strengthening of the executive centre inside the Commission administration (the Secretariat General) is not echoed throughout the services of the Commission. The ambition to make the Secretariat General the service centre for the Commission President is currently not greatly penetrating and transforming the everyday activities of the Directors General (DGs). Second, the study shows that despite historic administrative reforms of the Commission, the everyday behaviour of Commission officials remains basically unaffected.

This article studies the perception of the EU Commission's Secretariat General in policy‐making. Recently, research on EU institutions devotes increasing attention to analyzing structures and procedures of decision‐making in EU institutions, most notably the EU Commission. Conventionally, the EU Commission is portrayed as a fragmented organization, divided along the lines of staff nationality, sectoral responsibilities and cabinets and General Directorates (DGs). The Secretariat General has long been viewed a weak actor that is hardly able or motivated to steer internal decision‐making. However, recent research indicates a changing role of the Secretariat General as a pro‐active broker and last arbiter. This article studies how the Secretariat General is perceived by the DGs in policy coordination and argues that this perception depends on the pattern of political authority, bureaucratic roles and the relevance and the alternatives prevailing in the policy field. The article is based on data from a survey among Commission officials.

In this article, we study spillovers in political trust between the national parliaments of 15 Member States and the European Commission, the European Parliament and the European Central Bank in the period 2000–2015. We show that in most instances spillovers between the national parliaments and the European Commission and the European Parliament are bidirectional, asymmetric, and change over time and place. A corollary of these findings is that simultaneously achieving high level of trust in institutions at different levels of governance may require a deeper understanding of the complex inter-institutional relationships that exist in the EU multilevel governance setting.

The European Commission is a latecomer to administrative reform. Virtually alone among public administrations, it was untouched by the tide of management reforms that were a feature of the 1980s and early 1990s. Although modest attempts at modernisation were undertaken by the Santer Commission, these were limited, fragmentary and partially successful at best (Pollitt and Bourkaert, 2000; Stevens and Stevens, 2001). Since 1999, however, the Commission has adopted a far-reaching reform programme that, in relation to that body's size, tasks and responsibilities, is more comprehensive and radical than that undertaken by any other administration (Kassim, 2004). This article puts the reform programme implemented under the Prodi Commission into historical perspective. It argues, first, that only by approaching the Commission as an international organisation is it possible to explain both why reform failed to feature on its agenda for so long (see Siotis, 1965; Michelmann 1978; Claude 1971), and why the situation changed in 1999. It contends, second, that, though externally imposed and with elements prescribed by an outside body, the reform represents a significant achievement on the part of the Commission and, in particular, the reform Vice President, Neil Kinnock. The feat is all the more remarkable given the complexity of the EU's institutional environment and the short timescale within which the reform package was formulated and adopted. The article identifies problems, actual and potential, that may affect the ultimate success of the reform - a third aim. Finally, it contends that, in contrast to administrative reform at the national level (see Pollitt and Bourkeaert, 2000, p.6), there is little political capital to be made from Commission reform. The article is organised into four sections. The first discusses the non-occurrence of Commission reform for four decades after 1958. The second looks at the circumstances that brought about the Kinnock reforms, outlining the part played by the European Parliament and the European Council. The third examines the content of the reform programme and the nature of the reform strategy devised by the reform Vice President, focusing on how Kinnock sought to assert ownership over the reform, while at the same time using the opportunity to implement a full-scale modernisation programme. Potential difficulties are highlighted in the fourth.

A work/product of a state institution is one of the elements of cultural wealth that should be preserved and handled properly. This is done so that the historical value and information contained can be passed on to the next young generation. For this reason, the Library of the Parliament of Indonesia as a special library of The House of Representatives of the Republic of Indonesia (DPR RI), seeks to carry out its role as a collector/deposit of products of the DPR RI, the Secretariat General and the Expertise Body of the Indonesian House of Representatives (Secretariat General and BK DPR RI), by building a Repository DPR. However, in the development of the Repository DPR, the library faces obstacles in adding the number of product that can be included in the Repository DPR. The purpose of this paper is how to provide information and build awareness of the importance of the Repository DPR to the DPR RI, Secretariat General and BK DPR RI. The method used in this paper is a description of case studies and reference studies on the implementation of the Regulation of Secretariat General of DPR RI Number 11 of 2017 concerning Repository DPR. The type and source of data used are a brief report on Repository development activities.

