Abstract
This paper compares the strategic and technical debate about the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to the ABM debate of 1968–1972. One major difference is the commitment of the President to support SDI; those who apparently influenced the President on this matter came from outside the ranks of his usual military and diplomatic advisers. In Congress, science advisers are less influential now than they were in the past, due to the strengthening of Congressional staffs and agencies, the growth of scientific interest groups, and the dimished novelty of their appearances in Congress. In light of the history of the ABM, the US should be careful to ensure that the financial and technical commitments to SDI do not automatically imply a commitment to deploy a strategic defense system.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
