The risks of taking journalists for a ride during the Anglo-Irish War

The burning of the city of Cork on the night of 11-12 December 1920 —a “truly staggering reprisal” — was one of many outrageous acts by British forces in Ireland in the late autumn of 1920 and indeed during the entire Anglo-Irish War. Known in Ireland at the time as “the troubles” and in Éire today as “the war of independence,” or “the war of liberation,” the Anglo-Irish War lasted two-and-one-half years from January, 1919, until the truce in July, 1921. Not only did that struggle mark the end of 750 years of Irish subjection under Britain; it served as a warning of the eventual collapse of British and Western imperialism throughout the world.Throughout the first eight months of 1919 the British government's policy was simply military suppression of the Republican Movement. Repeatedly, it misjudged Sinn Féin and the rising Irish Republican Army (I.R.A.) as nothing but a “murder gang” terrorizing the mass of the Irish people. Not until the Fall of 1919 did Lloyd George finally conceive a policy — one combining force with appeasement. The latter was offered to Ireland in the Fourth Home Rule Bill though it was to be rejected by a majority of the Irish press and people. From the fall of 1919 until the summer of 1920, Lloyd George stepped up coercion, not only by strengthening the military, but by introducing “Black and Tans” into the Irish police force and establishing a new administration at Dublin Castle in the spring of 1920.When, in late July, 1920, it became evident to the British cabinet that police action was losing to the I.R.A.'s guerilla tactics, they broadened the struggle even further by choosing, not appeasement along Dominion lines, but a policy of war. Though never officially declared, war was first implemented under the guise of restoring order in Ireland and later by martial law. Accompanying Lloyd George's war policy between the summers of 1920 and 1921 were systematic reprisals against Irish civilians and their property by British forces retaliating for the I.R.A.'s killing of their own men. These reprisals, which became official and regulated under martial law in 1921, were unauthorized — although not officially condemned — in 1919 and 1920. Unauthorized reprisals reached a peak in the fall of 1920 at Balbriggan, Groke Park, and in the burning of Cork.

THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMYʼS «GREEN BOOK»: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC GOALS OF THE ORGANIZATION

Forest and climate issues are prominent within the policies and media in Bangladesh, as well as on the global level. In this study, media discourses from 1989 to 2010 from the “International Herald Tribune” and “The Daily Ittefaq” ofBangladeshare analyzed. Quantitative content analysis classifies 16 frames of the forest and climate issue and 17 political actors. Substantial differences between the forest and climate discourses of the national and international media have been discovered. The national print media reports that the forest is in a crisis due to climate change, whereas the international print media describes the forest as a solution opportunity to climate change. The hypothesis that the international media drives the national media discourse is rejected. The national media forest and climate discourse in Bangladesh began five years earlier than in the international media, and the different framing of the forest and climate issues can be explained by the influence of strong actors on both the national and international level. Journalists and politicians are the strongest influences in the national print media (The Daily Ittefaq) and primarily frame the discussion around the adverse impact of climate change on the forest inBangladesh, a country that faces potentially severe effects from climate change. By stressing that climate change has caused a forest crisis, the national media brings attention to a threat that they are not responsible for. Scientists, Non-Governmental Organizations and international organizations are the major voices in the international print media (International Herald Tribune). They shape the global forest and climate media discourse around the wider scope of forests’ role in climate change. International scientists and NGOs present themselves as problem solvers of climate change by framing the discussion around the mitigating role of the forests. These strategic arguments explain the differences in media discourse.