Analysis of EU law making is made difficult by the presence of multiple legislative procedures. Matters are further complicated by neither national nor postnational models of democracy providing convincing answers as to when EU law making is democratic. This grants EU law making a democratic ambiguity. It is committed to democracy and has democratic features, but not sufficiently to convince the Union’s citizens of its democratic authority. The scepticism generated by this is itself valuable. Democratic ambiguity generates further positive features within all EU legislative procedures: the possibility of triple review by different institutional actors—the European Parliament, national governments, and national parliaments. This is unparalleled but compromised by other features of EU law making: first, the lack of compass to indicate when it is democratic for the Union to legislate, and second, democratic fluidity, the presence of informal processes that serve to bypass and undermine this triple review.

The financial crisis has affected trust in national and European governmental institutions in different ways. This contribution analyses the determinants of trust in the national and European institutions over the last decade and comes to the conclusion that inflation reduces citizens’ trust only when the economy runs smoothly. In times of crisis, citizens do not worry about inflation but rather about jobs and the effects of a recession. Declining trust in national governments is related to an increase in unemployment in the EU-15 in all time periods, whereas trust in the European Commission and the European Parliament seems to be strongly associated with the situation in the real economy (unemployment and growth of GDP per capita) only in times of crisis. Yet in the EU-27, falling levels of trust in the national and European governmental institutions during times of crisis seem to be primarily related to an increase in government debt. In an EU-15 country sample, this negative relationship appears to be driven by countries that owe a larger share of their increase in government debt to aiding/bailing out their financial sectors and the implementation of significant austerity measures.

This study examines the organizational readiness of the Secretariat General of the House of Representatives of Indonesia in adapting to the challenges posed by open government and open parliament initiatives. The main issue addressed is the lack of synchronization between government openness policies and parliamentary openness efforts in Indonesia. The objective of this research is to explore possible future scenarios for the Secretariat General through scenario planning, a method that provides a strategic framework to navigate uncertain and complex environments. The research utilizes the TAIDA framework (Tracking, Analyzing, Imaging, Deciding, and Acting) to identify key drivers of change and map out potential futures. The results suggest four possible scenarios ranging from a fully aligned, innovative, and efficient Secretariat General to one that lags behind in adapting to these changes. The implications of this study are significant for policymakers, providing strategic insights into how the Secretariat General can improve organizational readiness, enhance public participation, and strengthen governance transparency to align with global trends of openness. These findings offer a roadmap for strengthening Indonesia’s parliamentary system and its commitment to open governance

In 1999, one US university alone spent US$ 760 000 on lobbying politicians for funding to improve its science facilities. Boston University was criticised when it contracted a professional lobbying agency, Cassidy & Associates, to do the ‘dirty’ work. And that is how it would be considered in the medieval world of European science politics. Welcome to the arcane, unintuitive and dimly lit labyrinth of the European Commission (EC). While some wander the narrow passageways with no more than a tallow torch to light their way, eventually joining the dusty skeletons, others seem to be friends with its keepers, and know the passwords to the secret rooms. Many scientists lament their lack of influence in the EC, and spend years knocking on closed doors; others have rapid success. Two factors appear to play a critical role: how big you are, and who your friends are. Size is important; a scientific organisation that represents a large number of members is more attractive to the EC than an individual voice. But to be effective it must speak with a single voice. Furthermore, basic researchers must become immersed in the economic and social implications of their research, and, most importantly, follow the tracks laid out by the EC. This is one side to the Commission. The other is a culture shrouded in mystery, and completely impenetrable to all but the initiated; a world that works on long established, trusted contacts, and a code of respect and honour. It has even been likened to the honour‐bound way of the Samurai. > Industry platforms span the twilight zone between a spark of genius in a scientist's mind, and a development of socio‐economic importance But let us start with size. Where academic organisations have fallen far behind in the race to the EC's ears, relative newcomers, such …

The EU Response to COVID-19: From Reactive Policies to Strategic Decision-Making.

