The Sanctions-Era Roots of Postinvasion Developments

Abstract

This chapter discusses the extent to which recent Iraqi history can explain the rise of religious actors and sectarian politics after the US-led invasion in 2003. It focuses on the alleged weakness of the Iraqi state under sanctions, Saddam Hussein's Faith Campaign, and the nature of the authority that Shiʻi and Sunni clerics held before the invasion. In the 1990s, the Baʻth's support for loyal tribal leaders increased, and many sheikhs saw their status elevated as they were brought into state patronage networks through personal relations with Saddam, security agencies, or party offices. The chapter looks at the clerical structure of Shiʻi Islam in Iraq. From 1923 to 2003, the dominant characteristic of Shiʻi religious authorities in Iraq was quietism, which broadly meant serving as an authority on traditional religious issues and avoiding involvement in political affairs. The chapter also considers Ali Sistani's gradual consolidation of the marjaʻiyya, as well as the Baʻth regime's tight regulation of the training, licensing, and placement of Sunni clerics. Sunni clerical networks were new, relatively flat, deeply connected to the state, and based on interpersonal ties and a shared ideology rooted in a Baʻthist interpretation of Islam and Arab nationalism.