The Anglo-Irish War of 1919–21, the first modern guerrilla war, offers many lessons relevant to today's counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. The Irish Republican Army (IRA), and de facto IRA commander-in-chief Michael Collins in particular, conducted a highly effective insurgent struggle against a British opponent lacking a coherent COIN strategy. For reasons discussed herein, however, the British government eventually was able to obtain an agreement that ended the war and protected its most vital strategic interests while nonetheless still permitting the creation of an Irish Free State. This study examines the character of Anglo-Irish War and draws a series of twenty-eight lessons from that conflict. The British dilemma: Whatever we do we are sure to be wrong. (General Sir Nevil Macready, Commander-in-Chief Ireland [GOC in C], 21 April, 1920). 1

Chapter 2 analyses the evolution of events in Ireland in the immediate post-war period, 1919–20. It considers the hierarchy of the British government’s agenda following the Armistice and the growth of the republican movement under Sinn Féin. During this period, the press and British government reconsidered the Irish question in the context of the Irish War of Independence (or Anglo-Irish War), which involved a guerrilla war between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and British Crown security forces. Here, concerns of global opinion were recognised as violence and the fear of more violence took precedence in press coverage. At this time, some within the press suggested a federal status solution along with calls for a dominion-type solution as the fourth Home Rule Bill made its way through Parliament.

This chapter explores the year between the Truce and ceasefire between the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the British forces in July 1921 and the outbreak of civil war in June 1922. First, it will examine non-lethal breaches of the terms of the Truce by the IRA and the reaction of Crown forces, highlighting a conflict between the political necessities of the Truce and the behaviour of local IRA units and civilians on the ground. Secondly, it will interrogate the nature of suspicion and the labelling of civilians at this time through a study of extant intelligence reports compiled by the IRA in early 1922. It will be seen that production of these files, and the IRA’s intelligence war more generally, was a product of the communities in which it was conducted and personal traits or labels that would have been well known in an everyday context were produced as evidence of suspicion. This idea will be expanded upon in the final section of the chapter as it takes a broader approach to civilian defiance and IRA punishment by dealing with the experiences of and perceptions towards specific minority groups, including Protestants, loyalists, and disbanded policemen.

Between 1969 and 1997, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) fought against British rule in Northern Ireland. Some scholars suggest Republicans saw the IRA as vital to achieving Irish unification. They argue that the IRA only ended their campaign because the organisation faced a trajectory of decline by the 1990s. Others agree that the IRA was utilised by Republicans to achieve unity but conclude that the IRA faced a stalemate by the 1990s and accepted a political compromise. Using a range of sources, I argue Irish Republican leaders viewed the IRA always as a tactic to get its opponents to negotiate and provide concessions towards its objectives, most crucially securing the principle of all-Ireland self-determination in some form. The IRA’s role in Republican strategy fluctuated in importance. Between 1969 and 1975, it was the main method used to try to get Republicans into talks and to try to achieve self-determination. After 1975, Republican leaders still believed the IRA was required to pressurise the British Government back into negotiations. But a political mandate was added to ensure their opponents would agree to and implement a political settlement inclusive of the principle of self-determination once IRA violence ceased. This “Armalite and Ballot Box” strategy lasted until 1997. I also demonstrate how recent archival releases show the IRA’s weapons remained in the background until 2005 in case the British Government and Unionists delayed implementing reforms agreed in the peace deal. During the IRA’s 1994 ceasefire, they discussed “TUAS”. Some commentators believe it meant the “Tactical Use of Armed Struggle”. This phrase best explains the IRA’s role in Republican strategy from 1969 to 2005. This case study reveals a pragmatism behind the leadership of some non-state armed groups.