Under Protocol No. 2 on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, national Parliaments have been granted participation in EU law-making through the Early Warning System (EWS). Within the framework of this mechanism, national chambers can evaluate EU legislative proposals on subsidiarity grounds, within an eight-week period, following their submission by the European Commission. The contribution of the National Parliaments Representatives at the European Parliament (or the liaison officers) is crucial for the national chambers to follow up on the Union agenda and participate in EU affairs. This study offers novel data that were collected through a questionnaire administered to the liaison officers in 2022. In brief, these transnational practitioners tend to express scepticism with regard to the EWS and its eventual reform, and at the same time, they would welcome an enhancement of the much broader “political dialogue” between the European Commission and national Parliaments.

Zsuzsanna Jakab: WHO's Regional Director for Europe

An increasing number of international research and governmental institutions are challenging several gene patents, arguing that the patent holders’ absolute control of diagnostic methods is not in the public's best interests. Most notably, the Institut Curie, a cancer research centre in Paris, is leading the fight against Myriad Genetics, a US biotechnology company that plans to install a monopoly on all genetic work associated with the breast and ovarian cancer predisposition gene brca1 . The critics of Myriad's wide‐ranging patent rights maintain that the company's absolute control not only prohibits further research on the diagnosis of and therapies against breast cancer, but also has a detrimental effect on public health. Physician examining mammographs. ![][1] > Critics of Myriad's wide‐ranging patent rights maintain that it not only prohibits further research on diagnostics and therapies but also has a detrimental effect on public health Since the European Commission adopted a directive allowing human genes to be patented in July 1998, many such patents have been granted and indeed challenged, including the battles over the insulin, relaxin and hematopoietin genes. In 2001, seven years after Myriad Genetics first identified the sequence of brca1 , the European Patent Office (EPO) granted the company three patents covering all potential diagnostic and therapeutic applications based on the gene's sequence. Several European research centres and associations quickly contested the first two patents in an attempt to fight Myriad's monopoly. More recently, in August 2002, the Institut Curie, the Institut Gustave‐Roussy, the Assistance‐Publique‐Hopitaux de Paris together with almost all European genetics societies and many scientific institutions and governments turned up the heat and filed a joint opposition notice to the third patent. As this protects the isolated gene and the corresponding protein, and includes all imaginable future therapeutic uses, such as gene therapy and screening of drugs or transgenic animals, … [1]: /embed/graphic-1.gif

Adopted on 3rd February 2021, Europe's Beating Cancer Plan aims to reduce the cancer burden for patients, their families and health systems, and is a major strategic priority of the European Commission in its present mandate. The Cancer Plan commits to updating the European Code Against Cancer and includes the objective of making “at least 80% of the population aware of the Code by 2025”. In order to measure progress towards and attainment of this goal, metrics and tools at European level would be needed. Possible options include, but are not limited to, the “Eurobarometer”. Since 1973, the European institutions commission regular public opinion surveys in all EU Member States. The European Commission's Eurobarometer Surveys is a series of multi-topic, pan-European surveys covering attitudes towards policies, economy, and health, among other topics. It comprises survey series or instruments such as the Standard Eurobarometer (regular face-to-face interviews with approximately 1,000 subjects in each Member State), the Special Eurobarometer (in-depth thematic studies relevant to the activities of the European institutions) or the Flash Eurobarometer (ad-hoc thematic surveys carried out within a short timespan), among others. Some of these options may provide a suitable tool to standardize and measure awareness and perceptions on cancer risk factors in a valid and reliable way, as well as the corresponding cancer preventive measures, and the European Code against Cancer itself, in the European population overtime. However, developments arising from the Cancer Plan, such as the recently established Knowledge Centre for Cancer of the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission, may offer more a suitable, continuous process. This brief presentation will prepare the audience for an interactive discussion on the pragmatic challenges and opportunities that lie ahead for the monitoring and evaluation of the European Code against Cancer.