The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

Abstract

AbstractThe rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case‐law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case‐law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three‐dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in‐depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case‐law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.