The signing of the contentious Anglo-Irish Treaty in 1921 was a traumatic experience for many Irish people. This is not only because of the ensuing Irish Civil War, but the psychological adjustments that the Irish people have to make in their partitioned land. Since the Irish Republican Army (IRA) emerged during the Anglo-Irish War (1919-21), it has been bent on terminating the British government’s control of Ireland and establishing a truly independent and unified Irish Republic through armed struggles. This traumatic history, which was embedded with the conflicts and compromises of such struggles, became a pivotal issue in many Irish writings. As a consequence, it helped shape subsequent Irish literature and culture when the dream of a free and unified Ireland was constantly recalled and reconfigured. These painful markings are reflected in complex ways in Edna O’Brien’s fiction House of Splendid Isolation (1994), in which an IRA fugitive named McGreevy holes up and finally bonds with Josie O’Meara, an aged widow, in a dilapidated house. Apart from the political turmoil, considerable anguishes caused by love and marriage converge to entangle the protagonists’ traumas. This paper focuses on how, by shifting between the multifarious narrative perspectives, O’Brien’s House of Splendid Isolation stitches the interwoven personal, interpersonal, and national suffering together. In addition, the role women play in facilitating sympathetic understanding and reconciliation amid the violence and traumas in contemporary Ireland is discussed. The findings imply that, despite the age-old traumatic experiences caused by political conflicts in Ireland in the past few centuries, a trauma-free tomorrow via love and reconciliation, mostly with the help of women, is possible in contemporary Ireland.

The precise rationale for, and timing of, the Northern Ireland peace process of the 1990s and beyond, which developed after more than two decades of conflict, has yet to be fully explained. It has been a common assumption that it arose from a stalemate involving the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the ‘regular’ pro‐state forces of the British Army and Royal Ulster Constabulary and the ‘irregular/ultra’ pro‐state loyalist paramilitary groups of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) and Ulster Defence Association (UDA). Under this interpretation, military/paramilitary deadlock led to ripeness for peace, amid reappraisals by all parties to the conflict of the utility of violence accompanied by reinterpretations of earlier political orthodoxies. The IRA could not remove the British sovereign claim to Northern Ireland; British forces could not militarily defeat the IRA and loyalists and republicans were engaged in a futile inter‐communal sectarian war. This stalemate thesis has obvious attraction in explaining why a seemingly intractable war finally subsided, but is less convincing when subject to empirical testing among republican and loyalist participants in the conflict. This article moves away from ‘top‐down’ generalist narratives of the onset of peace, which tend to argue the stalemate thesis, to assess ‘bottom‐up’ interpretations from the actual combatants as to why they ceased fighting. It suggests an asymmetry, rather than mutuality, of perception that there was ‘military’ cessation by the armed non‐state groups, with neither republican nor loyalist interpretations grounded in notions of stalemate. The article concludes by urging a wider consideration of the important and persistent interplay of the military and political in conflicts such as Northern Ireland.

The centrality of media amid society has been interrupted by gigantic impact of the internet nowadays. Departing from Lippman’s proposition, the foundation of agenda-setting theory with ecological online sphere consideration, and Galtung’s and devotees’ thought about international media works this research comparing national and international media Jakarta’s image as the capital city of Indonesia. Nevertheless, this essential topic seems neglected by previous research. This study used post-positivism paradigm, mixed-data with content analysis method, online observation. The sample of news taken randomly from the significant media according to pressgazette.co.uk for international media (6 media of 50), for Indonesia media was 4 of top 10 media. The selected news portal observed. The displayed news collected, structured, afterward analyzed systematically, objectively, from the title, paragraph, to the picture if any. The data shows both national and international media frame Jakarta’s image differently. International media portray Jakarta in negative way which is in line with Galtung’s and his devotee’s argument, appears as the third world country, framed with the negative attributes and tones as the most polluted city, sinking city, even dangerous city as the residence, workspace, and others. While major national media present Jakarta favorably as the central of national bustles in economy, business, education, and so forth, except one media reported Jakarta in deleterious way. This means the image of thing (capital city) related tightly to the interests or determining factors of media, while international media more complex layers than national media.

ABSTRACTThis article examines how media framed the deadly stampede that killed several dozen people gathered to celebrate a festival in Ethiopia. News articles published by 14 national media (N=21) and 116 international media (N=117) on October 2 and 3, 2016 were collected and comparative content analysis was carried out between April and May 2017. Conflict, attribution of responsibility and political consequences frames dominated the coverage. The differences observed in the use of conflict, responsibility and morality frames by national and international media were statistically significant. The differences in the appearance of political consequences and human-interest frames in national and international media were not statistically significant. In terms of coverage pattern, the themes of headlines of almost all the news articles published on the first day after the incident focused on deaths of people whereas the second day headlines diverged to deaths, mourning, unrest that followed, and other issues as the media found additional facts to organise strong and compelling frames to influence the audience. Based on the findings, this article generalises that national and international media cover the same disaster from different perspectives—national media promote national interest whereas international media emphasise conflict.

