Abstract
Putin's January 2001 ratified military development program is not a major breakthrough in the long overdue effort to reform Russia's excessive military organization, and to tame the swollen shadow armies, in particular. It is a policy without a strategy. Over a year after the Kursk tragedy, the Russian military is more dissatisfied than ever. Putin's military development plan confirms what servicemen have feared all along: dramatic personnel cuts and painful restructuring are inevitable, and with them severe economic and social dislocation and homelessness. Putin, nevertheless, represents a step forward in the military development process. During the past year, he has demonstrated newfound presidential will, and has broken the political logjam that has stalled military development in recent years. This is a hopeful sign.
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