The Role of the Independent Political Executive in State Governance: Stability in the Face of Change

Abstract

The First Report of the National Commission on the State and Local Public Service (Winter, 1993) argued that fragmentation of authority among a number of political actors denies governors the opportunity to lead effectively. In 1995, a symposium--Should Chief Executives Be Strengthened? Themes from the Winter Commission Report?--continued the dialogue about ongoing to strengthen the institutional foundations and formal authority of governors (Thompson, 1995). Thompson suggests that fragmented power at the state level makes it difficult for governors to formulate and implement coherent, plausible policy. Since the short ballot movement, emphasis in public administration has been on reducing the number of independently elected and appointed officials in state government (Newland, 1995). In spite of this emphasis on centralization, the number of separately and popularly elected state officials has changed little since the 1950s. In 1955 there were 515 such officials, and in 1981 and 1994 there were 511 (Beyle, 1995). Reflecting on this data, Beyle suggests that efforts to have fewer popularly elected officials result in an irreducible minimum (21). Inspite of at centralization, a large number of independently elected and appointed officials maintain extensive authority in state governments. American public administration theory and research have traditionally failed to deal much with the normative political dimensions of appointed and elected state executive government positions below the governor. As Thompson notes, critical empirical and narrative issues about executive leadership at the state and local levels remain to be tackled (1995, 8). The research presented in this article is an effort to address this omission of political analysis in public administration by answering the question, What is the role of the independent political executive in the governance process of one state? state executives are defined as officials who are either selected in statewide elections, appointed by the governor for a specified term, or appointed by another body such as a commission. These officials have oversight responsibility for a state governmental agency. Independent does not mean that these individuals do not support or work with the governor, but rather that their ability to retain their position within state government is not dependent upon such support. This definition excludes the governor's cabinet and staff as well as other positions that arc directly appointed by and can be removed by a governor. This definition also excludes top civil service positions. These positions are excluded because they arc obtained through a merit-based system rather than the political system. This article presents a brief overview of four case studies from one western state--Wyoming. Given Wyoming's small size, it is easy to argue that the findings of this research are not generalizable. Since every state is unique and, as Kotter and Lawrence (1974) note, context is important, no effort will be made to argue in this paper that specifics are applicable elsewhere. Rather, this research focuses on the governance process and the role of the political executive in this process. The goal of the research is to provide insight into Moe's political tier (1990) where political struggles occur. This research demonstrates that state political executives play a somewhat different role from federal political executives because of their number and longevity (Heclo, 1977; Wilson, 1989; Thompson, 1993a, 1993b, 1995; Roberts, 1993; Winter, 1993). The second theme of the article is that dispersion of authority accounts, in part, for the responsiveness, innovation, and other distinctive governmental features which have made states the focal points for governmental changes in the 1990s. During the last part of the twentieth century, Americans have come to trust state government more than the federal government. …