21 November 1920 began with the killing of fourteen men in their flats, boarding houses, and hotel rooms in Dublin. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) alleged that they were British spies. That afternoon British forces retaliated by firing on a crowd of supporters at a Gaelic football match in Croke Park, killing twelve and injuring sixty. The day quickly became known as Bloody Sunday. Much has been made of the afternoon's events. The shootings in Croke Park have acquired legendary status. Concern with the morning's killing has been largely limited to whether or not the dead men were the spies the IRA said they were. There has been little or no consideration of the men who did the killing. This article is based on largely unused interviews and statements made by the IRA men involved in this and many of the other days that came to constitute the guerrilla war fought against the British forces in Ireland from January 1919 until July 1921. This morning's killings are a chilling example of much of what passed for combat during this struggle. Bloody Sunday morning is used here as a means to explore how generally young and untrained IRA men killed and how this type of killing affected their lives.

The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.

British colonial policing dramatically evolved between 1920 and 1948. This time period represents the duration of the Anglo-Irish War, as well as British control of the Palestine Mandate. It was during the period that the security forces at work within these areas grew to combat similar nationalist populations. During the Anglo-Irish War in 1919 the security forces in Ireland found themselves unable to quell the rebellion of Irish nationalists. To supplement their inadequate numbers the Royal Irish Constabulary took on and trained large numbers of World War I veterans who were in desperate need of work. These men came to be known as the infamous 'Black and Tans'. They quickly earned a reputation for using violent tactics when dealing with the Irish Republican Army. Following the resolution of the Anglo-Irish War, many of these men were left with few employment options until the Empire came calling again. This time they were called upon to police the newly formed mandate in Palestine. A large portion of the Royal Irish Constabulary, as well as the Black and Tans immediately signed up to forge the British Gendarmerie in Palestine. This unit helped to keep the peace during years of heavy Jewish immigration into the Holy Land until 1926 when it was absorbed into the Palestine Police. Many of the same men who had started their career in Ireland continued into the Gendarmerie and further into the Palestine Police until the Mandate ended in 1948. During the 1930s and 1940s the Palestine Police at first were able to effectively police the population of the Mandate, but ultimately were unsuccessful in combating the forces of Jewish nationalism and Jewish terrorism. This study is supported by primary sources including administrative reports, commissions, personal diaries, personal correspondence, oral histories and memoirs. Further, it consults a wide range of secondary literature.

On 31 August 1994, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) announced a ceasefire. Over the previous two-and-a-half decades, it had waged western Europe’s most lethal and enduring insurgency, claiming the lives of over 1,700 people. The IRA’s ‘armed struggle’ had been a key driver of ‘the Troubles’ that beset Northern Ireland; its decision to end the campaign of violence was likewise integral to an emergent peace process. Almost from the moment it was declared, commentators and historians have debated the IRA ceasefire. Why did it happen? What did it mean? Which side had blinked first in the long war between the British government and the IRA? In seeking to answer such questions, an emerging trend within the historiography aims to advance an understanding of the conflict that foregrounds IRA flexibility, as juxtaposed to British intransigence. On this reading, it was the British refusal to engage in dialogue and offer the IRA an ‘honourable’ settlement that prevented a peaceful resolution as far back as the early 1970s; conversely, it was the British decision to shift course in the late 1980s that paved the way for peace. The problem, however, is that such a narrative represents a fundamental misreading of what happened. For this reason, the present article examines several recent, important contributions to the literature on the IRA and the peace process, as part of an effort to revisit the question of why it was that the IRA decided eventually to end its self-declared ‘long war’.